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ABSTRACT 
In response to energy policies and technological innovation, electricity systems 
are becoming more integrated and interdependent. In the Western United States, the 
creation of an energy imbalance market (EIM) is a significant move towards electricity 
grid integration. The question of how to govern this newly forming market has been 
deliberated in multiple decision-making venues. Through these deliberations, 
stakeholders engaged in the process of policy implementation and shaped the structure of 
the EIM as a policy intervention. To understand how this initiative unfolded and why this 
effort succeeded where others failed, this research explores policy implementation as the 
outcome of the social negotiation of authority. To accomplish this, this research combines 
policy implementation, boundary work, and field theories and develops an empirical 
investigation of how actors reconciled multiple and often conflicting authorities to enact 
policy change. This study asks how actors, using social practices and strategies, created 
and legitimated sources of authority to establish a governing body for this new market 
service. This case study relied on qualitative methods, including document review, 
participant interviews, systematic observation of decision-making in context, detailed 
observation fieldnotes, and the self-reflexive awareness of the role of the researcher. The 
dissertation demonstrates that: 1) dominant yet deficient narratives provided a rationale 
for ongoing resistance to regional governance in the West and prevented collaboration; 2) 
actors overcame and transformed deficient sources of authority by enacting social 
strategies that allowed alternative interpretations of the EIM construct and enabled 
 viii 
organizations to begin collaboration; 3) actors using social negotiation interpreted and 
adjusted the EIM policy intervention and co-created emergent forms of authority that are 
flexible and dynamic; and 4) field interdependencies surfaced taken-for-granted 
assumptions and provided critical resources for innovative forms of collective action. The 
implications of these findings highlight the importance of the social negotiation of 
authority in energy policy implementation. Specifically, the research makes several 
theoretical and practical contributions: 1) multi-organizational policy implementation is a 
social process of transforming, negotiating, and co-creating authority, and relational 
authority can be an important rationale for enacted practices; 2) strategic actors engage in 
communicative and social processes in which authority is emergent and abstraction 
enables collective action without requiring consensus; 3) routine field interdependencies 
can bring attention to taken-for-granted assumptions and create a moment of co-
authoring; and 4) regional electricity system governance structures evolve as they balance 
the inherent tensions of organized market participation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Electricity systems around the world are becoming more integrated and 
interdependent. Complex networks of infrastructure, markets, and regional governance 
manage systems that provide real-time balancing of electricity supply and demand. In 
most of North America, Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) manage the 
wholesale electricity system. However, the electricity system in the Western United 
States has remained relatively decentralized (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015). 
The seating of the Energy Imbalance Market Governing Body in the summer of 
2016 marked a significant move towards electricity grid integration in the West. The 
energy imbalance market (EIM) is the first successful extension of organized electricity 
markets in the Western United States beyond California. The EIM differs from other 
organized markets in two important ways. It is limited to real-time transactions and does 
not include the forward and ancillary services markets or many of the other coordinated 
functions that are used by RTOs. Additionally, the EIM emerged after the recent growth 
of renewable resources transformed the resource mix and operating constraints of the 
electricity system, whereas other organized markets originated primarily from pressures 
to improve system reliability and efficiency. 
To understand how this initiative unfolded and why this effort succeeded, while 
previous efforts to introduce organized markets failed, my proposed research began with 
an interest in three empirically linked questions: 1) Who were the actors that participated 
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in the negotiation of EIM development? 2) How did non-market participants, like public 
interest stakeholders and state regulators, engage in the debate? 3) How are the interests 
of diverse stakeholders reflected in the EIM governance structure? These questions 
emerged as a more specific way of exploring the overarching paradox of why 
stakeholders in the Western Interconnection created an EIM, when fully organized 
markets and regional governance provide greater economic efficiencies and more 
operational flexibility. 
1.1. Western Energy System Infrastructures 
The tension over organized markets and regional governance in the West has 
existed since 1996, when the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorized 
independent system operators (ISOs) and later, regional transmission organizations 
(RTOs) as voluntary organizations to ensure open access to the transmission grid.1 RTOs 
conduct infrastructure planning, ensure system reliability, centrally and dynamically 
dispatch generation, and operate wholesale energy markets. As the electricity system has 
become more integrated and interdependent, RTOs improved reliability and economic 
efficiency by increasing data sharing, communication, and transparency and by 
identifying and dispatching least cost resources (Hogan, 2002, 2014). 
The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) is a nonprofit public 
benefits corporation authorized in 1996 through California state statute and FERC tariff. 
CAISO is the largest balancing authority and the only FERC-authorized RTO in the 
interconnected electricity system in the Western United States. In the rest of the U.S. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this paper I will use RTOs to denote both RTOs and ISOs.  
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Western Interconnection, 33 balancing authorities are responsible for matching supply 
and demand in real-time and coordinating with each other for infrastructure planning and 
flexible reserves. These balancing authorities do not have organized electricity markets, 
but instead rely on a combination of short-term and long-term bilateral contracts. Despite 
multiple attempts to extend or create new organized markets, the Western Interconnection 
has, until recently, resisted these efforts, and continued to operate with a decentralized 
decision-making and coordination structure. 
Since RTOs were first established in the late 1990s and early 2000s, wind and 
solar resources have transitioned from emerging technologies to major wholesale 
electricity resources in many regions. In the West, state policies encouraging renewable 
resources, coupled with decreasing costs of renewable technologies, have expanded the 
share of these resources in the overall resources mix to more than 12%, and the West has 
a larger share of solar resources than any region except Hawaii (U.S. Energy Information 
Agency, 2017). Consequently, increasing attention is now being focused on how to 
integrate these resources into the electricity system, while maintaining reliability and 
affordability (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2015; Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council, 2011). 
Wind and solar resources are more variable than conventional resources and 
require the electricity system to be more flexible and dynamic. Because electricity is 
expensive to store, the grid precisely matches supply and demand in real time. As 
demand increases or decreases, resources are dispatched up or down. Electricity system 
infrastructure, rules, and processes were designed around relatively predictable and 
controllable resources, like coal and nuclear. Therefore, integrating high levels of 
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variable wind and solar resources creates a need for other resources to ramp up and down 
more quickly, creates shorter peaks for cost recovery by conventional resources, and can 
lead to negative prices and curtailment of wind and solar resources that would otherwise 
be available to meet clean energy policy goals. This affects investment opportunities and 
the value of existing assets. Maintaining reliability, maximizing the economic efficiency 
of a new resource mix, and achieving progress toward clean energy goals requires 
technological, institutional, and policy change to overcome the inflexibility of the legacy 
electricity system. Utilities, regulators, RTOs and other stakeholders are exploring a 
range of policy implementation options to enact such changes. For example, electricity 
system flexibility can be increased through forecasting, sub-hourly economic dispatch, 
distributed energy resources, energy storage, flexible generation, transmission, and 
regional coordination. These options require implementation of technological solutions, 
but they also all require implementation of new policy. RTO decisions about which 
options to pursue and the details of how implementation occurs, will shape the relative 
value of different resources, the location of infrastructure, and the incentives for 
developing new technologies at scale. 
Originated to provide efficiency and reliability benefits, RTOs are now playing a 
critical role in integrating variable wind and solar resources into the electricity system 
and creating market pathways for technological innovations such as storage, demand 
response, and other distributed energy resources (Cifor, Denholm, Ela, Hodge, & Reed, 
2015; Cochran et al., 2013; Dworkin, Sidortsov, & Sovacool, 2013; Mai, Sandor, Wiser, 
& Schneider, 2012; Moot, 2014). Relative to the decentralized decision-making 
structures in the West, RTOs provide geographic and resource diversity that helps 
  
5 
balance the variability of wind and solar, greater access to flexible reserves, coordinated 
infrastructure planning to bring renewable resources to distant load centers, market 
signals to encourage investment in new technologies, and more operational awareness 
and flexibility. 
Despite these economic and reliability benefits of RTOs, stakeholders in the West 
did not form a Western RTO, but instead decided to create an EIM that extends CAISO 
real-time market services to participating balancing authorities. The EIM allows the 
economic dispatch of resources in 15 minute and 5-minute market intervals, but does not 
allow balancing authorities to participate in the forward energy market (i.e., the day 
ahead and hour ahead markets) or the ancillary services markets. Participating in the EIM 
is voluntary and the choice to participate is made by individual balancing authorities that 
maintain autonomy from FERC rate regulation and responsibility for reserve obligations. 
To date, six investor-owned utilities with operations in seven states, other than California, 
have decided to participate in the Western EIM. 
1.2. Policy Implementation 
RTOs sit at the interface of federal, state, and local regulation. RTO operating 
protocols, market designs, and planning procedures comprise the complex processes of 
change and methods of coordination that translate policy inputs into outcomes. In other 
words, the outcomes of state policy initiatives, like renewable portfolio standards (RPS) 
or affordability goals, are shaped by the policy implementation decisions of RTOs and 
the numerous stakeholders that engage in organized wholesale power markets and 
determine the amount, value, and location of electricity resources. 
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Implementation of the EIM involved formal and informal conversations among a 
broad range of stakeholders including CAISO, investor-owned utilities, municipal power 
agencies and electric cooperatives, federal power marketing administrations, independent 
power producers, other asset owners, private power marketers, state and federal 
regulators, energy policy offices, and environmental advocates. The question of how to 
govern the newly forming market was deliberated in multiple decision-making venues 
including formal stakeholder engagement processes and a committee facilitated by 
CAISO. Through these deliberations, stakeholders engaged in the process of policy 
implementation and shaped the structure of the EIM as a policy intervention. 
This dissertation takes up questions of policy implementation, political control, 
and democratic accountability through the lens of social negotiation of authority. In 
particular, my research asks how RTO stakeholders negotiated multiple and conflicting 
sources of authority to legitimate certain actions. In broad terms, I am interested in 
understanding how actors within policy implementation systems reconcile ambiguous 
and often conflicting authorities to produce change and pursue collective interests. This 
process is central to understanding how state organizations within governance systems 
seek to exercise discretion and sustain accountability to the public interest. 
1.3. Rationale 
The rationale for this research is two-fold. First, the Western EIM initiative is a 
rich case of evolving electricity system governance and provides a unique opportunity to 
study policy implementation and interorganizational collaboration as they unfold in 
practice. By studying a complex governance system that requires interorganizational 
collaboration, this research seeks to provide insight into the social mechanisms that shape 
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implementation processes and outcomes. In particular, this research is focused on 
examining the social negotiation of authority, how strategic actors engage in these social 
negotiations, and how interdependencies and external events influence social 
negotiations. 
Much of the policy literature highlights the importance of understanding 
implementation through the causal relationships between processes, outcomes and the 
formal and informal authorities that form through centralized organizations and local 
contexts (Bardach, 1977; Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Matland, 1995; 
Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Schneider & Ingram, 
1990). However, the interdependent and dynamic nature of electricity policy 
implementation requires action by multiple organizations engaging at different levels and 
within a context of multiple and often conflicting sources of authority (Goldthau, 2014). 
Understanding policy implementation in these complex systems requires a framework 
that also incorporates the social process of reconciling different sources of authority in 
order to explain how and why things get done in a particular way. The understanding of 
authority as a negotiated phenomenon is well established in field theory and 
organizational communication literature (e.g., Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Taylor & Van 
Every, 2014) and is being explored in policy implementation literature (Moulton & 
Sandfort, 2017). This dissertation seeks to extend these ideas to the context of multi-
organizational regulatory policy implementation and to provide empirical evidence of the 
process. 
Second, the EIM initiative is of interest because it is fundamentally changing the 
decision-making processes and relative influence of stakeholders in the West. The 
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decisions about how to structure EIM governance will shape the region’s response to 
climate change and the distribution of benefits and burdens across the region for years to 
come. RTOs and their governance structures are increasingly important, yet understudied, 
policy environments. Aligning federal organized power markets with state policy 
initiatives is a critical energy policy challenge. It has been the subject of multiple FERC 
technical conferences, legal challenges, and Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Hughes v. 
Talen Energy Marketing, 2016; FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association et al., 2016; 
FERC Technical Conference: State Policies and Wholesale Markets Operated by ISO 
New England Inc., New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C. May, 2017). This dissertation seeks to provide insight into how 
RTO governance structures are evolving, the nature of the interface between state and 
federal regulators, and how energy policy implementation can be facilitated. 
Chapter 2 provides additional background on the electricity system in the West, 
the growth of renewable resources, and explains the case study presented in this 
dissertation. Chapter 3 reviews policy implementation literature and connects it to field 
theory and boundary work literature to help make sense of policy implementation that 
spans the responsibilities of more than one organization as the social negotiation of 
authority. Chapter 4 explains the methodology used to collect and analyze data. Chapters 
5 and 6 provide the findings from the analysis and Chapter 7 discusses the findings and 
the practical and theoretical implications of this research. 
 
  
9 
CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND AND CASE 
 
In recent years, many researchers have been interested in the shift in patterns and 
styles of governing to include multi-actor and multi-layered networks (Hill & Hupe, 
2014; Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2006; Moran, Rein, & Goodin, 
2006). This shift has led to governance systems that are less hierarchical and more 
dependent on coordination and cooperation. To better understand how change occurs 
within these complex systems, scholars have called for policy implementation research to 
go beyond descriptions of context and process to investigating the complex social 
mechanisms that explain why things are done in a particular way (DeLeon & DeLeon, 
2002; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; O’Toole, 2004). To answer that call, I am interested in 
understanding how stakeholders, within bounded policy implementation systems, 
dynamically produce and reproduce rules and resources to reconcile conflicting 
authorities and pursue collective interests. This process is central to understanding how 
organizations within governance systems seek to exercise discretion and sustain 
accountability to the public interest. 
To further my driving interest, this study focuses on a specific intervention, the 
expansion of organized electricity market services in the West, and how stakeholders 
created and legitimated sources of authority to establish a Governing Body for this new 
market service. This chapter provides the background and case description for the study. 
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Wind and solar resources now account for an important share of capacity and net 
generation in many western states (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). Consequently, 
increasing attention is being focused on how to integrate these variable resources into the 
electricity system, while maintaining reliability and affordability. Recent research 
demonstrates that high levels of wind and solar can be integrated with existing 
technologies, but this transition will require institutional and policy change. This presents 
a critical challenge for the West. Wind and solar integration can be facilitated by the 
automation, expanded communication, and regional scale provided by regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs). However, outside of the California Independent 
System Operator (CAISO), the West has long resisted the tight regionalization and 
organized markets of RTOs. The barriers to organized markets include concerns about 
retaining political control, maintaining affordability, and cultural differences. This history 
of resistance makes the decision in early 2013 to create a Western Energy Imbalance 
Market (EIM) a rich case of evolving electricity system governance and a unique 
opportunity to study multi-organizational policy implementation in practice. The EIM 
initiative is fundamentally changing the decision-making processes, relative influence of 
stakeholders, and energy federalism in the West. 
This chapter describes the energy resources, electricity system infrastructures, and 
legal authority that provide context for the EIM initiative. First, the chapter highlights the 
growth of wind and solar resources in the West and the challenges of integrating these 
resources into conventional infrastructures. Second, it describes the two distinct 
electricity system infrastructures in the West. Third, the chapter explains the federal 
authorization of RTOs. Finally, the chapter describes the implementation of an innovative 
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EIM mechanism that leverages the CAISO infrastructure and the initial steps toward the 
creation of a Western Regional System Operator (RSO). 
2.1. Pressure to Integrate Wind and Solar Resources 
Since RTOs were first established in the late 1990s and early 2000s, wind and 
solar resources have transitioned from emerging technologies to become major resources 
for wholesale electricity deployed at utility scale in many regions. This section describes 
the growth of wind and solar resources in the West and the challenges of integrating these 
resources into conventional infrastructures. 
Growth of Wind and Solar in the West 
In the West, state policies encouraging renewable resources, coupled with 
decreasing costs of renewable technologies and institutional innovations, have expanded 
the share of wind and solar in the overall resources mix. In the U.S., wind and solar 
capacity increased from 7,200 MW to more than 101,000 MW between 2004 and 2015 
and grew as a share of total capacity from 0.7% to more than 9% (U.S. Department of 
Energy, 2015, 2016). In comparison, wind and solar capacity in the CAISO footprint is 
now more than 13,600 MW, accounting for approximately 19% of total installed 
capacity. In the non-RTO portion of the Western Interconnection, wind and solar capacity 
exceeds 18,400 MW, accounting for approximately 9% of total capacity (Figure 2.1). 
In addition to growth in capacity, wind and solar now account for 7% of annual 
net generation in the U.S. and more than 12% of annual net generation in the U.S. 
Western Interconnection (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2017). In comparing 
electricity regions, only the Upper Midwest, Hawaii, and Texas have a higher total share 
of generation from wind and solar resources, and only Hawaii has a higher share of solar 
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generation (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2017). Given this growth in both capacity 
and generation, increasing attention is now being focused on how to integrate wind and 
solar into the electricity system, while maintaining reliability and affordability (National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2015; National Renewable Energy Laboratory & 
Economics+Environmental Economics, 2015; Western Electricity Coordinating Council, 
2011). 
 
Figure 2.1. Comparison of Resources Mix1  
Wind and solar are a more significant share of total net capacity in CAISO, than 
in the remaining regions of the Western Interconnection. 
1. Western Interconnection data includes the 37 balancing authorities in North America. 
Source: Data from California Independent System Operator, n.d.-a; Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council, 2016 
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Integration Challenges 
The electricity system infrastructures in the West were designed around 
predictable and controllable conventional resources, like coal, natural gas, and nuclear. 
However, the level of wind and solar generation that now exists in the West requires 
more flexibility in electricity system operations, planning, and markets. Wind and solar 
resources pose certain challenges due to the variability of their generation coupled with 
limitations in technology. Specifically, systems that are integrating high levels of variable 
resources need generation that can rapidly ramp supply up or down as wind and solar 
generation fluctuates. Systems can also face the potential for overgeneration when the 
combination of available wind, solar, and conventional resources exceed demand. CAISO 
is projecting significant overgeneration and ramping constraints driven by variable 
resources (California Independent System Operator, 2013d) and as an example of 
pressure in other regions of the West, the Bonneville Power Administration has already 
experienced overgeneration constraints during certain periods with both high wind and 
high water resources (Duane & Griffith, 2013). Ramping and overgeneration constraints 
can challenge reliability and affect economic efficiency. 
These challenges can be addressed with existing technologies, but require 
infrastructure and policy change (see E3 Advisory Panel, 2014; Mai et al., 2012; National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory & Economics+Environmental Economics, 2015). For 
example, a National Renewable Energy Laboratory analysis found that:  
...renewable electricity generation from technologies that are 
commercially available today, in combination with a more flexible electric 
system, is more than adequate to supply 80% of U.S. electricity generation 
in 2050 while meeting electricity demand on an hourly basis in every 
region of the United States (Mai et al., 2012).  
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As explained by NREL, integrating high levels of renewable resources requires 
policy changes to enable system flexibility. However, creating a more flexible electric 
system is a difficult challenge in practice. To avoid ramping constraints, overgeneration 
and electricity system failures, grid operators have traditionally relied on flexible reserves 
or curtailed generation to remove the electricity from the system. However, the growth of 
energy from wind and solar has shifted the implications of these practices. For example, 
during periods of high wind or solar generation, wholesale electricity prices for all 
resources can be negative and low-cost, clean wind and solar resources can be curtailed 
(shut down) in order to maintain reliability. This creates operational challenges and 
affects economic efficiency, the value of wind and solar investments, cost recovery for 
conventional resources, and progress toward clean energy goals (Stafford & Wilson, 
2016). 
Alternative approaches that improve electricity system flexibility, economic 
efficiency, and the integration of renewable resources include sub-hourly scheduling and 
dispatch, advances in forecasting, new transmission, economic dispatch of renewables, 
flexible gas generation, time-of-use pricing, new technologies like storage and demand 
response, and coordination across larger operating areas (Cochran, Denholm, Speer, & 
Miller, 2015; Loutan et al., 2007; Piwko, Clark, Freeman, Jordan, & Miller, 2010). Many 
of these alternative approaches require or can be facilitated by the improved automation, 
data sharing, expanded communication, and regional scale provided by RTOs. However, 
much of the West lacks the tight regionalization and organized markets of RTOs. 
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2.2. Electricity System Infrastructures in the West 
In the late 1990s, efforts to promote electricity system restructuring began to 
transform the relationships between regulators and utilities. Through a series of orders, 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) encouraged the formation of RTOs 
to manage transmission and oversee wholesale power markets. Additionally, many state 
restructuring efforts introduced generation and retail competition for electricity. 
Across the United States, RTOs formed in seven regions and these organizations 
now manage approximately 70% of the bulk power supply (U.S. Energy Information 
Agency, 2013). In contrast, the West has largely resisted this transition to organized 
markets and regional governance through RTOs. The California Independent System 
Operator (CAISO) is the only RTO operating in the U.S. segment of the Western 
Interconnection. Although originally envisioned as a pathway to a west-wide RTO, this 
expansion has not yet materialized and multiple efforts to form another western RTO 
have failed.2 Consequently, in the West electricity transmission infrastructures are 
managed within two distinct paradigms: areas managed by an RTO and areas managed 
through coordination among separate balancing authorities. This section describes each 
of these paradigms in more detail. 
A Single State Regional Transmission Organization 
CAISO organized in 1996 as one of the first RTOs. It is the largest balancing 
authority in the U.S. portion of the Western Interconnection. Balancing authorities are 
responsible for operating a portion of the grid and matching supply and demand in real 
                                                 
2 Including Desert STAR in the southwest and IndeGo, RTO West, and Grid West in the Northwest. 
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time. Most are either RTOs or electric utilities and most serve more than one utility. As 
both an RTO and a balancing authority, CAISO provides organized market services, 
coordinates transmission infrastructure planning, maintains reliable operations, ensures 
open-access to transmission, and manages the flow of electricity for about 80% of 
California and a small part of Nevada (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2. CAISO is the Only RTO in the U.S. Western Interconnection 
CAISO manages the flow of electricity for about 80% of 
California and a small part of Nevada. 
 Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, n.d.-a 
Like other RTOs, CAISO does not own generation or transmission; rather 
transmission owners relinquish operational control and allow CAISO to control their 
assets. CAISO administers organized electricity markets in which generation resources 
are cost-optimized subject to operating and reliability constraints and dispatched jointly.3 
                                                 
3 Dispatching refers to the operating control of an integrated electric system involving operations such as 
(1) the assignment of load to specific generating stations and other sources of supply to effect the most 
economical supply as the total or the significant area loads rise or fall (2) the control of operations and 
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This method of centrally determining which generation is used is known as security-
constrained economic dispatch (SCED) (Blumsack, 2007). The CAISO market 
framework includes three interdependent organized markets: a day-ahead market based 
on forecast demand, a real-time market used to address imbalances not covered in the 
day-ahead market, and an ancillary services market for products that help maintain grid 
stability and reliability. The real-time market centrally and automatically dispatches 
power every 15 minutes and every 5 minutes. This basic market model for organized 
electricity markets is used across most RTOs. While this approach is not without 
challenges, it generally has served to improve reliability and economic efficiency by 
increasing data sharing, communication, and transparency and by identifying and 
dispatching least cost resources (Blumsack, 2007; Hogan, 2002, 2014). 
The Non-RTO Regions of the West 
Outside of CAISO, 33 separate balancing authorities manage the transmission of 
electricity in the U.S. segment of the Western Interconnection (Figure 2.3).4 These 
balancing authorities are significantly smaller than CAISO in terms of managed 
electricity supply. While CAISO manages more than 30% of electric supply in the U.S. 
Western Interconnection, the Bonneville Power Administration, PacifiCorp West, 
PacifiCorp East, and Nevada Energy each manage between 6% and 7% of electric 
                                                 
maintenance of high-voltage lines, substations, and equipment; (3) the operation of principal tie lines and 
switching; (4) the scheduling of energy transactions with connecting electric utilities (U.S. Energy 
Information Agency, n.d.)) 
4 The Western Interconnection includes 37 balancing authorities: CAISO, 33 other balancing authorities in 
the U.S., two balancing authorities in Canada, and one in Mexico. 
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supply. All other balancing 
authorities manage 5% or less 
of the electric supply in the 
Western Interconnection 
(Table 2.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Balancing Authorities in the West1 
In the U.S. portion of the Western Interconnection, 34 balancing 
authorities manage the bulk transmission grid for all or part of 14 states. 
 
1. See Appendix A for legend identifying each balancing authority. 
Source: Adapted from Western Electricity Coordinating Council, n.d.  
 
Table 2.1. Size of Balancing Authorities in the West (2014 data) 
U.S. Western Interconnection 
Balancing Authorities Sales              
(Annual 
Gigawatt Hours) 
Share of 
Sales 
TOTAL 776,336,511  
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California Independent System Operator 247,685,664 32% 
Bonneville Power Administration 54,576,108 7% 
PacifiCorp West 49,538,710 6% 
Nevada Energy 47,766,286 6% 
PacifiCorp East 43,626,329 6% 
Other Balancing Authorities 333,143,414 43% 
Source: Data from Form 861 (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014) 
In the non-RTO regions of the West, power trading, planning, and reliability are 
managed through decentralized institutions and decision-making processes. For example, 
the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) serves as an umbrella 
organization over five voluntary groups of utilities that coordinate transmission planning 
in the West and it oversees compliance with mandatory reliability standards. 5  
Additionally, several sub-regional organizations, such as the Northwest Power Pool, the 
Western Systems Power Pool, and the Committee on Regional Electric Power 
Cooperation, act as voluntary organizations to facilitate regional coordination on certain 
aspects of power trading, operations, and reliability. 
In non-RTO regions, entities trade wholesale power through a combination of 
self-scheduled generation and bilateral contracts or brokerage agreements that range in 
terms from hourly to multi-year. Bilateral transactions can also occur in CAISO regions, 
subject to CAISO rules. Under this market construct, transmission congestion is managed 
through the purchase of physical transmission rights and actions of the transmission 
owner (Blumsack, 2007). Compared to the CAISO organized markets, data sharing, 
                                                 
5 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 established Section 215 of the Federal Power Act requiring compliance 
with mandatory reliability standards. FERC certified the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC), a non-profit organization, was certified to carry out these responsibilities and NERC has 
delegated the authority to create, monitor and enforce these standards in the Western Interconnection to the 
Western Electricity Coordinating Council. 
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communication, reliability, and transparency between balancing authorities is 
fragmented, and consequently, these balancing authorities are less operationally flexible 
than CAISO.6 
2.3. Federal Authorization of Regional Transmission Organizations 
RTOs are relatively new organizations that are formed by voluntary market 
participants, defined by technological system boundaries, and span political jurisdictional 
boundaries. They are authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
under the Federal Power Act of 1935 and are central to energy policy implementation. 
This section describes the relationship between RTOs and state and federal authority for 
electricity rate regulation. 
The Federal Power Act established a division of authority over rate regulation 
between federal and state agencies. FERC was responsible for interstate electricity sales, 
whereas state and local regulators were responsible for intrastate electricity sales. 
Because utilities typically had few interstate sales, FERC responsibilities were limited. 
State and local agencies were the primary electricity regulators responsible for protecting 
the public interest (Lyons, 2014). However, electricity industry restructuring has 
transformed this division between federal and state authority. 
In the late 1990s, FERC required utilities to provide open, non-discriminatory 
access to transmission customers and encouraged the formation of RTOs to manage 
                                                 
6 In 2014, two important actions were taken to improve economic efficiency and reliability. FERC issued 
Order 764 requiring intra-hourly transmission scheduling to reduce barriers to integrating variable 
resources and other market inefficiencies. However, liquidity in these markets has been limited. 
Additionally, NERC authorized the bifurcation of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council leading to 
the founding of Peak Reliability to serve as a reliability coordinator for the Western Interconnection with 
responsibilities to provide situational awareness and real-time monitoring. 
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transmission and oversee wholesale electricity markets (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 1996a, 1996b, 2000). 7 As a result, all independent power producers, 
including renewable energy generators, can purchase transmission services at the same 
rate that the utility charges itself and utilities can voluntarily chose to participate in 
organized wholesale electricity markets managed by RTOs. 
RTOs and electricity industry restructuring complicate the distinction between 
federal, state, and local regulatory responsibilities (Table 2.2). FERC Order 888, which 
required open access to the transmission grid, and subsequent interpretations and 
clarifications have established FERC authority over all investor-owned utility 
transactions made through the interconnected interstate transmission grid (Greenfield, 
2010).8 Thus, investor-owned utilities are subject to FERC regulation of transmission and 
wholesale electricity rates and state regulation of distribution and retail electricity rates. 
Table 2.2. Regulatory Authority by Type of Utility and Region 
 CAISO1 Non-RTO 
Investor-Owned Utility 
State 
FERC 
State 
FERC 
Publicly Owned Utility2 
Local 
FERC3 
Local4 
1. CAISO itself is a regulated utility as defined in the Federal Power Act and operates through an 
                                                 
7 FERC Order 888 reinterpreted provisions in the Federal Power Act to require FERC-jurisdictional 
utilities to provide open, non-discriminatory access to transmission customers (Eisen, 2016; Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 1996a; Lyons, 2014). Additionally, Order 888 encourages, but does not require, 
the formation of independent system operators (ISOs) to manage transmission and oversee wholesale 
power markets. Subsequently, FERC Order 2000 further defined the requirements for an entity to qualify as 
an ISO or RTO (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2000). 
8
 To implement this requirement, Order 888 requires all jurisdictional utilities to file a pro forma open-
access transmission tariff (OATT) that contains minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory 
access. Thus, all investor owned utilities are subject to FERC regulation through OATTs. In contrast, 
government agencies, certain electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing administrations are not 
universally required to file OATTs (Eisen, 2016). 
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open-access transmission tariff. CAISO is also subject to a California state organic statute. 
2. Publicly-owned utility (POU) for the purposes of this study include government agencies, 
certain electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing administrations. This definition 
departs from the formal definition in the Federal Power Act. 
3. FERC has authority to review a non-jurisdictional utility’s rates if they are a component of an 
RTO’s rate design (Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 306 F.3d 1112, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. FERC, 495 F.3d 663, at 671-72 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
4. FERC authority over POUs is limited to compliance with mandatory reliability standards and 
controls to prevent market manipulation (FPA 215 (16 USC 824o) FPA 222 (16 USC 824v)). 
In contrast, government agencies, certain electric cooperatives, and federal power 
marketing administrations are generally exempt from federal rate regulation.9  These 
types of utilities are often referred to as non-jurisdictional utilities and for the purposes of 
this study will be referred to as publicly owned utilities. Local agencies and boards of 
directors regulate transmission, distribution, and all sales for municipal utilities and 
electric cooperatives.10 However, a publicly owned utility that voluntarily chooses to 
participate in an RTO is subject to full rate review by FERC. Thus, for publicly owned 
utilities, joining an RTO involves relinquishing autonomy over rate regulation. 
                                                 
9
 The Federal Power Act uses the term ‘public utility’ in a manner that departs from common usage. The 
Act defines a public utility as "any person who owns or operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission," that is, "any person who owns or operates" facilities for the transmission of electric energy 
in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. Furthermore, 
the Act exempts federal, state, and local agencies, electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing 
administrations, with limited exceptions, from the plurality of FERC authority (Eisen, 2016). For the 
purposes of this study, publicly owned utility (POU) or public power utility refers to government agencies, 
certain electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing administrations. 
10
 Federal Power Act Section 211A, established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, expands FERC 
jurisdiction over the transmission system by authorizing FERC to order an unregulated transmitting utility 
to file changes to or replace its voluntarily-filed Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to address 
undue discrimination regarding access to its transmission system. This provision was used for the first time 
in 2011 when FERC ordered the Bonneville Power Administration to revise its wind curtailment practices 
to comply with the undue discrimination standards in Section 211A and file an OATT. These curtailment 
practices, orders, and revisions are still under dispute (Dennis & Brecher, 2015). 
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Furthermore, experience in RTOs across the U.S. has demonstrated the blurring of 
federal, state and local responsibilities around certain policy issues and technology 
innovations. The operation of organized wholesale markets affects policy decisions that 
traditionally have been under state jurisdiction, such as resources adequacy and 
transmission planning. Additionally, many new technologies, like storage and demand 
response, cannot be identified as providing only wholesale or retail services. With the 
expansion of organized markets and regional governance, the clear division of authority 
between federal and state regulators has given way to a more complex regulatory system 
that includes multiple and indirect authorities (See Rossi, 2016). 
2.4. The Western Energy Imbalance Market 
The Western EIM initiative that began in 2013 and the seating of the Energy 
Imbalance Market Governing Body in the summer of 2016 mark a significant move 
towards electricity grid integration in the West. The EIM is the first successful extension 
of organized electricity markets in the Western United States beyond California. The 
EIM differs from an RTO and other organized markets in important ways. An RTO is an 
organization that takes operational control of participating transmission assets and 
provides a full range of organized market services, infrastructure planning, and reliability 
functions to participating utilities, which are subject to FERC rate review. In contrast, the 
EIM is a mechanism that extends limited real-time market services to participating 
entities and preserves their autonomy from FERC rate review, operation of transmission 
assets, and responsibility for reserve obligations. Additionally, the EIM differs from other 
organized markets operated by RTOs because it emerged after the recent growth of 
renewable resources transformed the resource mix and operating constraints of the 
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electricity system; whereas, RTOs originated primarily from pressures to improve system 
reliability and efficiency. This section provides a broad overview of the case and 
describes the decision-making processes for each of the phases of the case. 
Overview of the Energy Imbalance Market Initiative 
Following efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s to create a west-wide RTO, 
attention began to focus on alternative mechanisms for integrating renewable resources 
and improving market efficiency (Cochran et al., 2013; Linvill, Candelaria, & Spalding, 
2011; Mai et al., 2012; Milligan et al., 2013; Piwko et al., 2010; Porter et al., 2012; 
Samaan et al., 2013; Western Electricity Coordinating Council, 2011). From this work, 
an EIM emerged as an alternative that could contribute to these goals through real-time 
automated dispatch, improved communications, increased system visibility, and sharing 
of resources. As designed by the CAISO-PacifiCorp implementation process, 
participation in the EIM is voluntary and there is no exit fee. Balancing authorities retain 
functional and planning control over their transmission and retain responsibility for 
reserve and capacity requirements. Participating balancing authorities do not have access 
to the CAISO day-ahead or ancillary services markets. 
In February 2012, western regulators held an initial meeting of the Public Utilities 
Commission-Energy Imbalance Market (PUC-EIM) Group. The formation of this Group 
marked the beginning of formal discussions specifically related to the CAISO EIM 
initiative that is the focus of this study. In 2013 CAISO and PacifiCorp signed a bilateral 
agreement to implement an EIM. The EIM creates opportunities for California exports 
during periods of high renewable resource generation and provides access to flexible 
capacity needed to accommodate variable renewable resources. In contrast, new market 
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participants are motivated to join the EIM by a range of interests, including greater 
efficiency, operational flexibility, access to additional markets, and the ability to integrate 
wind and solar resources. However, for many of these stakeholders an ability to maintain 
a level of autonomy from FERC, CAISO, and California policy institutions is critical. 
By April 2016, six investor-owned utilities had agreed to participate in the EIM, 
extending these services to seven states (Figure 2.4). The balancing authorities in 
remaining regions of the West that are not participating in either an EIM or CAISO 
manage approximately 30% of the electricity supply in the West (U.S. Energy 
Information Agency, 2014). 
 
Figure 2.4. Voluntary Participants in the Western Energy Imbalance Market 
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Source: California Independent System Operator, n.d.-b 
EIM transactions between CAISO and PacifiCorp began in November 2014 and a 
Governing Body was appointed in June 2016. The EIM provides economic, reliability, 
and environmental benefits for CAISO and participating entities. In the second quarter of 
2016, total benefits were estimated to be $88.19 million, and the EIM allowed CAISO to 
avoid curtailment of 158,806 MWh of renewables (California Independent System 
Operator, 2016a). However, the anticipated expansion of wind and solar generation to 
achieve California’s 50% RPS and greenhouse gas emission goals continues to present 
challenges. CAISO is now engaged in multiple initiatives to further improve system 
flexibility (Loutan, 2015). Additionally, the EIM has elevated fundamental questions 
about CAISO governance, and the region is now engaged in discussions of a fully 
organized market across a broader region in the West. 
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The case focuses on the collective action that occurred around the formation of a 
new regional Governing Body for the Western EIM (Figure 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.5. Timeline of Interdependent Decision-Making Fields  
Technical implementation of the EIM infrastructure proceeded while governance 
continued to be deliberated. Announcement of plans to explore a regional system 
operator occurred while the Transitional Committee was still developing governance 
recommendations. 
Technical Implementation 
In March 2013, CAISO management brought the EIM implementation agreement 
to their Board of Governors for approval and initiated a stakeholder engagement process. 
In CAISO, policy implementation issues are deliberated in ad-hoc processes that are open 
to any interested organization or individual and subject to California open meeting and 
Technical Implementation
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PUC-EIM Group 
Formed
February 2013
CAISO-PacifiCorp 
EIM Agreement
November 2013
Board Approves 
Market Design
November 2014
EIM Live Operation
Emergence of a New EIM Governing Body
August - December 2013
Stakeholder Engagement
May 2014
Transitional Committee 
Appointments
July 2014 - October 2015
Transitional Committee 
Meetings
September 2015
Board Approves Governance
June 2016
EIM Governing Body 
Appointed
Transformation to an RSO
April 2015
PacifiCorp to Study Full 
Market Participation
October 2015
SB 350 Defines Process for 
Governance Reform
February - July 2016
Stakeholder Meetings and 
Integration Studies 
July 2016
Joint Agency Workshop
August 2016
Governor Delays Initiative 
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open record statutes. Professional CAISO staff support deliberation of issues and move 
the discussion through an iterative process of straw proposals, comments, and revisions. 
There is no voting in stakeholder processes. Staff present proposed tariff changes to the 
board for disposition and any interested person or organization has the ability to provide 
written or verbal comments on proposals. 
In April 2013, CAISO released a straw proposal and issue paper that included 
detailed proposals for many technical market design and operational implementation 
issues. This document also identified several policy questions that required additional 
stakeholder input and discussion. Among these were governance issues, transmission cost 
allocation procedures, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission accounting. In reaction to this 
proposal, stakeholders requested “a more in-depth discussion” regarding governance 
issues and CAISO established a parallel stakeholder process specifically dedicated to 
governance (California Independent System Operator, 2013a, 2013c). CAISO, PacifiCorp 
and other stakeholders focused on implementation of technical issues through the 
standard CAISO decision-making process. These deliberations were relatively 
uncontroversial. The CAISO Board of Governors approved the EIM market design 
changes in November 2013, and as noted above, EIM transactions began in November of 
2014. 
Emergence of a New Energy Imbalance Market Governance Body 
In August 2013, CAISO proposed establishing a Transitional Committee 
(henceforth “the Committee”) that would be authorized as an advisory committee to the 
CAISO Board and charged with developing recommendations for a long-term 
independent governance structure. This bifurcation of the decision-making process 
  
29 
recognized a need to foster a space for collaboration, while allowing EIM implementation 
with PacifiCorp to proceed without delay. This shift in how policy implementation 
decisions would be negotiated narrowed the issues that needed to be addressed, allowed 
new stakeholders to play a more meaningful role in the process, and established a 
separation from CAISO. Between August and December of 2013, CASIO facilitated a 
process to develop a charter for the Committee. The Committee was appointed in May of 
2014 and comprised a total of 13 members including four members from balancing 
authorities participating in the EIM, two from incumbent CAISO investor-owned utilities 
and private marketers, two from potential EIM participants, and five from public power, 
state agencies, or public interest organizations. 
The Committee held 16 meetings between July 2014 and October 2015. During 
this time period two important events occurred. First, the actual EIM market mechanism 
became operational after only four Committee meetings. Second, in April of 2015 
PacifiCorp signed an agreement to explore the feasibility of full participation in the 
CAISO organized markets. This occurred after the Committee’s ninth meeting and in the 
midst of stakeholder comments on the initial governance structure straw proposal. The 
Committee decided to continue their work, despite this change in context, and it 
submitted a recommendation that was approved by the CAISO Board of Governors in 
September of 2015. The EIM Governing Body was appointed in June of 2016. 
Transformation to a Regional System Operator 
Following the PacifiCorp decision to explore full participation in CAISO, the two 
organizations worked from April to October of 2015 to define issues and communicate 
with stakeholders. These steps included initiating bi-weekly regional update calls, issuing 
  
30 
a discussion paper, developing a benefits study, and holding two stakeholder meetings. 
Additionally, CAISO shared eleven regional grid studies with interested stakeholders. 
Although this initiative did not follow the standard CAISO decision-making process, 
CAISO accepted comments on the benefits study. 
In October of 2015, the California Legislature and Governor enacted SB 350 (CA 
SB350, 2015) defining a process for CAISO governance reform to support its 
transformation into a regional organization. In support of this legislation, CAISO initiated 
detailed studies of the economic and environmental impacts of regionalization. 
Additionally, CAISO and PacifiCorp held a joint web conference and the California 
Energy Commission convened three workshops and a joint agency workshop between 
February and July of 2016. These workshops provided key stakeholders with the 
opportunity to present issues and allowed stakeholders to provide oral and written 
comments. This decision-making process was structured around the requirements and 
timelines imposed by SB 350 and stakeholders were working to develop a 
recommendation for the 2016 Legislative Session. In August of 2016, the California 
Governor notified the Legislature that a regionalization proposal would not be available 
for debate in the 2016 Session, but that state agencies, including CAISO, would continue 
to work on a proposal for the 2017 Session. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explain the growth of wind and solar resources in the West and 
the pressure this creates for policy change; the distinct electricity infrastructure 
governance approaches within CAISO and in non-RTO regions of the West; and the 
complexity that RTOs introduce to electricity system regulation. CAISO is perceived as 
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tightly aligned with California policy making. It operates within a single state, is 
authorized by state statute and FERC, and is dominated by three large investor-owned 
utilities and a partially restructured industry. In contrast, the non-RTO regions of the 
West are diverse. The balancing authorities are much smaller than CAISO, are located 
across 13 states with diverse energy policy goals, and the region is shaped by public 
power and a vertically integrated industry. These differences in infrastructure, regulation, 
policy goals, and resource mix mean that any expansion of organized markets involves 
complex negotiations and different perspectives regarding potential political and 
economic benefits risks of collaboration, as well as the complications introduced by 
California statute and FERC jurisdiction in relation to public power. 
 This chapter also introduces the unique concept of the EIM and explains that it 
differs from an RTO in critical aspects. An EIM provides more limited market services 
than an RTO, but allows participating utilities to retain autonomy over rate regulation, 
transmission operations, and reserve capacity for reliability. This chapter also explains 
the three interdependent phases in the implementation of the EIM market mechanism and 
the decision-making process that resulted in seating of an innovative EIM governance 
body and in legislation authorizing the first steps toward the creation of a Western RSO. 
This transition marks a significant shift in the relationships among federal regulators, 
state regulators, and utilities in the West. It represents a successful effort to enable policy 
change after nearly 20 years of stability in which stakeholders resisted organized 
electricity markets despite their widespread adoption in other regions of the U.S. and 
around the world. To understand how this policy change occurred, Chapter 3 reviews 
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theoretical literature on policy implementation, action fields, and organizational studies 
that provide a framework for my research.
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Regional transmission organization (RTO) governance structures and their 
accountability to the public interest have been an ongoing source of debate (Dworkin & 
Goldwasser, 2007; Eisen, 2016; Rossi, 2016). In this debate, considerable attention has 
focused on how to improve accountability to the public interest and the appropriate 
balance between state and federal regulatory jurisdiction. The difficulty in addressing 
these issues is compounded by the rapid transition of the electricity system over the past 
two decades and the evolving relationships between RTOs, policy goals, and technology. 
My research takes up questions of political control and democratic accountability through 
the lens of social negotiation and authority. In particular, I ask how RTO stakeholders 
themselves negotiated multiple and conflicting sources of authority to legitimate certain 
actions. In broad terms, I am interested in understanding how stakeholders within policy 
implementation systems reconcile ambiguous and often conflicting authorities to produce 
change and pursue collective interests. This process is central to understanding how state 
organizations within governance systems seek to exercise discretion and sustain 
accountability to the public interest. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review several bodies of literature that provide 
the background for this research. In particular, because RTOs inherently involve 
voluntary coordination of multiple organizations, I explore the topics of authority, social 
negotiation, and subsystem interdependencies within the context of policy 
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implementation that spans the responsibilities of more than one organization. Policy 
process and institutional theories use the concept of policy entrepreneur to identify the 
importance of individual agency in driving policy change and are generally focused on 
understanding policy implementation through competing coalitions and instrumental 
motivations. However, these theories have little to say about the strategies and actions of 
actors that contribute to change. Because the concepts of policy entrepreneur, identity, 
and voluntary cooperation are under-theorized in the policy process literature, I draw on 
field theory, and an application of these ideas to policy implementation, to provide a 
framework for investigating the complex social mechanisms that explain why things are 
done in a particular way. 
This dissertation thus departs from most theories of policy implementation or 
policy process in three important ways. First, unlike rational choice approaches, this 
research does not presume that rules and resources are known or fixed, but rather that 
they are produced, reproduced, and altered by socially skilled actors in relation to 
collective interests. In addition, rather than theorizing individual agency as motivated 
only by self interest, individual and collective action is theorized as being driven by a 
desire to construct meaning in relation to others and interests are defined and negotiated 
in relation to others (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Giddens, 1984; Moulton & Sandfort, 
2017). Second, this research focuses directly on the interdependencies among policy 
subsystems. Recognizing the ties among related social systems and the social system that 
forms around any given policy implementation intervention, this research explores how 
these ties routinely introduce discursive resources and different sources of authority 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Moulton & Sandfort, 
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2017). Third, this research adopts a discursive perspective, which builds on 
communication and interorganizational collaboration literature, to identify how 
discourses produce identities, shared meanings, and lead to particular practices. This 
approach shifts attention from the intentions of individuals to their observable 
communication practices and the effects of those practices on social relations (Hardy et 
al., 2005; Koschmann & Burk, 2016). 
Regional transmission systems (RTOs) represent an interesting case of complex 
governance and provide an opportunity to focus on the social interactions that are part of 
implementation in practice. For example, the California Independent System Operator 
(CAISO) is a space for organizations to negotiate market, planning, and operational rules. 
CAISO decision-making relies on open stakeholder participation, staff-driven processes, 
and Board approval of tariff changes. FERC requires RTOs to be both independent of and 
responsive to stakeholders (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2000, 2008). As 
such, RTOs must balance the interests of direct market participants with those who may 
not be direct participants but are affected by market transactions nonetheless. 
The stakeholders that participate in CAISO decision-making processes include 
investor-owned utilities, publicly owned utilities, generators, marketers, alternative 
energy providers, new technology suppliers, trade associations, state policymakers and 
regulators, and civil society organizations. CAISO does not have a formal concept of 
member and uses the term stakeholder to refer to any interested individual or 
organization. Following this convention, my research uses the same broad definition of 
stakeholder to refer to the wide range of private, public, and civil society organizations 
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and individuals interested in clean energy, organized markets, and electricity system 
reliability and affordability. 
This dissertation draws from several theoretical traditions relevant to public 
policy, action fields, and organizational studies. In this chapter, I examine where these 
various theoretical concepts intersect, and why this intersection is significant for 
understanding RTO governance. First, this chapter provides an overview of policy 
implementation literature focusing on definitions and theoretical concepts used to explain 
change and stability. Next, I review the literature on field theory as it relates to multi-
organizational policy implementation and particularly to implementation that requires 
cooperation and innovation. Then, drawing on field theory concepts, I review research on 
authority, social negotiation, and field interdependencies. Next, the chapter explains the 
discursive approach in organizational studies, its relevance to multi-organizational policy 
implementation, and its connection to understanding social negotiation, strategies and 
practices. Finally, drawing on the concepts from these literatures, the chapter identifies 
several research questions that serve as the basis of the empirical investigation. 
3.1.  Policy Implementation 
This section describes policy implementation, with a specific focus on the social 
processes and interdependencies that explain change and stability within policy 
implementation systems. 
Definitions 
Public policy implementation has been defined as the “carrying out of a basic 
policy decision” (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 540). Traditional public policy 
scholars focus on the role of implementation as a stage in the policy process falling 
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between selection and evaluation and as something distinct from policy formulation 
(Brewer, 1974; Lasswell, 1956) (Figure  3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1. Policy Process Cycle 
Source: Adapted from Cairney, n.d.  
This research focuses on centralized policy formulation and goal achievement (Bardach, 
1977; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980) and has expanded to 
include research on policy design choices (Ingram & Schneider, 1990; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1990) and levels of ambiguity and conflict (Matland, 1995). This research 
highlights the importance of causal theory. 
In contrast, other scholars have challenged the definition of implementation as a 
distinct stage in the policy process. These scholars emphasize the interaction between the 
stages that occurs in practice and focus on implementation as a process of negotiation 
(Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Nakamura, 1987). This implementation 
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research seeks to provide local explanations for empirical variations in outputs or 
outcomes (Berman, 1978; Hjern & Porter, 1981). It has drawn attention to administrative 
discretion and the role of coordinating mechanisms (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Lipsky, 
2010; Milward & Provan, 2003; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Sandfort, 2000) and highlights 
the complexity of local contexts and the existence of multiple policies and authorities 
within an implementation subsystem. 
Policy implementation is further defined by the problem of multi-actor or multi-
organizational action. Scholars have long recognized that implementation inherently 
involves the “complexity of joint action” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). The more 
recent shift in the pattern and style of governing to relationships between actors and 
levels that are less hierarchical and involve implementation that spans the responsibilities 
of more than one organization add to this complexity (Hill & Hupe, 2014; Lynn et al., 
2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2006). This move toward governance alters the locus of decision 
making, expands the scope of delegated authority, draws attention to how processes are 
carried out in practice, and requires more reliance on cooperation and negotiation (Meier 
& O’Toole, 2006; Moran et al., 2006). 
Social Processes and Interdependencies 
Drawing on these definitions and concepts, implementation research often closely 
ties to questions of political control and democratic accountability or focuses on 
identifying structures to improve outcomes either in terms of alignment with formal 
policy or integration into the implementation system (Hill & Hupe, 2014). Policy process 
literature brings attention to the idea of implementation as policy change. Broadly, this 
research focuses on the interactions between public policy and actors, events, contexts, 
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and outcomes (Weible, 2014). These frameworks and theories are not specific to 
implementation or to a specific stage in the policy process, but provide concepts and 
insights for understanding different aspects of policy change or stability and therefore, 
can be useful in understanding implementation. For example, the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) was designed to 
integrate findings from earlier implementation research and is most useful for 
understanding coalitions, learning, and policy change in high-conflict situations. 
Several policy process frameworks and theories draw attention to the role of 
individuals in driving policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011; 
Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 1968; Olsen & March, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). These actors behave strategically to influence decisions, enable policy learning, or 
shape outcomes and are sometimes referred to as policy entrepreneurs or policy brokers. 
For example, the Multiple Streams Theory introduces the concept of a policy 
entrepreneur and conceptualizes policy change as a dynamic interplay between human 
agency and enabling and constraining organizational structures embedded in situational 
contexts (Sætren, 2016). These theories, with notable exceptions, have little to say about 
what strategies and actions by actors contribute to change (Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom & 
Norman, 2009; Pierce et al., 2014; Sætren, 2016). Suggested strategies include framing 
decisions as gains or loses, manipulation of sequential decision making, use of symbols 
to appeal to emotion and cognitive meanings, assigning values, creating narratives, 
typifying, displaying social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and reducing the 
perception of risks (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2005; 
Schneider & Ingram, 2005; Zahariadis, 2003). 
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Most policy process frameworks and theories focus on a single policy system or 
subsystem as the level of analysis (Cairney & Heikkila, 2014). Several of these theories 
also highlight the role of stable and dynamic external effects on change or stability 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Schneider 
& Ingram, 2005). For example, the Advocacy Coalition Framework conceives of policy 
subsystems as semi-independent with the potential for overlaps and nesting with other 
subsystems. This framework acknowledges that subsystem decisions are affected by and 
can affect external subsystem affairs and highlights the importance of spillover effects 
from other policy subsystems (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). While empirical research has 
supported the importance of external events or shocks in driving policy change (Barke, 
1993; Bischoff, 2001; Nohrstedt, 2005; Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010), there is a need for 
additional research on the role of subsystem interdependencies in driving change 
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). Interdependencies occur within and across 
subsystems and are theorized to shape identities and result in coordination among actors 
with shared beliefs (Fenger & Klok, 2001; Litfin, 2000; Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). 
Coordination is defined as an actor altering its own strategies to accommodate the 
activity of others in pursuit of similar goals (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). 
Interdependencies can be understood as a boundary or frontier, in terms of the resources 
that enable actions, or in terms of functional ties in which actions are linked or causally 
related to each other (Fenger & Klok, 2001; Litfin, 2000; Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). 
This research highlights the importance of understanding implementation through 
the causal relationships between processes, outcomes and the formal and informal 
authorities that form through centralized organizations and local contexts. It also brings 
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attention to an understanding of implementation as policy change driven by various 
interactions among contexts, actors, events and outcomes. It provides important insights 
for understanding the role of social skills and interdependencies in policy implementation 
and also highlights that these are two areas where additional research is needed. The next 
section reviews literature from field theory that provides insight into each of these issues. 
3.2. Strategic Action Fields 
The electricity infrastructure and institutions of the 20th Century were designed 
with a particular: 1) scale reflecting geographic reach, 2) structure reflecting the 
relationship between public institutions and private industry structure, and 3) policy 
scope aligned to the technologies and energy system values of the time which included 
equal access to electricity, affordability, and reliability of service (Figure 3.2 see 
Dworkin et al., 2013; Hirsh, Sovacool, & Badinelli, 2010; Hughes, 1987; Stephens, 
Wilson, & Peterson, 2015). The responsibilities and authorities of RTOs, regulators, and 
energy policymakers are deeply enmeshed with one other and with the decisions of actors 
in the electricity sector. As the electricity sector transitions to clean energy resources, 
new technologies are shaping policy implementation through electricity grid planning, 
operations, and market rules; at the same time, these policy implementation decisions are 
determining the value, development, and operation of existing system assets and 
emerging technologies. This co-evolution of technology and policy is a fundamental 
aspect of energy policy change. 
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Figure 3.2. Shift in Electricity System Values 
The co-evolution of technology and energy system values shapes the scale, 
structure and scope of the electricity system. Clean energy values are reshaping 
this complex socio-technical system. 
In this complex sociotechnical system, policy implementation spans the 
responsibilities of more than one organization and involves multiple, interconnected 
levels of action. Therefore, it is essential to consider energy policy implementation from 
a governance framework in which policy implementation spans the responsibilities of 
multiple organizations and the boundaries between public and private have blurred (Hill 
& Hupe, 2014; Lynn et al., 2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2006; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; 
Ostrom, 2011). 
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Policy implementation literature from a policy process perspective focuses on 
identifying causal relationships and predicting outcome effects (Jenkins-Smith et al., 
2014; Kingdon, 2011; Sabatier, 1986; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999; Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007; Zahariadis, 2003). These literatures emphasize how political control, 
power, and authority contribute to implementation success or failure. However, the 
interdependent and dynamic nature of energy policy implementation requires action by 
multiple organizations engaging at different levels and within a context of multiple and 
often conflicting sources of authority (Goldthau, 2014; Ostrom, 2011). Understanding the 
interaction among these authorities based on fixed descriptions of rules or resources can 
be difficult. Policy implementation in complex systems requires a framework that also 
incorporates the social mechanisms that explain how and why things get done in a 
particular way. 
Moulton & Sandfort (2017) propose a strategic action field framework as a way 
of making sense of this complexity and the variations of local implementation in practice 
by focusing on which authorities are activated, or perceived to be legitimate. This 
framework identifies two components that are useful in defining a bounded system for 
the study of policy implementation: a focus on a public service intervention and decision 
making at multiple levels of strategic action. The framework also describes change driven 
by the use of social skills to legitimize various sources of authority, which is addressed in 
Section 3.3. 
Public Service Intervention 
Moulton & Sandfort (2017) focus on the interaction between structure and action 
as an ongoing emergent process at key sites within the implementation system. Using this 
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perspective, research is centered on a public service intervention that embodies ideas 
about creating change. The EIM extension of organized market services can be 
conceptualized as this type of a public service intervention. An important aspect of this 
approach is the recognition that policy implementation often requires change to existing 
interventions as well as modifications to a proposed intervention. Like policy process 
theories, implementation is defined in terms of policy change, but the level of analysis is 
a public service intervention around which collective action occurs. This shift focuses 
attention on the social processes and negotiations that drive change. Specifically, policy 
implementation is defined as “deliberate, institutionally sanctioned change to a public 
service intervention that is legitimated in part by political authority” (Moulton & 
Sandfort, 2017, p. 145). From this perspective, a particular public service intervention 
both shapes implementation dynamics and is shaped by social interactions. For example, 
the EIM extension of organized market services requires technical and policy changes to 
the existing mechanisms for power trading in CAISO and in the non-RTO regions of the 
West, which engaged particular actors in specific processes, and details of these market 
mechanisms were negotiated and altered through the implementation process. 
Strategic Action Fields 
Drawing on Fligstein & McAdam (2012) and Moulton & Sandfort (2017), 
strategic action fields can be understood as bounded social systems that form around 
shared understandings about purposes, relationships among members, and rules 
governing legitimate action. Field boundaries are emergent and are produced and 
reproduced through the interaction of actors. Multiple and often overlapping strategic 
action fields form around any given policy implementation intervention and enable or 
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constrain what is possible to change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, 2012; Moulton & 
Sandfort, 2017). For example, the expansion of organized market services was 
implemented through multiple stakeholder processes each focused on different aspects of 
the public service intervention and involving various combinations of stakeholders 
orienting to the intervention based on the unique rules, resources, and social interactions 
that serve to define the stakeholder process as a distinct strategic action field. 
Importantly, policy implementation outcomes are viewed as the result of dynamic 
interactions between structures and socially skilled actors. This perspective draws on 
organizational sociology and emphasizes that structures, which consist of rules and 
resources, are emergent and shaped by human agency (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Giddens, 1984). From this perspective, organizational 
structures are continually produced through interaction and also shape that interaction. 
Within a system of competing values and belief systems the groups with the most power 
are those that have best integrated their interests into the structuring of the organization 
(Mumby, 1987, p. 116). Thus, in policy implementation systems that involve ambiguous 
or competing authorities, the ability to integrate a particular interpretation of an authority 
into the structuring of the organization serves to legitimate the practices that are enacted. 
The implementation of clean energy policy is complex and can occur 
simultaneously in multiple fields and at multiple levels. Moulton & Sandfort (2017) 
differentiate three levels of fields based on scale of action: policy, organizational, and 
frontlines. Organizations may participate in more than one field, at multiple levels, and 
engage in implementation activities in different fields simultaneously. In this way 
implementation can be understood as a system in which the levels of implementation are 
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connected and influence each other. For example, the expansion of organized markets in 
the West can be understood through the initial policy field level conversations in which 
stakeholders determined which policy options to pursue, the logic of change, and which 
processes are desirable. It can also be understood through a focus on where and when 
implementation occurred at the organizational level as policy ideals were reconciled and 
integrated with existing market products and protocols. 
3.3. Drivers of Change: Authority, Social Skills and Interdependencies 
The field theory literature proposes three drivers of change: authority, social skills 
and interdependencies. Each of these is addressed below. 
Authority 
The Strategic Action Field Framework focuses on the activation of legitimate 
authority as fundamental in shaping how policy implementation occurs in practice. As 
defined by Weber authority can be understood as a legitimate form of power (cited in 
Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009, p. 6)  and within a given policy subsystem or strategic 
action field, policy implementation often involves ambiguous authority relationships or 
competing sources of authority (Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009; Koschmann, 2012; 
Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Ostrom, 2011). 
Authority can derive from a range of non-material sources, including legal 
instruments, hierarchical position, political relationships, economic incentives, norms, 
and shared beliefs. From the perspective of structuration theory, the significance of any 
particular source of authority is interpreted in context. Social structures consist of rules, 
which are the patterns people follow, and resources, which control people or objects. 
Social structures are emergent and form through interaction with actors (Fligstein & 
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McAdam, 2012; Giddens, 1984). According to Moulton & Sandfort (2017) “...the 
significance of any rule or resource is not predetermined; actors make decisions about the 
relative importance...” (p. 146). For example, RTOs are required to balance the interests 
of direct market participants, state regulatory policies, FERC policy directives, and the 
interests of those affected by market transactions. These interests are reflected through a 
combination of state and federal formal political authorities, the distribution of benefits 
and costs associated with power market transactions and transmission infrastructure, and 
various organizational norms and beliefs that enable and constrain what is considered 
possible. Policy implementation is thus understood as a process of negotiating which 
sources of authority provide rationale for practices that are enacted and involves actors in 
a process of interpreting what is and what is not possible. 
In voluntary collaborations, such as an RTO or the EIM, formal authority from 
political or economic mechanisms is limited and cultural authority derived from shared 
meanings and collective identity becomes more important in providing the rationale for 
collective action (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; 
Koschmann, 2012). This is of particular relevance for understanding RTOs and the 
expansion of EIM markets. The stakeholders involved in discussion of market rules and 
governance are engaged in collaborative relationships that are voluntary and only bound 
within certain limits by formal authority or exchange of resources. This type of 
collaborative relationship to determine market structures is identified by Lawrence, 
Phillips, & Hardy (1999), which clarifies that it is possible for organizations to engage in 
voluntary collaborative relationships that are critical to joint success in the marketplace. 
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These formal and informal sources of authority can be theorized as more than just 
structural properties of the strategic action field. We can also analyze them as discursive 
resources that actors draw on as a rationale for action around a public service 
intervention. 
Social Skills 
To go beyond identifying the sources of authority that provide rationale for 
certain actions or constrain what is perceived as legitimate action, and gain insight into 
how change occurs, the Moulton and Sandfort (2017) framework focuses on the social 
skills of actors as drivers of change or stability. From a field theory perspective, action 
within fields can occur through competition, coercion, and cooperation, and consideration 
of all these different types of coordination is fundamental to analysis. However, 
collective action among voluntary participants depends on cooperation. Actors induce 
cooperation and achieve negotiated authority through interactions in which members 
work to convey purpose, shared meanings, and collective identities (Cooren, 2010; 
Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Kuhn, 2008; Taylor & Van 
Every, 2014). Social skills can include tactics such as framing, agenda setting, brokering 
resources, or seizing opportunities (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 46). This construct of 
social skills is based on a model of the individual that differs from the model used in 
most policy process frameworks and theories. 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) suggest that any adequate model of the individual 
or theory of human strategic action must account for both instrumental and existential 
motives (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 43). Instrumental motives reflect individual and 
collective self-interest and form the basis for the rational choice and bounded rationality 
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models used in most theories of the policy process. Existential motives reflect the human 
need to fashion shared meanings and identities. This model of the individual, which 
recognizes both instrumental and existential motives, is particularly useful in 
understanding voluntary collaboration that depends on cooperation. Importantly, given 
the assumption that humans seek sociability and define meaning in relation to others, 
legitimacy is an important driver of strategic action. 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) challenge scholarship that focuses on the 
disposition or personal qualities of an individual and suggest instead that “entrepreneur” 
is a role in which socially skilled actors vary in their ability to recognize the structural 
situation, produce shared meanings, and take advantage of their resources, positions, 
relationships, and rules. In particular, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) challenge the 
traditional concept of human agency as entrepreneurship, in which agency is only 
relevant at particular moments or for particular individuals. From a field theory 
perspective, “individuals and groups are always acting and they are always looking for an 
edge” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 180). The structure of the field determines what 
actions make sense and social skills give actors an understanding of their opportunities 
and constraints. 
Interdependencies 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) conceive of fields as embedded within a complex 
web of other fields that can be distant or proximate and can be dependent, interdependent 
or independent. From this perspective, “the stability of any given field is largely a 
function of its relations to other fields” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 19). The ties 
among fields impose constraints and opportunities that are routinely affected by actions 
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in other fields. Thus, stability is a dynamic process of interaction among actors and the 
opportunity for change occurs through interactions that involve “innovative and 
previously prohibited forms of collective action” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 21). 
Drawing on field theory, the Strategic Action Field Framework allows researchers 
to explore how policy implementation processes occur across multiple fields and focuses 
attention on how the horizontal and vertical ties among these fields affect the purposes of 
the field, the actors who are involved, what is possible, and introduce new discursive 
resources and sources of authority (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 
2017). 
3.4. Discursive Approach and Collaboration 
The strategic action field framework brings attention to policy implementation as 
a collective action and to the dynamic interaction between social structures and actors. 
Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) consider shared understandings about purpose and 
relationship to other actors as fundamental to the emergence, stability, and transformation 
of strategic action fields. Interorganizational collaboration theory extends this 
conceptualization by focusing on communicative practices and providing additional 
insight into how actors create shared meanings and collective identities (Hardy et al., 
2005; Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 1998; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; 
Koschmann, 2012; Koschmann & Isbell, 2009). This literature examines the role of 
conversations and discourse in creating the shared meanings and collective identities that 
lead to collective action. Discursive practices and skills include the following: metaphor, 
symbolic contrast, abstraction, ideological rhetorical strategies, negative or positive 
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framing, self-referencing rationalities, privileging, recognition, resistance, translation, 
and boundary spanning (see, for example, Koschmann, 2016). 
Within this literature, collaboration is defined as “a cooperative 
interorganizational relationship that relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms 
of control” (Lawrence et al., 1999, p. 481) and collaboration can be understood as “the 
discursive negotiation of the issues to be addressed by the collaboration, the interests 
relevant to the collaboration, and the actors who should represent these legitimate 
interests” (Lawrence et al., 1999, p. 479). Building on these ideas about the central role of 
discourse, Hardy, Lawrence and Grant (2005) provide a model that uses a discursive 
approach to describe the formation of collective identity and shared meanings. A 
discursive approach allows researchers to track language in use, rather than attempt to 
understand stakeholder beliefs. A discursive approach also allows a researcher to focus 
on various levels of interaction, within an organization or at a broader societal level, and 
explore interrelationships among these levels (Hardy et al., 2005). Drawing on a 
discourse perspective emphasizes the dynamic nature of implementation and provides a 
useful way of understanding individual and collective meanings, policy learning, and 
how social skills are enacted in practice. 
The social negotiation of authority involves stakeholders in a process of 
interpreting what is and what is not possible. Interactions and conversations produce 
discursive resources that stakeholders draw on to create and legitimate courses of action 
(Hardy et al., 2005). These discursive resources are produced to make sense of issues on 
which there is general agreement and to reflect other issues in disparate or conflicting 
terms. Drawing on Hardy et al. (2005), socially skilled actors employ discursive 
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strategies to develop shared understandings of collective identities, agreements about key 
issues, and constructions that attach key issues to individual participants and their 
particular perspectives. In this model, innovation occurs when the process of change 
leverages differences among participants and balances divergent stakeholder concerns. 
When stakeholders have different interpretations of how policy implementation 
should proceed, these negotiations bring into focus the different meanings for particular 
issues or material things (Nelson-Marsh, 2017). The concept of boundary objects has 
been developed to makes sense of cases where actors are coordinating work without 
reaching consensus and to help understand the social practices involved in negotiating 
these differences and managing the tensions between different viewpoints (Bowker & 
Star, 1999; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989). A boundary object incorporates the 
interpretive flexibility of a loosely structured common concept, more specific local 
interpretations that make the concept useful for work that is not coordinated, and a 
process of tacking between these forms of the object to coordinate work without 
consensus (Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Stakeholders must explore and discuss 
the symbolic boundary formed by different meanings before they can collaboratively 
construct a shared understanding of the object and develop a legitimate course of action 
(Nelson-Marsh, 2017). 
Interorganizational collaboration literature also provides insight into 
understanding how interdependencies among fields drive stability and change. In this 
context, socially skilled actors engage in boundary spanning to sustain discourses, sustain 
collaborative spaces and provide symbolic interpretation of legitimacy (Koschmann, 
2012; Koschmann & Isbell, 2009; Nelson-Marsh, 2017; Schneider, 2009; Susan Leigh 
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Star & Griesemer, 1989). Incorporating these concepts within the strategic action field 
framework provides a useful way of examining how different stakeholders engaged in the 
implementation process. 
3.5. Conclusion and Research Questions 
In summary, this dissertation combines literature on policy implementation, 
action fields, and interorganizational collaboration to extend two concepts in policy 
process literature that have been under-theorized. First, many policy process and 
institutional theories use the concept of policy entrepreneur or policy broker to identify 
the importance of individual agency in driving policy change. However, this concept is 
not well developed (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Sætren, 2016; Weible et al., 2009). 
Second, much of the policy process theory, and in particular the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, addresses the complexity of implementation by partitioning the analysis into 
specific policy subsystems or contexts and focusing on competition among interests 
within the subsystems. These theories provide limited insight into understanding 
subsystem interdependencies or cases, in which cooperation and the need for innovation 
is a driver of change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Weible et al., 2009). The research 
approach outlined in Chapter 4 provides additional insight into the role of agency and 
cooperation in policy implementation by focusing on the social negotiations used by 
actors to promote change or enable stability. It also provides additional insight into field 
interdependencies by focusing on the horizontal and vertical ties among overlapping 
bounded social systems that work to implement policy. 
To further my driving interest in policy implementation, this study focuses on a 
specific intervention, the expansion of organized energy imbalance market services in the 
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West, and asks how stakeholders, using social practices and strategies, created and 
legitimated sources of authority to establish a Governing Body for this new market 
service. This study sought to answer the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: What sources of authority provided rationale for the practices that were 
enacted? 
 
RQ2: What social practices or strategies did stakeholders use to de-authorize or 
legitimate these sources of authority? 
 
RQ3: What influenced the definition of boundaries around the separate strategic 
action fields?  
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS 
 
This chapter presents the research methodology used for collecting and analyzing 
data. It explains the selection of methods, describes the selection of the case, sampling, 
data collection, data analysis, and interpretation. 
4.1. Selection of Methods 
This research uses a single case study and a qualitative methodology. A single 
case study approach is particularly useful for my interest in understanding the process 
and dynamics of a unique change in energy system governance. Additionally, a 
qualitative methodology is selected based on my interest in understanding the dynamic 
interaction among organizations during energy policy implementation; the social 
practices and strategies used to induce cooperation and create shared meanings; and the 
negotiation of authority. 
This research has a combined purpose. First, the aim is to conceptualize a context 
that is itself of interest. In this way my research is primarily an intrinsic case (Stake, 
2005). However, the case is also of interest in advancing our understanding of how multi-
organizational policy implementation and interorganizational collaboration occur in 
practice and in this way serves as an instrumental case (Stake, 2005). Furthermore, while 
the aim of the research is to conceptualize a context, the approach and methods allow me 
to demonstrate how and in what ways my findings may be transferable to other contexts 
or used by others (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009). In particular, 
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the discussion of my findings identify concepts and processes that can be generalized to 
other regulatory policy implementation contexts and provide empirical evidence of and 
extend our understanding of theories that have not been validated with many studies. 
This approach responds to calls for energy research to focus on the human 
dimensions of the system, address questions that are relevant to real world problems, and 
recognize the complex contexts, histories, and multiple perspectives within which the 
electricity system is embedded (Goldthau, 2014; Sovacool, 2014). Sovacool (2014) 
reviewed 4,444 research articles in three leading energy journals from 1999 to 2013 and 
found that only 12.6% utilized qualitative methods and less than 5% used qualitative 
methods other than survey analysis (Sovacool, 2014). This research also responds to an 
identified need in policy implementation and interorganizational collaboration literature 
to investigate the social mechanisms that explain how organizations collaborate and why 
things get done in a particular way (deLeon & deLeon, 2002; Goggin, Bowman, Lester, 
& O’Toole, 1990; Hardy et al., 2003; Lewis, 2006; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; O’Toole, 
1986). 
Qualitative case study research can be characterized as particularistic, descriptive, 
and heuristic (Merriam, 2009). As such, qualitative case studies are appropriate for 
exploring problems in practice (Cronbach, 1975; Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009; Stake, 
2005) and for exploring unique phenomenon (Merriam, 2009; Simons, 2009; Stake, 
2005). My study takes a problem-based approach by examining how negotiations among 
stakeholders shaped the EIM governance structure that emerged and the role and 
strategies of utilities, generators, regulators, policymakers, advocates, and non-asset 
owning stakeholders in these conversations. 
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The qualitative methods selected for this research rely on multiple sources of 
information and thick description, immersion in the context, and the self-reflexivity of the 
researcher (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; Tracy, 2013). These methods are used to study the 
performance and practices of communication. By observing what people actually do and 
the discursive practices they engage in, these methods allow me to go beyond description 
to focus on interpretation of how and why processes unfolded as they did, the tacit 
understandings of a culture, and the ways in which communication constructs or 
constitutes cultures and organizations (Kuhn, 2005; Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; Tracy, 
2013). My research is focused on understanding the policy implementation process that 
occurred in establishing the EIM governance structure and the ways in which the ongoing 
communicative processes among participating stakeholders provide insight into “the 
ability to induce cooperation by appealing to and helping to create shared meanings and 
collective identities” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). 
4.2. Research Site and Selection of the Case 
The Western EIM initiative is a rich case of evolving electricity system 
governance and provides a unique opportunity to study policy implementation and 
interorganizational collaboration as they occur in practice. Furthermore, the initiative is 
of interest because it is fundamentally changing the decision-making processes and 
relative influence of stakeholders in the West. The decisions about governance will shape 
the distribution of benefits and burdens across the region for years to come. 
My qualitative case study is defined by the collective action that occurred around 
the formation of the new regional governance structure for the EIM. It is bounded by the 
initial meeting of the Public Utilities Commission-Energy Imbalance Market (PUC-EIM) 
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Group in February 2012 and by the decision by California Governor Jerry Brown in 
August 2016 to delay submission of a broader regionalization proposal pending further 
work on the issue (see Section 2.4 for additional detail on the case). Before 2012, there 
were informal discussions and several analyses regarding the potential benefits of energy 
imbalance markets; however, the formation of the PUC-EIM Group marked the 
beginning of formal discussions specifically related to the CAISO EIM initiative that is 
the focus of this study. 
The EIM initiative is an excellent research site because the organizations involved 
in the implementation effort provided many opportunities for any interested member of 
the public to access many of the documents and meetings that shaped the process. I was 
able to gain access to the research site by signing up for meeting notifications, reviewing 
documents available online, observing public meetings, and reviewing audio recordings 
or transcripts of meetings made publicly available on the CAISO website. The only 
meetings that required pre-registration for participation were the two on-site meetings I 
observed. 
4.3. Sampling and Data Collection 
The qualitative data collection methods for this research project include 
participant interviews, immersion and systematic observation of decision making in 
context, detailed observation fieldnotes, and document review. All data for this study was 
collected with approval from and in accordance with Boise State University Institutional 
Review Board policies and procedures (IRB protocol number: EX 042-SB11-132 and EX 
042-SB11-016). All interview and meeting observation data was managed and reported in 
a manner that maintains the confidentially of the interviewees and participants. 
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Participant Interviews 
I conducted semi-structured interviews to gain an understanding of the decision-
making processes at CAISO, the actual experiences of those who participate in CAISO 
stakeholder processes, and the experiences of those who are now within the EIM 
footprint (see interview protocol provided in Appendix B). The protocol included 
questions on experience, the process for decision-making, stakeholder groups, and 
influences. The protocol was revised twice during the process as I gained experience with 
the issues to ensure the questions were relevant to both the respondents and my research. 
The protocol used a flexible guide to encourage respondents to share their view of how 
decision making occurs and questions were adjusted or improvised to accommodate the 
widely varying experience and expertise of the respondents (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 
200). 
Initial interviews were selected through repeated conversations with field experts, 
including our research advisory committee, and purposive sampling (Lindlof & Taylor, 
2011) to recruit interviewees across the different stakeholder sectors as identified in other 
RTOs and the CAISO Board nomination process. Subsequent interviews were identified 
through referrals from interviewees and included in the study to the extent they achieved 
our purposive sampling objectives. As the importance of the EIM case emerged and a 
group of EIM Transitional Committee members was named the sampling criterion was 
expanded to include a range of individuals participating on the Committee and 
perspectives from entities that do not actively participate in CAISO processes, but are 
now within the service area of the EIM and therefore, in a position to consider whether or 
not to engage with the EIM market. 
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Of the 21 interviews I conducted, two were in-person and 19 were by phone. Each 
interview was approximately one hour and all interviews were recorded, professionally 
transcribed, and scrubbed for accuracy, resulting in 419 single-spaced pages of interview 
data. The interviews are distributed across six stakeholder groups and include six EIM 
Committee members and six individuals from organizations that are not currently 
participating in CAISO or EIM organized markets (Figure 4.1). A more expansive data 
set would include current staff from CAISO and Bonneville Power Administration, who 
unfortunately declined to participate in the study. CAISO perspectives were obtained 
from former CAISO staff members. 
  
Figure 4.1. Distribution of Interviews Across Stakeholder Sectors 
Observations 
CAISO staff facilitated the stakeholder engagement processes used to develop the 
EIM Transitional Committee Charter, the deliberations of governance alternatives by the 
Committee, and the nomination process used to seat the EIM Governing Body. These 
Asset	Owners	
7	
Former	RTO	
Staff	
2	
Industry	
Expert	
2	
Industry	
Associa on	
3	
Public	Interest	
Group	
2	
Public	Regulator	
5	
  
61 
processes, though modified to encourage broader regional participation, followed 
CAISO’s standard procedures for engaging stakeholders. Furthermore, each of these 
processes followed, to the extent applicable, CAISO records availability and open 
meeting policies. The initiative and meetings were announced through CAISO market 
notices and the meetings were open to public participation either in-person or through 
WebEx or teleconference with the exception of topics appropriate to executive session, 
working groups, and Nominating Review Committee discussions. Because stakeholders 
are located in a wide geographic area and several meetings are held each week, many 
stakeholders participate via teleconference or WebEx. Observation of stakeholder 
interactions in these meetings provides an opportunity to “create a record of 
communication” by “describing and interpreting the observable relationships between 
social practices and systems of meaning” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 134) and gain 
insight into the social skills and discursive strategies used to either introduce or block 
change, as well as the iterative nature of collaboration as a social accomplishment (Hardy 
et al., 2005; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). 
For my research, observations were selected to include each of the common 
CAISO decision-making venues including Board of Governors meetings, Market 
Surveillance Committee meetings, stakeholder engagement processes, and inter-agency 
workshops. Additional focused attention is given to the EIM Transitional Committee 
meetings. These data consist of 27 field observations including 10 of the 13 public EIM 
Transitional Committee meetings. Of these observations, one is an on-site visit to a Board 
of Governors meeting at the CAISO Offices in Folsom, California, another is an on-site 
visit to an EIM Transitional Committee meeting in Portland, Oregon, one is an on-site 
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visit to an EIM Regional Issues Forum meeting in Boise, Idaho, and the remaining 
observations are via WebEx or publicly available audio recordings. These observations 
are documented in 261 single-spaced pages of field notes and 718 double-spaced pages of 
professional transcription of four regional grid operator and governance workshops (see 
summary of field observation data in Appendix C). 
Document Review 
Throughout the initiative, stakeholder input was solicited through an iterative 
process of developing straw proposals, facilitating discussion in public meetings, 
providing opportunities for oral and written comments, responding to comments, and 
revising proposals. Additionally, CAISO staff provided regular informational updates and 
briefings on special topics for the Transitional Committee. All briefings, presentations, 
proposals, and draft charters were made available through the CAISO website (see 
Appendix D for a list of documents analyzed in this study). In the stakeholder processes, 
communication performances and practices occur as an iterative back and forth between 
meeting participation, written proposals, presentations, written stakeholder comments, 
and written responses. These documents act as “aids in speech acts” and convey 
communication practices among stakeholders (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). The documents 
analyzed in this study include reports and presentations that provide an accounting of 
agency and stakeholder positions, and primary stakeholder comments and interviews that 
provide first-person descriptions of their own communications. 
4.4. Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Taken together, the interviews, meeting observations, foundational documents, 
proposals, stakeholder comments, responses to comments, and other texts provide insight 
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into the communicative process as it occurs (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011; Tracy, 2013). 
Consistent with a qualitative approach, my data analysis is iterative, alternating between 
emic (emergent) analysis of the data and etic (external) uses of existing models and 
theories, and was conducted along with data collection. I used two complementary 
methods for making sense of the data. First, the interviews, stakeholder comments, and 
fieldnotes were coded through a cyclical process. Second, other documents were 
analyzed through progressive focusing to generate issues and themes. 
The data analysis for the interviews, comments and fieldnotes used grounded 
theory and the constant comparative technique, in which meanings and claims are 
grounded in codes and categories that emerge through cumulative coding cycles and 
analytical memo writing (Charmaz, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In this method, data 
are reviewed line-by-line and assigned a code, which is a word or short phrase, that 
identifies the “summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute” of a 
portion of data (Saldaña, 2009). My primary-cycle coding focused largely on the use of 
open, process, and in vivo coding to “fracture” the data. Open coding serves as a first step 
in identifying similarities and differences in the data and naming my interpretation of the 
data (see examples in Table 4.1). Process coding identifies action and is especially 
appropriate for understanding ongoing interactions. In Vivo coding is based on actual 
language in the data and is especially appropriate for understanding worldviews. 
Simultaneous coding is used when the content suggests multiple meanings. My primary 
coding cycle resulted in 95 codes related to authority and social skills. 
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Table 4.1. Primary Coding Examples 
Type of Code Interview Text Code 
Open 
Unfortunately the ISO stakeholder processes are usually 
focused on narrow issues. One of the frustrations- and 
people involved in energy policy in California who've 
been doing it a long time, most of them will agree- that 
what we've had is a bunch of disjointed policy decisions 
without taking a broad overview and a lot of decisions 
that work at cross purposes and unintended 
consequences.  
Stakeholder 
Process Narrow 
Process 
They’ve been extremely creative in looking at how to 
apply demand response and demand side management 
resources as a way to deal with the variability on the 
distribution grid and on the load side as part of their 
portfolio of ways to integrate large amounts of 
renewables. Finally perhaps the most important thing 
that they have done was extending their Energy 
Imbalance Market to the rest of the West. 
Crediting CAISO 
In Vivo 
They’re in the middle of the market simulations they’re 
doing right now to make sure that the interactions 
between PacifiCorp’s controls and Cal ISO’s system 
controls can operate the system automatically and deal 
with settlements that are going to be necessary in such a 
rapidly moving market. This is creative stuff. This is game 
changing stuff. 
Game Changing 
Versus 
What has been more influential, in my opinion, about how 
decisions get made is the ISO has really had to engage 
more heavily with the state regulatory bodies- such as the 
CPUC, and the Energy Commission, Air Resources Board, 
and things like this. Sometimes in order for the ISO to get 
what it wants on certain issues, it has to give a little on 
what the state agencies want, and that’s not always a 
good thing. It detracts from the independence a little bit. 
RTO 
Independence vs. 
Coordination with 
State Regulators 
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Subsequent cycles of coding compared and reorganized the primary codes 
according to similarities or patterns to create categories that facilitate the analysis of the 
connections among codes and the development of themes, concepts, and claims. These 
cycles of coding also drew on theoretical constructs and were guided by my research 
questions relating the theoretical constructs to the broader questions for the study. These 
coding cycles resulted in 24 subcategories and 11 categories that were grouped into the 
four themes presented in Chapters 5 and 6 (see codebook in Appendix E). To strengthen 
the validity of the analysis, I went back to the data throughout the project to see if there 
were any instances that contradicted the developing results (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 
278). For example, my initial analysis identified “expansion of governance” as important 
to a wide range of stakeholders. However, in subsequent analysis it became evident that 
the taken-for-granted meaning behind these statements differed among stakeholders and 
the codes were divided between “transformation” and “constitution” of the market. 
Finally, I used NVIVO software to maintain the code list, organize codes into categories, 
and associated concepts and themes. Classification tables were created to allow the data 
to be analyzed by stakeholder sector, organization, or CAISO-affiliation status. 
Data collection and analysis ended following the seating of the EIM Governing 
Board in July 2016, the on-site observation of one of the first Regional Issues Forum 
meetings in August 2016, and the California Governor’s announcement that a 
recommendation for expanding CAISO to a broader multi-state region would be delayed. 
Additionally, after 32 months of observations, interviews, document review, and 
preliminary analysis, I decided the research had achieved theoretical saturation and that 
additional data collection and analysis had reached a point of diminishing returns (Tracy, 
  
66 
2013) In particular, after 21 interviews, the data provided rich contributions to my 
research and little new data seemed to emerge regarding my research questions. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I review the case study approach and qualitative methodology 
used in my research. The data collection and analysis process allowed me to 
systematically explore how the policy implementation process unfolded in practice and 
gain insight into the taken-for-granted understandings of stakeholders as they worked 
together to form a new governance structure. These insights are described in Chapters 5 
and 6.
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CHAPTER FIVE: TRANSFORMING EXISTING AUTHORITY 
 
Policy implementation involving coordination or collaboration among 
organizations often involves ambiguous authority relationships or competing sources of 
authority (Koschmann, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Ostrom, 2011). In such cases, 
policy change requires efforts to overcome or transform existing authorities that would 
otherwise prevent collaboration (Koschmann & Burk, 2016). Sources of authority include 
public policies, economic incentives, norms or beliefs. 
The analysis of stakeholder interactions presented in this chapter identifies how 
stakeholders worked to transform a dynamic of individual jurisdictional interests and 
mistrust among actors in the West and opened the possibility for collaboration and 
expansion of the EIM. The first section of this chapter identifies the values and 
jurisdictional relationships that provide a rationale for the long-standing resistance to 
regional organized markets in the Western Interconnection. This section demonstrates 
that the rationale for stability persisted in both the CAISO and the non-RTO regions and 
across differences in local circumstances, preventing collaboration. The second section 
introduces the concept of a boundary object as a way of understanding stakeholder 
interactions and demonstrates how stakeholders in the West engaged in three discursive 
strategies to overcome and transform the existing sources of authority: 1) shifting the 
discourse, 2) symbolic contrast, and 3) boundary spanning. These strategies made 
collective action possible by allowing diverse interpretations of EIM governance, but 
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were not sufficient to enable durable policy change. To enact a long-term governance 
structure, stakeholders had to explore these alternative interpretations. Chapter 6 
examines the rationale and external events that provided legitimacy for a new EIM 
governance structure.  
5.1. Existing Authorities that Prevent Collaboration  
Understanding how authority is negotiated among stakeholders involves 
investigating how particular sources of authority are created or legitimated and how 
established authoritative influences are overcome or transformed (Feldman & Quick, 
2009; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). This research extends 
these ideas of authority as a negotiated and emergent phenomenon that involves 
transforming, negotiating, and co-creating authority to the context of multi-organizational 
regulatory policy implementation. 
The long-standing resistance to organized markets in the Western Interconnection 
reflects not only a fundamental tension between the energy system values of 
policymakers in the West, but also a shared mistrust of multi-state electricity governance 
and a resistance to ceding additional authority to FERC. The first theme that emerged 
from my data involves this dynamic of mistrust and how a narrative that jurisdictional 
independence serves energy policy goals influences collaboration. Diverse energy system 
values and complex jurisdictional relationships have prevented states in the West from 
forming regional organized markets, reinforced the boundary between CAISO and non-
RTO regions in the West, and reinforced a shared mistrust of multi-state RTOs. However, 
this dynamic is being challenged by clean energy policy, innovative technology, and 
market changes. 
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Diverse Energy System Values 
Western states, municipalities, electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing 
authorities and the constituents that they serve have diverse energy system values. The 
following exchange regarding the shifting economics and over-generation problems 
associated with integrating variable renewable resources reflects some of these 
differences: 
If California gets into an over-generation situation in the afternoon and 
they are paying more for solar as a source, then when solar decreases they 
will need replacement energy and they are going to have to pay more for 
that. What is the benefit to the ratepayer of paying such high prices? 
 
(Field Observation, 11/17/15) 
 
This statement highlights the conflicting priorities among stakeholders in the West as 
they work to balance affordability, reliability, and sustainability within the electricity 
system. Policymakers across the West who see traditional thermal generation, such as 
coal, as a preferred approach for maintaining affordability do not share the clean energy 
policy goals enacted by the California Legislature. 
Across the West formal energy policy goals are diverse (Figure 5.1). The West 
has some of the most aggressive clean energy policies in the United States. California and 
Oregon require 50% of electricity to be procured from renewable resources by 2030 and 
2040, respectively (California Energy Commission, n.d.; Oregon Department of Energy, 
n.d.). California has an energy-resource loading order that gives preference to renewable 
resources over fossil-fuel generation and a greenhouse gas reduction mandate (California 
Energy Commission, n.d.; State of California, 2003). Oregon is requiring its two major 
investor-owned utilities to phase-out coal-fired electricity generation from in-state and 
out-of state sources by 2030 (OR SB1547, 2016). 
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Renewable portfolio standard
Renewable portfolio goal 
Includes non-renewable alternative resources
*	 Extra credit for solar or customer-sited renewables
†
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies in the West 
California and Oregon have some of the most aggressive RPS 
policies in the U.S. In contrast, Idaho and Wyoming are among 13 states 
that do not have an RPS goal or mandate. 
Source: Adapted from NC Clean Energy Technology Center, n.d. 
 
In other parts of the West, regulators, publicly owned utilities, and other 
stakeholders are focused on “least cost/least risk” energy policy and Idaho and Wyoming 
are among 13 states that do not have an RPS goal or mandate (NC Clean Energy 
Technology Center, n.d.). In many of these jurisdictions, it is not simply that clean energy 
is not a policy priority, but rather that regulators and policymakers have established 
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affordability and reliability as energy policy goals that are reflected throughout their 
decision-making processes. For example, a state regulator characterized the energy policy 
values in the West in this way: “ ...Cost is, you know, 95 percent the driver of energy 
policy on the part of state commissions in the Western United States, outside of 
California” (Respondent 207). A public power stakeholder also noted that for public 
power the mission is “energy at the lowest cost” (Field Observation 10/01/2014). In other 
words, regulators and policymakers in California are primarily focused on clean energy, 
whereas in much of the West regulators and policymakers are primarily focused on the 
affordability and reliability of the electricity system. 
Furthermore, some regions of the West are heavily dependent on hydroelectric 
generation, which has different environmental impacts than thermal generation. Although 
hydropower lacks the carbon and air pollution impacts associated with thermal 
generation, these resources are typically limited or not included at all in state clean 
energy policy goals because of the competing demands on water resources. In the 
Northwest Power Pool, hydropower accounts for nearly 50% of the generating capacity 
as compared to only 8% of generating capacity in the U.S. (U.S. Energy Information 
Agency, 2016a). These resources are used for multiple purposes in addition to electricity 
generation, including irrigation, fisheries, flood control, and recreation, and are subject to 
a wide range of state and federal policies. Although these other uses and regulations do 
not prohibit hydroelectric generation from participating in organized markets, they are 
often cited as a barrier to effective participation. A Northwest stakeholder expressed this 
concern as follows: 
I think there’s just some concern that could you really put a complex 
system like that into a market and get much out of it. Because it is already 
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so heavily coordinated and controlled by all of these other things. 
(Respondent 216) 
 
Specifically, for jurisdictions that rely on clean and flexible hydropower, organized 
markets lack many of the environmental and economic benefits they provide elsewhere 
and raise unique concerns about the ability to maintain operational flexibility for other 
uses. 
The distinct approaches to energy policy across the West contribute to division 
and mistrust among stakeholders. Furthermore, as explained below, underlying the policy 
preferences in both California and in non-RTO regions is tension around complex 
jurisdictional relationships and a belief that maintaining jurisdictional independence 
serves the public interest. 
Jurisdictional Relationships 
Both stakeholders within and outside of California express concern about 
engaging in a multi-state RTO and ceding additional authority to FERC. A long-time 
observer of CAISO pointed out that since the founding of the organization the resistance 
to expansion has been mutual: “The original thought was that this ISO thing was going to 
be west-wide. Nobody liked that idea outside of California. Few people inside California 
liked it either” (Respondent 209). Many stakeholders across the Western Interconnection 
believe that their own political and market interests are served by retaining jurisdictional 
independence, rather than engaging in the collective activities of an EIM or an RTO. This 
can been seen in the resistance among states to engaging with each other; in the divisions 
across federal, state, and local levels of regulatory authority; and in the inherent risks of 
engaging in a more dynamic governance system. 
  
73 
Regulators, policy makers, utilities, and other stakeholders in the non-RTO 
regions of the West have concerns about relinquishing state or local control and engaging 
with states that have very different energy policy goals. These stakeholders commonly 
refer to a preference for “local control,” “homegrown” solutions, and “anything but 
California.” Many stakeholders suggest this resistance to collective action is driven by 
concerns that California would dominate any multi-state governance structure because it 
could control a decision-making mechanism based on electricity load or population. 
Other stakeholders explained that lingering tensions from the 2001 energy crisis continue 
to have salience throughout the West and noted the wide differences in retail electricity 
prices across the region. While many western states, including Idaho, Washington, and 
Wyoming have some of the lowest average retail electricity prices in the U.S., California 
has some of the highest average retail prices (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2016b). 
In particular, stakeholders outside of CAISO are concerned that relinquishing 
jurisdictional independence would open them to political and economic risks from 
engaging with jurisdictions that not only have different energy system values but also 
have the ability to control the decision making process. 
However, another important barrier to collective action in the West is the 
fundamental tension between public power utilities and FERC. Investor-owned utilities 
and publicly owned utilities are subject to different regulatory structures.11 Investor-
owned utilities are already subject to rate regulation through state utilities commissions 
and FERC. In contrast, most public power utilities are exempt from state and federal rate 
                                                 
11 For the purposes of this paper, publicly owned utility or public power utility will be used to denote 
municipal, state, and federal electric utilities, rural electric cooperatives, and federal power marketing 
administrations.  
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regulation. For these utilities, joining an organized market means relinquishing some 
control to an RTO that is authorized by FERC and becoming subject to FERC rate 
review. It also means engaging in an organization that is influenced by state regulators. 
One long-time participant in CAISO processes observed that: “The biggest boogeyman in 
the room is FERC. They [California public power utilities] don’t want to be FERC 
jurisdictional any more than Bonneville Power does” (Respondent 213). These concerns 
have been a significant barrier to expanding organized markets in the West. 
The ownership pattern within CAISO stands in sharp contrast to the importance of 
public power in non-RTO regions of the West (Table 5.1). CAISO is designed around the 
three large investor-owned utilities in California and a partially restructured industry.12 
Within CAISO, the three largest investor-owned utilities manage more than 80% of the 
electric supply and public power utilities manage only 8% (based on analysis of U.S. 
Energy Information Agency, 2014). In contrast, the non-RTO regions of the West are 
shaped by public power and a vertically integrated industry.13 Outside of CAISO, public 
power utilities manage 48% of the electricity supply in the West (based on analysis of 
U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014). Of the six largest public power utilities outside 
of CAISO, two are in California and one is a state agency. Public power also includes 
two federal Power Marketing Administrations that manage transmission and market  
                                                 
12 As part of the industry restructuring in the late 1990s, California required divesture of generation assets. 
However, following the energy crisis of 2001 this requirement was amended and investor-owned utilities 
can own or contract for generation. California now has a hybrid industry structure in which utilities 
purchase 41% of generation output from independent power producers and own the remaining generation 
(Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015). 
13
 Outside of California, the industry structure in the West is mostly vertically integrated with 
companies that own generation, transmission, and distribution assets. The extent of independent power 
ownership of generation in the West ranges from 27% in Idaho to 6% in Wyoming and is notably less than 
the more than 40% in California (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015).  
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Table 5.1. Comparison of Utility Ownership in the West (2014 data) 
CAISO Non-RTO 
TOTAL 244,405 TOTAL 534,260 
Share of CAISO Sales1 Share of Non-RTO Sales1 
Investor Owned Utilities and 
Power Marketers 
92% 
Investor Owned Utilities and 
Power Marketers 
52% 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co 42% PacifiCorp 11% 
Southern California Edison Co 33% Portland General Electric Co 5% 
San Diego Gas & Electric Co 7% Public Service Co of Colorado 5% 
Noble Americas Energy Solutions 3% Arizona Public Service Co 5% 
Constellation NewEnergy 2% Puget Sound Energy Inc 4% 
Shell Energy North America 2% Nevada Power Co 4% 
Other Investor Owned 3% Other Investor Owned 17% 
Public Power Utilities  8% Public Power Utilities  46% 
City of Santa Clara 1% Emerald People's Utility District 5% 
Modesto Irrigation District 1% Salt River Project 5% 
City of Anaheim 1% Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power 4% 
City of Riverside 1% Colorado River Commission of NV 2% 
City of Vernon <1% Sacramento Municipal Utility District 2% 
City of Pasadena <1% Seattle City Light 2% 
Other Public Power 2% Other Public Power 25% 
Federal Power Marketing 
Administrators 
0% 
Federal Power Marketing 
Administrators 
2% 
 Bonneville Power Administration 1% 
  Western Area Power Administration 1% 
1. Based on annual GWh sales. Does not include behind the meter, customer sited, or adjustments. 
Source: Data from Form 861 (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014) 
 
power primarily to public utilities. The Bonneville Power Administration and the 
Western Area Power Administration manage 2% of electric supply in non-RTO regions 
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of the West (based on analysis of U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2014). These 
divisions across federal, state, and local regulatory jurisdictions create additional barriers 
to collective action. 
Finally, in addition to the jurisdictional tensions among western states and 
between public power and FERC, state and local officials across the region share 
concerns about FERC limiting their authority as organized markets evolve. CAISO is 
authorized not only by FERC, but also by California state statute and it has a Board of 
Governors appointed by the Governor of California and confirmed by the California State 
Senate. The authorization in state statute is unique and makes CAISO more like a quasi-
governmental agency than other RTOs (see Dworkin & Goldwasser, 2007). Although 
California statute originally contemplated the potential expansion to a west-wide RTO, a 
change in CAISO governance would require new legislation. In practice, this has led to a 
tight relationship between CAISO and California policy-making processes and a 
perception that jurisdictional independence facilitates California’s aggressive clean 
energy policy goals. For example, one CAISO stakeholder stated: 
...there are ways in which once you go down that path [to a multi-state 
RTO] – at least it's definitely my perception and the perception of others – 
that it limits the flexibility of states to pursue their state energy policies. 
Because those markets tend to try to treat everything on exactly the same 
basis to the extent they can, and sometimes the rules that work for 
generators don't work as well for demand response or for renewables or 
what have you. (Respondent 201) 
 
As this response highlights, many stakeholders within California are skeptical of 
expanding CAISO to a multi-state RTO not only because it would involve sharing control 
with other state regulators, but also because the fuel-neutrality norms for market design, 
which require a level playing field for all resource types, would be more difficult to 
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negotiate in a multi-state RTO. Stakeholders within California repeatedly expressed 
concern that expanding to a multi-state RTO or allowing autonomous decisions by the 
EIM Governing Body would be ceding additional authority to FERC to arbitrate 
conflicts. In particular, stakeholders are concerned that relinquishing jurisdictional 
independence would open CAISO decisions to more frequent challenges in FERC 
proceedings and the courts, thereby limiting progress toward clean energy policy goals. 
These concerns about engaging in a more dynamic market and FERC regulation 
are also central to the perspective of many jurisdictions outside of CAISO. A 
Northwestern stakeholder used a multi-state RTO in the Eastern Interconnection as an 
example of the perceived political and market risks associated with engaging in an RTO. 
From this perspective, over time as market rules have evolved, utilities have been caught 
in the middle of a conflict between the RTO and state and local officials over control of 
resource procurement and how they ensure that there are adequate energy resources in the 
system (Respondent 221). This example highlights one of several policy issues for which 
RTOs have blurred the traditional divides between federal, state and local jurisdictions. 
For these jurisdictions, stakeholders are concerned that relinquishing jurisdictional 
independence would risk their ability to maintain affordable and reliable energy policy 
goals. 
Rationale for Continued Fragmentation in Energy System Governance 
These examples highlight that engaging in an organized market inherently 
involves risks because market rules evolve over time and it is difficult to condition 
participation on a specified economic benefit, guaranteed affordability of rates, or 
protection of certain state and local authority. Individual utilities in the Western 
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Interconnection vary in their market positions, administrative capacities to engage in the 
complexity of an organized market, and assessment of the economic and political risks of 
engaging in a multi-state governance structure. However, many regulators, policymakers, 
and utilities share a belief that jurisdictional independence serves the interests of their 
constituents by furthering explicit energy policy goals and this provides a rationale to 
justify decisions not to engage in a multi-state EIM or multi-state RTO. 
5.2. Transforming Existing Authority 
The social negotiation of authority involves stakeholders in a process of 
interpreting what is and what is not possible. When ambiguous or conflicting authorities 
exist, actors make decisions about the relative importance of different authorities as they 
create and legitimate courses of action. In practice, researchers have observed that 
boundary objects arise directly from such conflicts and serve to enable cooperation across 
intersecting communities (Bowker & Star, 1999). Central to understanding cases where 
actors are coordinating work without reaching consensus is an examination of the 
interpretive flexibility of a particular material thing, issues, or policies. Stakeholders must 
explore and discuss the symbolic boundary formed by different meanings before they can 
collaboratively construct a shared understanding of the object and develop a legitimate 
course of action (Nelson-Marsh, 2017). Thus, the social practice of boundary spanning 
involves an ability to create a shared understanding while maintaining elements of 
alternative interpretations (Bowker & Star, 1999). 
The second theme that emerged from my data involves the loosely structured 
meaning of an EIM and the alternative interpretations that allowed stakeholders to begin 
engaging in the initiative. The Western EIM is a unique and complex set of material 
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practices developed through diverse venues over the course of nearly a decade. These 
material practices have been reified through various taken-for-granted meanings among 
stakeholders in the West. Thus, my analysis of stakeholder interactions conceptualizes 
the EIM as a boundary object and identifies how stakeholders worked to transform the 
existing authorities that have prevented collaboration and to develop alternative 
interpretations for how EIM implementation should proceed. 
Specifically, CAISO, state regulators, utilities, other stakeholders, and the 
Committee needed to transform long-standing beliefs that jurisdictional independence 
served the public interest in order to open the possibility for stakeholders to engage in a 
regional initiative. This analysis demonstrates that they did this using three discursive 
strategies: 1) shifting the discourse, 2) symbolic contrast, and 3) boundary spanning. 
Shifting the Discourse 
The EIM was initiated in early 2013 through a bilateral agreement between 
CAISO and PacifiCorp, rather than a broad agreement among stakeholders and market 
participants. I suggest that this was a strategic action intended to trigger a critical shift in 
the discourse around organized markets in the West. Previous failed market 
collaborations had attempted to resolve governance, market design, and operational 
issues before moving forward with an agreement to form a market. These initiatives 
suffered from a deficient discourse that revolved around uncertainty about market 
participation, design, and operation, all of which affect the distribution of benefits and 
costs (Cifor et al., 2015). These uncertainties increased concerns about economic and 
political risks and reinforced the authority of jurisdictional independence. 
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The CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement shifted this discourse by identifying major 
market participants, designating CAISO as the market operator, and proposing a 
relatively equal sharing of benefits between CAISO and PacifiCorp. This strategic move 
framed the EIM as a dynamic, multi-state market that generates economic and 
environmental benefits. 
The CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement structured the EIM initiative to reflect certain 
interests by privileging the position of a large investor-owned utility and marginalizing 
the Bonneville Power Administration. PacifiCorp is the largest investor-owned utility in 
the non-RTO region of the West and the largest transmission owner and operator in the 
West. It operates in six states and is one of several businesses managed by Berkshire 
Hathaway Energy. In other words, PacifiCorp has experience working with multiple state 
regulatory commissions, was already subject to FERC rate regulation, and its parent 
company has experience operating a business that participates in an RTO.14 By engaging 
in the EIM, PacifiCorp brought the issue of organized markets to the fore for regulators in 
six states. 
The Bonneville Power Administration is also an important electricity system 
stakeholder in the West. It owns and operates three-quarters of the transmission in the 
Northwest, generates electricity primarily from hydropower, and is not subject to state or 
local regulation. So, although Bonneville Power Administration faces limited economic 
or political pressure to engage in regional markets, its dominant position as a 
transmission operator means that its involvement is necessary for the proposed EIM. The 
                                                 
14 Berkshire Hathaway Energy also manages NV Energy, which was the second utility to join the EIM, and 
MidAmerican Energy, which participates in the organized market operated by the Midcontinent 
Independent System Operator. 
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CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement not only aligned two of the largest balancing authorities in 
the West, it marked PacifiCorp’s withdrawal from an alternative EIM initiative that it co-
chaired with the Bonneville Power Administration.15 This led to a situation in which 
Bonneville Power Administration was engaged in technical implementation, but 
marginalized in governance discussions. 
In addition, the CAISO-PacifiCorp agreement bifurcated the EIM technical and 
governance implementation efforts and defined the question of governance in terms of 
the relationship between the EIM and CAISO. Technical implementation proceeded 
through conventional CAISO stakeholder processes and was relatively uncontroversial, 
whereas, governance was deliberated through a newly created Transitional Committee. 
Through this separation of the issues, the EIM mechanism became operational after only 
four Committee meetings and more than a year and a half before the EIM Governing 
Body was appointed. 
These strategic actions framed the EIM as a dynamic, multi-state market. It 
brought the expansion of organized markets to the attention of regulators and stakeholder 
across six states, yet was always described as an initial step, with expansion of the EIM 
being fundamental to the design. For example, in a Board of Governors meeting a 
stakeholder emphasized that, “We hope and expect that other entities in the West will 
follow along and help expand the market in the coming months and years” (Field 
Observation 9/18/14). 
                                                 
15 Bonneville Power Administration continued this exploratory initiative in various forms through 
December of 2015. However, the withdrawal of PacifiCorp, and subsequently other investor-owned 
utilities, shifted the scale and resource mix of the initiative so that it was no longer economically viable. 
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These actions also framed the EIM as a market that generates economic and 
environmental benefits. This framing became important in shifting the discourse and was 
reiterated in each Committee meeting, and in many other venues across the West, as 
CAISO reported on technical implementation progress, realized net benefits, and 
reductions in carbon emissions. As an example, the conversation below highlights how 
this framing was used to shift the discourse: 
SPEARKER 1: We hope and expect that other entities in the West will 
follow along and help expand the market in the coming months and 
years...the interregional benefits [of the EIM] are highly dependent on 
available transmission capacity, so we worked closely with CAISO and 
Bonneville Power Administration to maximize these benefits... 
 
SPEARKER 2: Thank you...We’re all at the beginnings of something very 
good for consumers in the West. 
 
SPEAKER 3: This particular initiative is transforming the way this grid is 
going to operate and we will have a more integrated grid as a result of this 
effort. I was talking this morning with the Northwest Power Pool and they 
are taking action because things around them are changing and they can’t 
sit it out and part of that is from the leadership from CAISO, PacifiCorp 
and NV Energy. 
 
(Field Observation, 9/18/14) 
 
This exchange highlights the expectation that the EIM will generate benefits and implies 
that this will translate into more affordability or more sustainable energy for consumers. 
This message was reinforced each time CAISO reported on the economic and 
environmental benefits of the EIM and it became a dominant narrative despite ongoing 
settlement difficulties for utilities. It also points to how the “leadership” from CAISO and 
the Berkshire Hathaway companies has reoriented discussions about organized markets 
across the West and to the importance of further expanding the market. Finally, it 
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highlights Bonneville Power Administration’s involvement as another indicator of the 
shift in the long stalemate around organized markets. 
The framing of the EIM around teamwork and benefits worked to shift the 
discourse regarding potential economic risks of regional engagement and to overcome the 
authority of jurisdictional independence. 
Symbolic Contrast 
In addition to shifting the discourse about the economic risks of regional 
engagement, state regulators and policymakers needed to overcome existing authoritative 
narratives about the political risks of regional engagement. They did this in conversations 
about grid modernization and leading the transition to renewable energy. Specifically, 
certain regulators and policymakers began to contrast the existing decentralized grid with 
new technologies and regional coordination approaches that could better serve the public 
interest. Through this practice of symbolic contrast in which the meanings for things are 
derived through social interaction and modified by contrasting taken-for-granted 
assumptions with new potential meanings actors transformed the dominant authoritative 
narrative about political risks. 
First, state regulators and policymakers began to describe the Western 
Interconnection as “Balkanized” or as a “feudal kingdom” and contrasting it to the “21st 
Century” technologies provided by RTOs. The negative characterizations of the Western 
grid emerged from repeated interactions across the West, frustration with the inefficient 
use of grid infrastructure, difficulties in building transmission lines, and failures of past 
attempts to introduce organized markets. As one public interest advocate stated, “In the 
Western United States the grid is Balkanized...we have a system that is just crazy...it’s 
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slow...it’s dumb” (Respondent 215). Whereas, the positive characterizations of RTOs 
result from the proven ability for advanced information, communication, and control 
system technologies to improve economic efficiency and reliability. For example, state 
policymakers and regulators describe the potential benefits of regional integration of the 
electricity system this way: “it just really is time to move the grid operations to the 21st 
Century” (Field Observation 6/16/16) and  “...It’s just a piece of software, you know? 
Let's just start using it” (Field Observation 5/6/16). This symbolic contrast not only 
associates the authoritative narrative of local control with outdated and dysfunctional 
approaches; it also de-emphasizes the political and market significance of the EIM by 
focusing attention on the ability for its advanced information, communication, and 
control system technologies to improve economic efficiency and reliability. 
Second, regulators and policymakers began to describe the challenges of 
balancing California’s resource mix in terms of “overgeneration risks” and as a potential 
“political and economic failure” and contrasting it to the potential to “lead the transition 
to renewable energy” through regional collaboration. The negative characterizations of 
the current challenge are tied to the political risks associated with curtailing wind or solar 
resources. California’s clean energy policies and transmission investments have been 
designed to promote rapid growth of renewable resources and green economic 
development within the state. Many in California see its role as leading the transition to a 
low-carbon economy by acting as a model for others. As one California policymaker 
noted: “We can certainly act as a model or example of how you can maintain a 
sustainable economy and grow the economy while addressing climate issues” (Field 
Observation 7/26/16). However, now that renewable resources are a significant share of 
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the resource mix and are at times exceeding what the system can use, this construct of 
leading by example is being challenged. As a state official explained: 
We clearly don’t want to curtail that level of generation, we clearly don’t 
want to throw away those renewables that we’ve spent so much time and 
effort and cost putting on the system, and so we’re going to have to attack 
this across the spectrum.  
 
(Field Observation 9/18/14) 
 
Without policy and institutional changes, available generation from renewable resources 
will have to be turned off during certain periods because it exceeds what can be managed 
on the system. The existing infrastructure, including current and anticipated investments 
in renewable generation, can be used more efficiently if the footprint is expanded to take 
advantage of geographic, load, and resource diversity. Therefore, California 
policymakers and regulators have increasingly focused on their role in leading the 
transition to low-carbon economy, redefining how they measure success, and engaging 
regionally. The following comment reflects this effort: 
...California is one percent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions...we 
cannot solve things ourselves...it’s sort of game over unless we move out 
of our comfort zone of California and reach out...Idaho is like 82 percent 
renewable. Well, that’s not our definition. A lot of it’s large hydro. I mean, 
but frankly, again, you can’t get much better from a greenhouse gas 
perspective.  
 
(Field Observation 7/26/16) 
 
This symbolic contrast associates the authoritative narrative of local control with 
inefficiency and reliability risks and associates regional integration with furthering 
aggressive clean energy policy goals. 
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Through these uses of symbolic contrast, regulators and policymakers worked to 
provide other decision makers with the necessary authority to improve collaboration and 
make it difficult for them to continue the status quo. 
Boundary Spanning 
The EIM is described most often as an extension of existing real-time market 
services to other balancing authorities in the West. However, it is a unique and highly 
technical construct that has evolved from discussions throughout the West. An EIM was 
initially explored in studies by research institutions and regional governance entities (e.g., 
Cochran et al., 2013; Milligan et al., 2013; Porter et al., 2012; Samaan et al., 2013). It 
was further developed through initiatives spearheaded by the Western Interstate Energy 
Board and the Northwest Power Pool and proposals developed by various RTOs 
including CAISO and the Southwest Power Pool. It is therefore not surprising that 
differently situated stakeholders express a range of alternative interpretations of the EIM. 
Through the social practice of boundary spanning, strategic actors explored these 
alternative interpretations, created space for diverse perspectives, and worked to 
transform authorities that prevented collaboration by allowing stakeholders to understand 
how their particular interest connect to the EIM formed by CAISO and PacifiCorp. 
In discussing the conflicting views regarding the EIM, one stakeholder drew a 
distinction between the EIM as a project to create a clearly defined market product and 
the EIM as a policy to promote regionalization of the grid by asserting: 
It’s hard for people to understand EIM as a project, but it is a 
project...EIM is not—they call it an initiative, EIM is not a policy 
(Respondent 219) 
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I suggest that this is a useful distinction in understanding the alternative 
interpretations of the EIM and I identify boundary spanning across four types of local 
interpretations reflecting this distinction. These alternative interpretations do not 
represent fixed coalitions in competition with each other to drive decision making, but 
rather represent different meanings that stakeholders explored as they sought to engage in 
cooperative work. For example, CAISO used all four seemingly contradictory local 
interpretations as it engaged with various stakeholders. 
Discrete Product 
In many venues, the EIM is described in terms of its differences from an RTO. 
For example, at the first Committee meeting, CAISO staff explained that, unlike an RTO, 
the EIM requires no critical mass, has no exit fees, is low-cost and low-risk, and does not 
affect balancing authority autonomy (Field Observation, 7/1/14). These explanations 
focus on the aspects of EIM market design that protect state and local autonomy to drive 
reliability, affordability, and clean energy decisions. These explanations are important 
because retaining this authority is critical for many potential EIM stakeholders. However, 
these explanations do not convey the complexity of the EIM market design, but rather 
characterize the EIM as a discrete market product that utilities can voluntarily chose to 
use or not use. 
Integrated Product 
In other venues, the EIM is described as tightly integrated with CAISO’s other 
organized markets. For example, in a stakeholder meeting, an experienced CAISO 
participant questioned how the EIM would work: 
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SPEAKER 1: CAISO operates three markets; the EIM is not a separate 
market, it is participation in the real time markets. Does the committee see 
this as one market? Or is it separate? Or might that change in the future? 
 
SPEAKER 2: The Committee understands it is an extension of the real 
time market and that is why we have considered how difficult it would be 
to separate out. We recognize they are linked and a governance model 
would consider this...because we do know they are not easily separable. 
 
(Field Observation 1/12/15) 
 
These explanations focus on aspects of EIM market design that are highly 
interdependent and require market rules across products be kept compatible. These 
explanations are important because ensuring the fully organized markets continue to 
function efficiently and reliably and California’s investment in market infrastructure 
retains its value is critical for incumbent CAISO participants and many California 
stakeholders. However, the EIM market design work is highly technical and described by 
experienced stakeholders as “wonky” or as “the deep end of the pool.” Furthermore, it 
was carried out in a separate stakeholder process meaning that somewhat different action 
fields formed around the technical and governance implementation efforts. As a result, 
the functioning of the EIM as a highly integrated market product was not well understood 
among stakeholders. For example: 
SPEAKER 1: EIM is just on the hour – this is a full on day-ahead market. 
 
SPEAKER 2: I don’t understand how they operate side by side. 
 
SPEAKER 1: Imbalance is a product within the ISO. It’s not like being 
full in. If you are a full ISO customer, it is like turning over the keys. 
Imbalance is a separate market. 
 
SPEAKER 2: If you are in hourly, what is left? 
 
SPEAKER 1: In EIM you don’t have to bid everything in. With ISO you 
are fully in. It is almost as if you are part of their balancing authority. 
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SPEAKER 2: You are still operating your plants technically, but they tell 
you what to do. 
 
(Field Observation, 11/17/15) 
 
Many stakeholders were unclear about the relationship between the EIM and 
CAISO’s interdependent market framework. This confusion was compounded by the fact 
that other RTOs started their organized markets by operating an autonomous EIM market 
and then layering on other market productions. However, unlike other RTOs, CAISO was 
leveraging previous investments in market development to offer EIM services at low-cost 
and with easy entry and easy exit. These conversations focus on the complexity of the 
organized market designs and characterize the EIM as an integrated market product that 
must remain compatible with other real-time and day-ahead market services. 
Transformation Policy 
The EIM is also often described as an initial step toward a more integrated market 
in the West. For example, in a CAISO Board of Governors meeting, CAISO staff noted: 
“It’s a harbinger of the West working closer together” (Field Observation 9/18/14), and a 
Committee member indicated some stakeholder discussions are revolving around this 
issue: “Okay, this is just a small part of the market. Should there be broader engagement 
in an RTO or an ISO, not just EIM?”(Respondent 214). These descriptions focus on the 
aspects of EIM market design that create pressure for it to evolve over time to include 
new participants and new market functions. Such an expansion would improve 
efficiency, reliability, and importantly, enable the integration of higher levels of 
renewables. This is clearly articulated by many clean energy advocates. For example, in 
testifying about what it would take to reach climate change, affordability, and health 
goals, one advocate declared: 
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I don’t see another way to get there without taking this step. And I mean 
by that, the entire step. The whole complement of markets that comes with 
a regional RTO as well as the transmission planning pieces, and thinking 
through the EIM, which has shown great benefits and potential, I don’t 
think that goes far enough to get to that place. 
 
(Field Observation 6/16/16) 
 
Many clean energy advocates, like the one quoted above, are supportive of 
regionalization to further clean energy and environmental policy goals, and some utilities 
and FERC also support regionalization through creation of a multi-state RTO 
(Respondent 205). These explanations are important because regionalization of the grid 
provides a way to integrate high levels of wind and solar resources and achieve clean 
energy policy goals. However, they do not convey the limitations of the EIM’s current 
functionality, but rather focus on the expectation that the EIM will add functionality and 
characterize the EIM as the first step in transforming the western grid into a fully 
organized market. 
Constitution Policy 
Other stakeholders most often describe the EIM as requiring independence. For 
example, a Committee member stated, “It’s got to be an independent board solely for the 
Energy Imbalance Market. It can’t be a creature of the California Independent System 
Operator, or no one would join it” (Respondent 215). These descriptions focus on the 
aspects of EIM market design that allow participants to have a meaningful decision-
making role in the future direction of the market. As described by CAISO staff in a 
presentation to stakeholders, the guiding objectives for the Committee were intended to 
drive a “long-term independent EIM” (California Independent System Operator, 2013b). 
 These conversations are important because the EIM is shifting market 
  
91 
opportunities for utilities outside of California. For example, many California utilities are 
motivated to participate in the EIM because it reduces the cost of integrating variable 
renewable resources. In contrast, many utilities outside of California, particularly those 
that rely heavily on hydroelectric resources, do not face significant challenges in 
balancing variability within their system. For these utilities, an important motivation to 
participate in the EIM is the opportunity to provide generation into the market. In 
addition, expansion to a fully organized market could: reduce opportunities with 
traditional energy contracting partners; continue to depress prices as more zero marginal 
cost wind and solar enter the market; allow wind and solar from outside of California and 
Oregon to be valued as resources that meet state renewable portfolio standard 
requirements; and increase the value of flexible resources like hydroelectric. For these 
reasons, utilities are anticipating changing market opportunities and are paying attention 
to the market evolution. As one Northwest utility explained: 
We need to see how to stay relevant and influence where that market goes. 
We have a lot at stake. We need to be sure the value of hydro continues to 
be recognized, and transmission value and emission value. We need to 
continue to influence those big policy issues going forward. 
 
(Field Observation 11/18/15) 
 
As highlighted by this comment, the ability to influence EIM market rules and the future 
evolution of the market is critical for some stakeholders. However, CAISO’s statutory 
authorization by and accountability to the California Legislature makes the current 
governance structure untenable. These conversations focus on the potential market 
opportunities from the EIM and characterize the EIM as the first step in constituting a 
new autonomous organized market within the western grid. 
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Alternative Interpretations 
These alternative meanings of the EIM focus on four fundamental local needs and 
constraints of stakeholders: 1) preservation of political autonomy, 2) requirements for 
market efficiency, 3) representation of market interests, and 4) representation of political 
interests. The interpretive flexibility that permits the EIM to be understood as either a 
product or a policy allowed stakeholders to come together and explore these alternative 
meanings. However, these meanings also reflect two tensions (Figure 5.2). First, the 
alternative interpretations reflect tensions around the scope and sale of the EIM, or in 
other words, how tightly the market and operational design is integrated with existing 
CAISO markets and whether it will only expand geographically or will also expand to 
include additional market functions. Second, the alternative interpretations reflect 
tensions around the structure of EIM decision-making and stakeholder interactions, or in 
other words, who will influence EIM market design, planning, and operations. 
As the Committee began deliberating specific options for EIM governance, the 
conflicts in these alternative interpretations surfaced and made it difficult for 
organizations to coordinate work. Although the interpretive flexibility of the EIM opened 
the possibility for coordination and engaged stakeholders in the initiative, the EIM 
requires a governance structure to make decisions about new market rules and to 
encourage additional market participants to join. Defining the scope, scale and structure 
for EIM governance required additional negotiation of authorities. 
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Figure 5.2. Alternative Interpretations of the EIM 
The ambiguity of EIM governance and future market design allow it to be 
interpreted to meet widely varying local needs and constraints. 
5.3. Conclusion 
The unique design of the EIM allowed it to launch with only a single new market 
participant – PacifiCorp. However, as other market participants join they are expected to 
also increase the benefits for existing participants, and in fact, this did occur when NV 
Energy entered the market because it added transfer capacity (California Independent 
System Operator, 2016b). The efforts by strategic actors to shift the discourse, use 
symbolic contrast, and engage in boundary spanning created discursive resources and 
allowed different local interpretations of the EIM, which enable collaboration and 
expansion. Between August 2014 and April 2016 five additional investor-owned utilities 
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decided to join the EIM.16 These actions were important in overcoming and transforming 
existing authorities that had prevented collaboration for nearly two decades. 
However, the EIM operated without an independent governance structure until 
June 2016. In the interim, implementation issues were deliberated through CAISO 
stakeholder processes with advice from the Committee. This approach was untenable 
over the long term and only accepted because of the work the Committee was 
undertaking to develop recommendations for an alternative EIM governance structure. 
Chapter 6 explores how the Committee and stakeholders legitimated existing authority 
and created new sources of authority in developing recommendations for EIM 
governance. In doing so, the Committee worked to maintain a common understanding of 
the EIM while continuing to allow diverse local interpretations. 
                                                 
16 Announcement of intent to join: NV Energy (8/14), Puget Sound Energy (3/15), Arizona Public Service 
(5/15), Portland General Electric (11/15), and Idaho Power (4/16). 
  
95 
CHAPTER SIX: NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY 
 
Authority provides actors with a rationale for the practices they enact (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). Yet, in policy implementation, various 
ambiguous or competing sources of authority must be reconciled and the significance of 
any particular authority depends on how it is interpreted. Authority is thus co-created or 
negotiated among organizations as it is interpreted within a particular context (Fligstein 
& McAdam, 2012; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). In other 
words, skilled actors engage in social negotiation to interpret and adapt policy 
interventions to build shared meanings, enable collective action and enact policy change. 
Because the EIM is voluntary, the imposition of one governance-model or another could 
threaten the success of the initiative. Therefore, to further coordination among western 
stakeholders, it was necessary to collaboratively construct shared meanings that provide 
rationale for particular governance structures, but also allow stakeholders to tailor 
interpretations to address local needs and constraints (Bowker & Star, 1999; Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989). 
Chapter 5 identifies four alternative meanings of the EIM that address the local 
needs and constraints of stakeholders: 1) preservation of political autonomy, 2) 
requirements for market efficiency, 3) representation of market interests, and 4) 
representation of political interests. The analysis of stakeholder interactions presented in 
this chapter investigates how the Committee reconciled the tensions between political 
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autonomy and market efficiency and negotiated conflicting norms for stakeholder 
interactions that shape political and market influence. Based on my analysis, the 
Committee can be said to have performed two transformative functions that contributed 
to the acceptance of the EIM Governing Body as a legitimate structure. First, the 
Committee transformed the concept of delegated governance to an opportunity for 
shaping the future west-wide market evolution and legitimated new rationale that allowed 
stakeholders to express conditional support for delegated, rather than autonomous 
governance, as a pragmatic and temporary approach. Second, the Committee created new 
governance structures for state regulators and regional stakeholders to interact with each 
other, with the CAISO Board and with the EIM Governing Body. Somewhat counter-
intuitively, the Committee sought to achieve greater interaction and relational authority 
by creating more hierarchical structure in the CAISO process, which has been highly 
participatory and informal. 
The first section of this chapter explains how alternative interpretations of the 
EIM relate to different, initial preferences for EIM governance. The second section 
identifies the constraints imposed by the inherent design of the EIM, demonstrates how 
the Committee engaged in the discursive strategies of tacking and abstraction to create 
new sources of authority necessary to legitimate EIM governance, and highlights the role 
of interdependencies with other strategic action fields. The third section of this chapter 
describes the conflicting organizational norms for interactions among stakeholders and 
demonstrates how the committee enacted boundary spanning through questioning to 
produce unique governance structures for coordinating interactions among stakeholders. 
In these negotiations, interdependencies with other actions fields were also important. 
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Finally, the last section of this chapter compares the new EIM governance structure to the 
common elements of regional electricity governance across the seven RTOs in the United 
States. It also draws implications for the ongoing negotiation of a west-wide organized 
market and for the evolution of regional electricity system governance. 
6.1. Governance Models 
Organized markets require governance. A structure is needed to make ongoing 
decisions about market rules and to align these rules with operations and infrastructure 
planning. However, market governance is not only an issue of defining mechanisms and 
procedures, but involves decisions about autonomy and the allocation of influence. The 
Transitional Committee was created to define the relationship between CAISO and the 
EIM and to establish structures to allocate influence. 
The Committee framed stakeholder discussions around three conceptual models 
of EIM Governing Body authority: advisory, delegated, and autonomous. In very broad 
terms, California investor-owned utilities supported an advisory model of governance and 
Northwest investor-owned and public power utilities supported an autonomous model. 
However, specific stakeholder positions do not align well with generalizations based on 
RTO participation, utility ownership, or region; and many stakeholders qualified their 
positions or recommended alternatives (Appendix F). Furthermore, many stakeholders 
suggested a need to consider changes to EIM governance or CAISO governance as the 
market evolves. 
Given the long history of failed attempts to extend organized markets in the 
Western Interconnection, it is not surprising that these positions cannot be easily framed 
as competing coalitions. The relationships among stakeholders are complex. Within 
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general categories such as RTO-participation, ownership, or region, utilities differ in their 
administrative capacity, transmission rights, resource capacity, resource flexibility, 
bilateral market obligations, electricity costs, renewable energy requirements, and 
exposure to carbon cost risks. These differences complicate collaboration. For example, a 
clean energy advocate explained that reaching agreement on another organized market 
initiative failed because, “all of the participants, the different utilities, are situated 
differently” (Respondent 217). 
Focusing on the alternative interpretations of the EIM provides a way of making 
sense of these diverse stakeholder positions. The conversations and iterative comments 
and responses in the EIM stakeholder process reveal how different proposed governance 
models relate to the local needs and constraints of stakeholders (Table 6.1). 
Stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of political autonomy 
supported an autonomous governance model. These stakeholders commented on the 
importance of limiting their participation to only imbalance services and the need for 
EIM governance to be accountable to consumers outside of California. Because the 
CAISO Board is appointed by the Governor of California and has statutory obligations to 
the citizens of California, an autonomous governance structure was seen as essential. 
Stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of market efficiency 
supported an advisory model. These stakeholders commented on the value of 
comprehensive market design, the potential economic and reliability risks associated with 
disrupting the tightly integrated market framework, the obligation of CAISO to protect all 
market participants, and the large investment the consumers of California have already 
made in developing CAISO. Because the EIM is a limited market service, these 
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stakeholders sought to limit the influence of the EIM Governing Body, but also sought to 
expand the EIM geographically and functionally. 
Table 6.1. Alternative Interpretations of the EIM Related to Governance Models 
Alternative Sample Quotes 
POLITICAL 
AUTONOMY 
EIM is a discrete 
product and 
governance should be 
autonomous 
“An autonomous governing model would clearly signal to potential market 
participants that this endeavor is solely focused on the development of an 
EIM.” (Non-governmental Organization) 
 
“The intent of this revision is to ensure that no single group or area can 
force proposals on others...Overall, it creates an on-going risk that the EIM 
will not return the maximum achievable benefits to EIM participants that 
do not choose to participate in the other Cal ISO markets.” (Public Power 
Organization) 
MARKET EFFICIENCY 
EIM is an integrated 
product and 
governance cannot be 
separated 
“A separate autonomous governing board would ultimately lead to conflicts 
resulting in inefficient administration of energy markets which leads to 
higher costs, reduced benefits, and create seams issues.” (California 
Investor-Owned Utility) 
 
“I emphasize the word seamless because it has two meanings – its normal 
meaning and the meaning of not creating seams, and the hope that this 
committee’s work will not introduce additional complexities or seams into 
the framework of the EIM that we have worked so hard to achieve.” (CAISO 
Staff) 
POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE 
EIM is a 
regionalization policy 
and governance 
should be transformed 
“This evolution of the CAISO into an entity that provides wholesale electric 
market and operations services on a regional basis, and so is responsible to 
a range of states, not just California, is already anticipated by California 
law.” (California Investor-Owned Utility) 
 
“One of the most crucial functions for the EIM Governance committee is the 
authority to recommend and expand the functionality of markets to 
provide additional services...“ (Non-governmental Organization) 
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Alternative Sample Quotes 
MARKET INFLUENCE 
EIM is a 
regionalization policy 
and a foundation for 
constituting a new 
governance structure 
“...It will require greater coordination and collaboration of a Governing 
Body independent of CAISO’s Board and its obligations to protect California 
interest.” (Northwest Investor-Owned Utility) 
 
“...The EIM governance committee will be the sole body tasked with 
ensuring representation and protection of EIM interests in the CAISO 
markets.” (Northwest Investor-Owned Utility) 
 
Stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of political influence 
were divided in their governance model preferences. These stakeholders supported 
regionalization to further clean energy, reliability, and affordability policy goals. They 
sought a governance approach that would encourage geographic and functional expansion 
of the EIM. For some of these stakeholders, the delegated or autonomous governance 
models seemed most likely to encourage regionalization, while others supported 
transformation of CAISO governance. 
Finally, stakeholders that primarily interpreted the EIM in terms of market 
influence supported autonomous governance. These stakeholders emphasized the need 
for a neutral market or level playing field. Like the stakeholders that sought political 
autonomy, these stakeholders objected to California’s role in EIM governance and 
supported autonomous governance, but rather than seeking a limited market, these 
stakeholders viewed the EIM as the first step in constituting a new autonomous organized 
market within the western grid. 
What is interesting about this analysis is that initially stakeholders associated their 
local needs and constraints with particular governance approaches. Stakeholders 
fundamentally concerned with political autonomy supported an autonomous governance 
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model, whereas stakeholders primarily focused on the constraints imposed by market 
efficiency supported an advisory governance model. Other stakeholders who were 
focused on ensuring political or market influence supported a delegated or autonomous 
model. With the exception of stakeholders focused on political autonomy, stakeholders 
were united in support of the long-term transition to regionalization of markets. Part of 
the challenge for the Committee was to align the different interpretations of the EIM with 
a common governance structure. 
6.2. Defining the Relationship between CAISO and the EIM 
In conversations about which governance model to use, the Committee worked to 
define the relationship between CAISO and the EIM in a way that would encourage EIM 
expansion, while maintaining the efficiency and reliability of the market. The third theme 
that emerged from my data involves this tension between political autonomy and market 
efficiency and how it shaped the legitimacy of a delegated governance model. I suggest 
that Committee conversations about the value proposition of the EIM, the feasibility of 
amending the California statutory authorization of CAISO, and connection between the 
EIM and the future evolution of a west-wide organized market transformed the concept 
of delegated governance and legitimated a shared governance model as a pragmatic and 
temporary approach. 
This section identifies the formal economic and political authority of the EIM 
value proposition that was initially offered as a rationale for a delegated approach to 
governance. The section also examines how the social practices of tacking and 
abstraction shaped how the Committee and stakeholders understood the alternative 
models for EIM governance. Finally, this section explains how field interdependencies 
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altered the potential for the EIM to further regionalization and brought attention to taken-
for-granted assumptions. 
Authority of the EIM Value Proposition 
The EIM value proposition provided a rationale for supporting a delegated, rather 
than autonomous, governance model. The EIM leverages the complex market platforms 
paid for by California ratepayers. By extending existing systems and market processes to 
a wider footprint, CAISO is able to offer an EIM that is low-cost, has easy entry and 
exist, and can be extended incrementally to voluntary participants. These features are 
important for potential market participants focused on political autonomy. However, this 
value proposition imposes two constraints on EIM governance. First, the EIM must 
remain tightly integrated with other CAISO markets. Second, supervision of the EIM 
tariff cannot be transferred to an autonomous Governing Body without change to 
California statute. 
Negotiating Authority for Shared Governance 
The authority of the EIM value proposition conflicted with other sources of 
authority that are important to stakeholders outside of CAISO, including the potential 
economic and environmental benefits from EIM expansion and state and local obligations 
to serve their constituents. Consequently, stakeholders did not agree on the significance 
of the EIM value proposition as they began to deliberate a governance recommendation. 
However, the Committee used two discursive practices that shaped how stakeholders 
interpreted it: tacking and abstraction. I suggest that these practices revealed important 
aspects of local interpretations and shaped the rationale for participating in a delegated 
form of governance. 
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Tacking 
The concept of a boundary object incorporates the interpretive flexibility of a 
loosely structured common concept, more specific interpretations that make the concept 
useful for work that is not coordinated, and a process of tacking between these forms of 
the object to coordinate work without consensus (Star, 2010; Star & Griesemer, 1989). 
The EIM stakeholder engagement process provides a unique opportunity to analyze how 
actors “tack” between common and local interpretations as they construct and use a 
boundary object to facilitate coordinated work. The Committee is comprised of 
stakeholders. The members were nominated by stakeholder sectors and appointed by the 
CAISO Board of Governors. The members deliberated in working groups and public 
meetings, worked together to draft iterative governance proposals that were shared 
widely with any interested stakeholder, and presented the proposals in meetings. These 
members were selected not to represent their individual organizational interests, but 
rather were to selected to represent “...a diverse, well-qualified group that can promote 
the objectives of a successful EIM” (California Independent System Operator, 2013c). 
However, the home organizations and in some cases the actual committee members, also 
participated in the process as stakeholders by submitting written comments or identifying 
positions representing their individual interests. For example, the organizations that 
employed nine of the thirteen Committee members submitted written comments on the 
governance proposals. 
In the first six months, the public meetings of the Committee primarily consisted 
of updates from CAISO staff on the operation of the EIM. Committee members 
interacted very little with the public or with each other in these public venues. During this 
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time period, the Committee was gathering information and engaging in private working 
group sessions. After this period of learning about legal and economic constraints, 
structures of other RTOs, and local concerns, the Committee referenced this experience 
to provide legitimacy to their proposed course of action. For example: 
This is not something that occurred overnight. There was a lot of 
debate...while many of us came from different lines of organizations the 
criteria is that we be independent on the transitional committee and that is 
what we are looking for going forward. 
 
 (Field Observation, 1/12/15) 
 
In the next eight months of Committee meetings, the members explained common 
positions in public and to their home organizations and responded formally with 
comments on the proposals. So while members had legitimacy within the Committee 
because of their particular stakeholder experiences, they also had legitimacy with their 
home organizations because of their ability to interpret positions of the Committee. This 
tacking between meanings and how it shaped the interpretation of the EIM value 
proposition can be seen in the following example, which traces the dialogue as 
represented in iterative written documents between the Committee and local comments of 
one Committee member between January and July of 2015: 
COMMON:  The model involving ‘Autonomous Separate Entity’ 
raises questions related to the additional costs. Those additional 
costs could undermine a key premise for the EIM business model ... 
Would these types of costs, or other potential costs, be worth 
incurring in order to have the EIM governed through an autonomous 
entity? 
 
LOCAL: If there was significant critical mass of potential EIM 
Entities ... then it may be that those benefits would justify additional 
system, legal, administrative, and other supporting start-up costs. 
This would be a factual inquiry. 
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COMMON:  At this time, we have mixed opinions about change to 
the overall ISO governance. On one hand, if the ISO continues to 
expand in its geographic reach, such a change seems both fair and 
inevitable. At this time, however, a change may be premature... 
 
LOCAL: It is appropriate...that the CAISO Board would maintain 
the foundation of market governance until such time as regional 
developments are sufficiently extensive that wholesale governance 
changes may be considered further... 
 
COMMON:  One continuing point of disagreement is whether the 
Transitional Committee should attempt to create an autonomous and 
separate model of governance for EIM matters now. This is a 
concept we rejected...A number of commenters reiterated their 
desire for an autonomous model...We once again decline to adopt an 
autonomous governance model, because the only way to do so 
meaningfully is to obtain a legislative approval that is unlikely with 
respect to the immediate need for EIM governance. 
 
LOCAL: As currently constructed, the EIM is a bolt-on addition to 
the CAISO Real-Time Market. It is not an RTO, yet...the Committee 
faces a Hobson’s choice, and the failure to move forward with some 
proposal seems untenable. 
 
This exchange is interesting for several reasons. First, it highlights that 
stakeholders confronting a need for political influence did not consider potential costs 
sufficient justification to rule out an autonomous governance model. The comments of 
many stakeholders reflected similar positions and asserted the need for the EIM to have 
some degree of independent authority. Second, it demonstrates a shift in the formal 
dialogue, which had previously omitted reform of CAISO governance from the range of 
possible options. Many stakeholders did not accept the constraints imposed by existing 
California statute, but instead repeatedly asked the Committee to recommend that 
statutory changes be pursued. Finally, it illustrates how the Committee offered the limited 
EIM functionality as a rationale for accepting more limited influence required by not 
pursuing legislative action and how a local response reflected acceptance of this 
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rationale. In this way, the Committee and stakeholders tailored the local meaning of the 
EIM. By repeatedly referring to the EIM as a “bolt-on addition,” stakeholders reinforced 
the limited scope of EIM functions relative to the full range of organized market services 
offered by CAISO within California and the dependence of the EIM on this integrated 
market platform. 
Abstraction 
Throughout the Committee process, stakeholders expressed diverse positions 
about the evolution of the EIM market. While nearly all stakeholders expressed support 
for expansion of the EIM, they had different understandings of what expansion meant. 
Specifically, some stakeholders supported the EIM expanding geographically and 
evolving to autonomous governance, but with functionality limited to current services. In 
contrast, other stakeholders supported the EIM expanding both geographically and 
functionally and evolving into a multi-state RTO. Rather than explicitly accepting or 
rejecting differing expectations or explicitly designing governance to support a particular 
pathway for market growth, the Committee repeatedly framed the governance 
recommendation as being developed with “an eye toward the future” and “not an end 
state.” By refraining from committing to one particular future and abstracting the concept 
of market evolution, the Committee retained an element of interpretive flexibility in the 
EIM. 
Interdependencies Affecting Choice of Governance Models 
The interdependence between the Committee processes and other action fields 
imposed constraints on what was possible and shaped how stakeholders understood the 
choice of governance models. In April 2015, PacifiCorp signed an agreement with 
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CAISO to explore the feasibility of full participation in the CAISO organized markets. 
This occurred after the Committee’s ninth meeting and in the midst of stakeholder 
comments on the straw proposal. This changed the context of the Committee’s work. 
PacifiCorp and CAISO began to evaluate benefits of a fully organized market and 
discussions were initiated with California policymakers to consider the statutory reforms 
necessary to transform CAISO into a multi-state RTO. Consequently, the EIM could no 
longer be expected to evolve into a regional market with expanded functionality and 
deliberations about statutory changes shifted to a different venue. 
This external event required the Committee and stakeholders to discuss the future 
of the EIM in more specific terms and disrupted the previous efforts to abstract the 
concept of market evolution. The PacifiCorp announcement created a moment of co-
authoring in which the Committee and stakeholders discussed their previously taken-for-
granted assumptions about the future of the EIM. The limited functionality of the future 
EIM and uncertainty about its long-term viability if market participants engage in a 
multi-state RTO initially led some stakeholders and Committee members to question the 
need for EIM governance. However, several Committee members suggested that their 
work designing the EIM Governing Body should be viewed as foundational for regional 
governance. A new rationale for delegated governance emerged. The success of EIM 
governance was framed as critical for building the trust necessary for a wider regional 
market (CAISO, 6/22/15). To further this end, the Committee innovated the concept of 
shared governance, which places an emphasis on authority derived through ongoing 
social negotiation. 
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The shared governance mechanism was designed to “foster a collaborative 
relationship” between the EIM Governing Body and the CAISO Board of Governors. It 
gives the EIM Governing Body primary authority over EIM market rules, although any 
approved changes are also subject to consent by the CAISO Board. It also requires joint 
approval of market rule changes that affect both the EIM and other CAISO markets. 
Additionally, the EIM Governing Body has a formal advisory role for market rules 
applicable generally to CAISO markets. This shared approach avoids competing FERC 
tariff filings and requires collaboration. By creating space for interactions rather than 
creating hierarchical structures, the Committee sought to provide tangible relational 
authority, while ensuring the EIM and other organized market rules remain coherent and 
compatible. 
Balancing Political Autonomy and Market Efficiency 
The EIM value proposition provided a rationale for supporting a delegated 
governance model and ensuring that the EIM remains tightly integrated with other 
CAISO markets. However, this source of authority was not sufficient. For stakeholders 
concerned about political autonomy, the distinction between the EIM and the full CAISO 
market became important in accepting a delegated form of governance. Furthermore, the 
initiative to consider comprehensive regional governance provided a rationale for the 
Committee’s decision declining to recommend changes to California statute. By 
repeatedly referring to the EIM as a “bolt-on addition,” stakeholders reinforced the 
limited scope of EIM functions relative to the full range of the CAISO organized market, 
the limited future evolution of the market, and the dependence of the EIM on the CAISO 
market platform. Finally, the innovation of a shared governance model transformed the 
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concept of delegated governance from the designation of limited authority to an 
opportunity to shape the future west-wide market evolution and provided a rationale for 
engaging in the EIM. 
These new sources of authority did little to change stated stakeholder positions 
regarding the end state for EIM governance. In particular, many stakeholders continued 
to voice a preference for autonomous governance and requested that the Committee 
recommend changes to California state law. However, these new sources of authority 
allowed stakeholders to express conditional support for delegated, rather than 
autonomous governance, as a pragmatic and temporary approach. For example, 
stakeholders endorsed delegated governance because of the “practicalities of the 
immediate need” or for a “limited duration.” Stakeholders faced a “Hobson’s choice” in 
that a proposal was needed to address immediate EIM governance needs, but the broader 
discussions of CAISO governance reform or autonomous west-wide governance had 
shifted to a different venue. 
The shared understanding of EIM governance as something temporary and open 
to further modifications, but linked to the success of market reform in the wider region 
provides a loosely structured shared meaning that allows stakeholders with different 
beliefs about market evolution to participate together in the EIM. 
6.3. Developing Structures to Coordinate Stakeholder Interactions 
In conversations about governance structures to coordinate stakeholder 
interactions, the Committee worked to reconcile conflicting organizational norms for how 
to interact with market participants and public sector stakeholders. The fourth theme that 
emerged from my data involves this tension between the influence of political interests 
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and the influence of market interests. I suggest that the Committee sought to achieve 
greater interaction and relational authority through decisions to create two new 
governance structures: a body of state regulators and a forum for regional stakeholders. 
This section identifies the conflicting organizational norms that contribute to a 
rationale for the two new structures to coordinate stakeholder interactions. It also 
identifies how the Committee enacted boundary spanning through the discursive practice 
of questioning to reveal the importance of and differences between organizational norms. 
Finally, this section explains how field interdependencies altered the likely scope of EIM 
participation and brought attention to taken-for-granted assumptions. 
Authority of Organizational Norms 
Over the course of Committee deliberations, the structures and norms for how 
multi-state RTOs interact with state policymakers provided a rationale for creating a new 
EIM body of state regulators. In other parts of the United States, multi-state RTOs have 
voluntarily established organizations of state regulators and policymakers that coordinate 
information sharing and provide recommendations to the RTO and to FERC (for 
explanation of purpose, see Smith, 2007). These organizations are actively involved in 
issues that overlap with traditional areas of state purview, such as regional transmission 
planning, transmission cost allocation, resource adequacy, and clean energy policies. 
Although the EIM is a limited market product, establishing a mechanism to 
represent diverse public interests was important for stakeholders focused on political 
influence. State regulators and local officials are accountable to the public. If they 
delegate influence to a new EIM Governing Body, they need a rationale that allows them 
to align this decision with their obligation for accountability. When a regional market 
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forms, the shift in the locus of control from state and local to federal regulation and the 
new lines of accountability are difficult for public sector organizations to maneuver. For 
example, one stakeholder speculated that the primary role of the governance effort was to 
provide an accountability mechanism for state regulators: 
Because they [state regulators] wanted to show their constituents and their 
governor’s offices that we’re keeping a tab. We are not controlling. We’re 
keeping a tab on this growing market structure... (Respondent 219) 
 
The Committee initially proposed a body of state regulators to advise both the 
CAISO board and the EIM Governing Body. The proposed body, like the state 
organizations affiliated with multi-state RTOs, was designed to provide accountability to 
the public, facilitate the work of state regulators, and inform RTOs on issues at the 
interface with state priorities. However, the relatively large share of public power in the 
Western Interconnection and the relationships formed through long-term participation in 
voluntary power pools complicated this proposal.17 
Negotiating Authority for Stakeholder Structures 
While the proposal to create an elevated role for state regulators was widely 
supported, stakeholders did not agree that this body alone would be sufficient to represent 
the full range of public interests in the Western Interconnection or on how other political 
and market interests should be represented. Through an iterative process of questioning 
focused on differentiating positions, Committee members engaged stakeholders in 
conversations that explored their preferences for stakeholder interactions. These 
responses informed the Committee as it worked to construct governance structures with 
                                                 
17 Power pools establish relationships among electric power companies within a region with common 
operational goals, such as maintaining system stability and service reliability. The Western Interconnection 
includes the Northwest Power Pool and the Western Systems Power Pool.  
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sufficient perceived legitimacy to attract new EIM market participants. I suggest that 
through this practice of questioning and refining the recommendations, the Committee 
enacted boundary spanning that shaped how stakeholder interactions with the EIM will 
be coordinated. This can be seen in the following examples. 
Interactions with Market Participants 
The following exchange illustrates how Committee questioning revealed the 
importance of differences between CAISO norms for interacting with market participants 
and the norms in traditional power pools and other RTOs. 
COMMITTEE MEMBER: The EIM governance is not yet set and while 
concerns about governance are often raised, it is not clear what type of 
governance is acceptable? 
 
STAKEHOLDER: Something like the governance of the Southwest Power 
Pool [a multi-state RTO] would be acceptable. They have lots of member 
representation; stakeholders are heard and have real influence. We are 
looking at getting away from a “California-centric” approach. We are 
looking to be independent from looking at exclusively California. 
 
(Field Observation 03/05/15) 
 
This exchange highlights that for many stakeholders influence is equated with the 
concepts of membership and representation. For example, utilities that are part of the 
Northwest Power Pool have expressed support for the Southwest Power Pool governance 
approach. The Southwest Power Pool, like other RTOs that evolved from existing power 
pools, is structured around the concepts of membership, hierarchical committees, sector 
representation, voting, and industry staff preparing position papers. It describes itself as 
“member-driven.”  During Board meetings, members of committees representing market 
participants and state regulators sit intermixed with the Board and provide advisory 
opinions before the Board votes. As a Committee member explained, these organizational 
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norms are important for building relationships and creating legitimacy in formal 
governance structures: 
I think it facilitates that culture of engagement and inclusiveness. And it's 
a lot easier to sit back in a stakeholder process, write comments, and then 
file a pleading at FERC objecting to something than it is to sit in a group 
of your peers and not compromise on a position. 
 
(Field Observation 5/6/16) 
 
These structures for how other RTOs have chosen to interact with market 
participants stand in stark contrast with the CAISO stakeholder engagement process. The 
CAISO process is structured around the concepts of open participation, open access to the 
Board, and ad hoc initiatives driven by a professional staff. CAISO does not have a 
concept of membership, a hierarchical committee structure, or voting, and sector 
representation is only used for Board nominations. 
These differences in how RTOs engage with market participants did not initially 
surface as an issue for the Committee. Although the Committee was diverse in terms of 
industry sector, expertise, ownership, and participation in organized markets, the 
members were predominantly from organizations that were familiar with CAISO 
processes. Of the original ten members, five were affiliated with organizations that 
engaged regularly with CAISO; three were state regulators; one was affiliated with an 
EIM participant; and one was affiliated with an investor-owned utility operating in both 
the Western and Eastern Interconnection. The Committee viewed the CAISO stakeholder 
engagement process in positive terms and proposed that the EIM use the same structures 
for interacting with stakeholders. However, for many stakeholders not familiar with 
CAISO processes the EIM proposal lacked sufficient hierarchical structures to be 
perceived as legitimate. 
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Interactions with Public Sector Agencies  
Committee questioning also revealed the importance of differences between the 
organizational norms of RTOs and the norms of public power utilities in the Western 
Interconnection. In response to questions about whether representatives of public power 
should be included on the body of state regulators, a wide range of stakeholders, 
including an investor-owned utility, municipal utilities, and clean energy advocates, 
replied that an advisory body, like the body of state regulators, should include the local 
officials that regulate public power. Others noted that the proposed body of state 
regulators unfairly elevated the interests of investor-owned utilities relative to public 
power and that an advisory body should be “created in a balanced way to represent other 
interests including those of non-jurisdictional utilities” (Stakeholder Comments and EIM 
Transitional Committee Responses, 03/23/15). These comments are interesting because 
they illustrate the inherent challenge of creating governance structures to coordinate 
interactions among state regulators, state policymakers, and investor-owned utilities and 
public power utilities, which at the local level comprise the roles of regulator, 
policymaker, and market participant. 
CAISO and other RTOs treat public power utilities as market participants, rather 
than public sector representatives. These norms conflict with how many public power 
utilities in the Western Interconnection view their responsibilities. Several stakeholder 
comments highlight that, similar to state regulators, public power utilities face pressures 
to ensure engagement in the EIM continues to support their clean energy, reliability, and 
affordability goals. As one stakeholder explained: 
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For local government structures, that's very challenging, not only to cede 
to some other authority in the first place, but then to accept the risk, the 
future risk, associated with those changes. (Respondent 221) 
 
In other words, public power utilities have unique public accountability 
responsibilities that differ from investor-owned utilities and affect their assessment of 
market risks. From this perspective, the body of state regulators unfairly excluded elected 
or appointed officials responsible for municipal or cooperative power. These comments 
also highlight that some public power utilities see state regulators as not only 
representatives of the public interest, but also as representatives of the investor-owned 
utilities that they regulate. From this perspective the body of state regulators upsets the 
level playing field of the market. 
To address stakeholder concerns, the Committee proposed that the body of state 
regulators include representatives from public power. This was framed as a way to 
address the public accountability obligations of these utilities and provide representation 
for their consumers. The proposal was supported by public power utilities, but opposed 
by Bonneville Power Administration. As a federally authorized Power Marketing 
Administration, Bonneville is often included with public power; however, it does not 
have a clearly corresponding elected official that would have met the criteria being 
discussed for participation on the body of state regulators. Other stakeholders asserted 
that public power should be viewed, not as a representative of public interest, but 
primarily as a market participant. From this perspective, including public power on the 
body of state regulators would unfairly elevate the interests of a certain class of market 
participants and would upset the level playing field of the market. 
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Interdependencies Affecting Governance Structures 
Interdependencies with other action fields altered stakeholder thinking about what 
was possible and shaped how stakeholders understood alternative EIM governance 
structures. While the Committee was developing its initial issue paper, the Northwest 
Power Pool issued a solicitation to develop a separate EIM. The solicitation was closed 
without a disposition in February 2015. Although some members of the Northwest Power 
Pool continued to explore a more limited and less expensive alternative, it became less 
likely that there would be a second EIM in the Western Interconnection and more clear 
that Bonneville Power Administration would be unlikely to join the CAISO EIM. 
These external events highlighted taken-for-granted assumptions that governing 
structures, like the Body of State Regulators, would be designed around the geographic 
scale of the EIM and brought attention to the concerns of stakeholders that do not intend 
to participate in an organized market, but are critical for coordinating such services and 
ensuring efficient use of transmission infrastructure. Committee interactions with 
stakeholders around these issues, led to a fundamental shift in thinking about stakeholder 
engagement. Rather than designing structures for stakeholder interactions around market 
participants, the Committee began thinking about how to coordinate work with non-
participants and the seams with these “neighboring balancing authorities.” 
The increasing importance of clean energy in the West contributed to this shift in 
thinking about stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders that interpret the EIM as a 
regionalization policy to promote integration of wind and solar recognized the 
importance of engaging across the boundaries between RTO and non-RTO regions. For 
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example, a Committee member challenged others to think differently about the role of 
EIM governance: 
I think one of the biggest benefits that we eventually get from doing this is 
the overall coordination of the system. We have PMAs [Power Marketing 
Administrations] that control large parts of the western grid...I think it is 
wise to have some sort of role for them to be heard...Probably, they 
wouldn’t be interested in joining the market necessarily, but they facilitate 
participation in the market and their systems are implicated. No more than 
they can pretend that we’re not here. We can’t pretend that their not there 
either.  
 
(Field Observation 4/30/15) 
 
This comment reflects a growing interest in innovating a uniquely Western approach to 
electricity system governance that would coordinate bilateral markets, organized markets, 
infrastructure planning, and operations at a regional scale. 
The Committee was challenged with reconciling several conflicting positions: 
objections to creating a body of state regulators while relying on CAISO stakeholder 
processes; objections to including public power on the body of state regulators; and 
support for coordinating among organized markets, bilateral markets, and transmission 
systems. In response, the Committee chose to limit participation in the body of state 
regulators, but departed from the CAISO norms for stakeholder engagement. The 
Committee proposed a Regional Issues Forum to engage neighboring balancing 
authorities, including Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs), and to provide a forum 
for “face-to-face communication” among stakeholders. 
The new forum is intended to augment CAISO’s existing stakeholder process, 
which continues to be open to all interested stakeholders including representatives of 
neighboring balancing authorities and PMAs. The Committee recognized that they 
needed to interact in new ways in order for EIM governance to be perceived as legitimate 
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and to attract new market participants. By instituting new structures to increase 
interactions among participating and non-participating stakeholders, the Committee 
acknowledged the importance of communication, relationships and trust as emergent 
sources of authority. One Committee member provided the following rationale for the 
Regional Issues Forum: 
I think as we have talked through some of the EIM start up issues and also 
in this governance-centric process, I think we’ve determined that the more 
discussion we have of these matters the better we facilitate understanding 
and the better off we are and so that is really the underlying purpose... 
 
(Field Observation 8/25/15) 
 
As reflected in this comment, the success of the Committee process itself was seen as a 
rationale for creating new structures to encourage stakeholder interactions and facilitate 
coordination among stakeholders with different regulatory requirements and business 
model demands. 
Balancing Political Influence and Market Influence 
EIM stakeholders had to negotiate conflicting norms for stakeholder interactions. 
Other RTOs coordinate interactions with public sector stakeholders through organizations 
of state regulators. This type of organization was important to state regulators, state 
policymakers, and other stakeholders who sought a mechanism to ensure energy policy 
values were represented in EIM governance. However, public power utilities did not see 
this structure as representative of their interests or the interests of their consumers, but 
rather viewed it as upsetting the level playing field of the market. Furthermore, these 
stakeholders did not accept CAISO’s open stakeholder process as a legitimate 
participation mechanism, but instead equated influence with membership and 
representation. To reconcile these conflicting norms, the Committee created new 
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governance structures for state regulators and regional stakeholder to interact with each 
other, with the CAISO Board and with the EIM Governing Body. Somewhat counter 
intuitively, the Committee sought to achieve greater interaction and relational authority 
by creating more hierarchical structure in the CAISO process, which has been highly 
participatory and informal. 
6.4. Elements of Regional Electricity Governance 
The alternative interpretations of the EIM focus on four fundamental local needs 
and constraints of stakeholders: 1) requirements for market efficiency, 2) preservation of 
political autonomy, 3) representation of political interests, and 4) representation of 
market interests. I suggest that these needs and constraints are not only relevant for the 
EIM, but are generalizable to RTO governance structures in the United States. 
Across the United States, transmission organizations have formed seven different 
RTOs. Despite being authorized under the same federal authority and early FERC efforts 
to impose a standardized market design, each RTO is shaped by its context and is 
somewhat unique (Appendix G). Of the seven RTOs, four serve market participants 
across a multi-state region: Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), ISO 
New England (ISO-NE), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and the Southwest Power Pool 
(SPP). In contrast, three RTOs serve market participants within the boundaries of a single 
state: CAISO, Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), and New York 
Independent System Operator (NYISO). The scope of RTO operations ranges from PJM, 
with more than 171,000 MW of generation capacity and a service population of 
approximately 61 million customers, to ISO-NE, with 31,000 MW of generation capacity 
and a service population of approximately 31 million (Independent System Operator of 
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New England, n.d.; PJM Interconnection, 2016b). 
The system architecture, market designs, and utility business models also differ 
across RTOs. For example, NYISO has 11,000 miles of transmission lines, eight 
transmission owners, and more than 400 market participants (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, n.d.-b; Fernandez, 2011). In contrast, SPP has 60,000 miles of transmission 
lines, 43 transmission owners, and 93 market participants (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, n.d.-b; Southwest Power Pool, n.d.). In MISO, the utilities are largely 
vertically integrated and regulated by the states, whereas many of the states in PJM have 
more fully restructured generation and retail sales. Finally, RTOs differ in renewable 
resource generation and capacity (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015).18 For example, CAISO, 
ERCOT, ISO-NE and NYISO have the largest share of hydroelectric and renewable 
resources (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2016).  
These differences create distinct organizational challenges for RTO governance 
and decision-making. However, all RTOs have four common governance elements that 
correspond to the unique combinations of local needs and constraints of stakeholders 
within a particular region (Table 6.2). 
First, RTO boards are designed to ensure market efficiency and promote a level 
playing field. FERC Order 2000 requires RTOs to be independent of control by any 
market participant or class of participants (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
2000) and RTO board members are nominated by stakeholders, but selected based on 
                                                 
18 Data is not available from FERC (2016) for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). ERCOT 
2015 generation use: 48% natural gas, 28% coal, 12% wind, 11% nuclear, and 1% other. ERCOT 2015 
generation capacity: 53% natural gas, 22% coal, 18% wind, 6% nuclear, and 1% other (Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas, n.d.) 
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expertise and diversity. 
Table 6.2. Comparison of RTO Governance Structures 
 CAISO ERCOT ISO-NE MISO NYSIO PJM SPP 
States Served 1 1 6 15 1 13 14 
Board Membership and Nomination 
Independent  Hybrid1      
Board 
Selection 
Governor 
appoints2 
Board and 
Sectors 
Board and 
Sectors 
Board and 
Sectors 
Board and 
Sectors 
Board and 
Sectors 
Board and 
Sectors 
Stakeholder Engagement3 
Members 
and Sector 
Voting 
*      
Public Power 
Sector  
      
Alternative 
Resources 
Sector4 
*      
Civil Society 
Sector5 
*      
State Relationship 
 
Governor 
appoints 
board 
State PUC 
oversight 
State policy 
/ regulator 
body 
State 
regulator 
body6 
State PUC 
oversight 
State 
regulator 
body 
State 
regulator 
body 
Shared Section 205 Filing Rights 
   Competing  Delegated Consensus Consensus Delegated 
1. Board includes 5 independent members, 10 stakeholder representatives and Chair of the Texas Public 
Utilities Commission.  
2. Appointed by Governor and confirmed by State Senate using stakeholder nomination process at Governor’s 
discretion. 
3. Typical sectors include transmission, generators, other suppliers, and end-users. Table highlights sectors of 
interest. 
4. Includes renewable energy, energy efficiency, demand response, and distributed generation. 
5. Includes environmental and consumer advocates. MISO also explicitly includes state regulators as a 
separate sector. 
6. The Organization of MISO States consists of state regulators and associate members representing other 
public policymakers. 
* = CAISO uses sectors only for board nominations, which are considered only at the discretion of the Governor. 
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 CAISO ERCOT ISO-NE MISO NYSIO PJM SPP 
Sources: (California Independent System Operator, 2014a, 2014b; E4 the Future and Synapse Energy Economics, 
2016; Fernandez, 2011; PJM Interconnection, 2016a; Shonkwiler, 2016) 
Second, RTO mechanisms for sharing authority to file changes to market rules act 
to preserve political autonomy. The Federal Power Act authorizes RTOs to submit 
market rule changes for regulatory approval by FERC, and in general RTOs have a 
mechanism to share this formal authority.19 CAISO is an exception in that it does not 
share Section 205 filing rights. In ISO-NE, NYISO and PJM, specific member 
committees have either competing or consensus authority to make or request Section 205 
tariff filings with FERC. For example, in PJM, the Members Committee has filing 
authority over operating issues and the Board has filing authority over reliability and 
rates. Similarly, the state regulator organizations affiliated with MISO and SPP have 
delegated authority to request Section 205 tariff filings for specific policy issues. For 
example, the Organization of MISO states has responsibility for transmission planning, 
resource adequacy, and transmission cost allocation and has formally delegated authority 
to request that MISO make a tariff filing with FERC for certain transmission projects. 
Third, RTO structures for interacting with state regulators or policymakers 
provide a formal mechanism for the influence of political interests. Experience across 
RTOs demonstrates a nexus of formal regulatory authority among federal, state and local 
entities around issues such as resource adequacy, capacity, transmission planning, 
storage, and demand response. The multi-state RTOs interact with state officials through 
organizations that coordinate information and recommendations among states. In 
contrast, single-state RTOs are responsible to state officials through either direct statutory 
                                                 
19 ERCOT is not FERC jurisdictional. Thus, this mechanism is not applicable. 
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authorization or regulatory oversight. 
Finally, RTO stakeholder engagement processes provide a formal mechanism for 
the influence of market interests. FERC Order 719 requires RTOs to be responsive to 
stakeholders and to provide stakeholders with direct access to their boards (Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 2008). In response to this requirement, RTOs generally 
have membership requirements, hierarchical committee structures, and industry or public 
interest sector voting. Each RTO varies in the types of sectors represented and in the 
weighting of sector votes. Again, CAISO is an exception to this approach to stakeholder 
interactions. 
CAISO is unique among RTOs because it does not ensure stakeholders a role in 
selecting the board, it does not have a mechanism for sharing Section 205 filing rights, it 
is authorized in California statute, and it has an open stakeholder engagement process 
with a flattened organizational structure. The voting thresholds in typical RTO processes 
promote coalition building and make it easier to sustain the status quo rather than enact 
change; whereas, the CAISO process does not require consensus to enact change. In 
addition, in typical RTO processes, the sector definitions and weighted voting structures 
affect the balance of power; whereas, in the CAISO process the balance of power is 
shaped by how staff responds to stakeholder input. As stakeholders in the Western 
Interconnection contemplate creating a west-wide RTO, they are negotiating yet another 
unique combination of governance elements to reflect local needs and constraints. 
6.5. Conclusion 
Like many policy implementation issues, EIM governance is not only an issue of 
defining policy mechanisms and procedures, but involves decisions about autonomy and 
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the allocation of influence. This research demonstrates that EIM governance was 
designed to maintain a loosely structured construct with interpretive flexibility and 
rationale that would encourage additional EIM participation without requiring consensus. 
This indeed appears to have been successful. Since the EIM Governing Body was 
appointed and despite continued support for autonomous governance, three public power 
organizations – the Balancing Authority of Northern California, Sacramento Municipal 
Utility District, and Seattle City Light – have announced their intent to join the EIM. 
Additionally, the Baja California Norte grid in Mexico is also exploring participation. 
This research also highlights that the success of the new EIM Governing Body 
depends on its ability to co-create emergent forms of authority, rather than on hierarchies 
and rules. This also appears to be proving successful. Participants in both the Body of 
State Regulators and the Regional Issues Forum have commented on the value of 
relational authority. For example, in the Body of State Regulators: “Communication and 
education and as much talking as possible is helping us all get to the same place” (Field 
Observation, 05/06/15) and in the Regional Issues Forum: “There is a fundamental trust 
around that group that is more than the sum of its parts” (Field Observation, 06/20/16). 
Finally, this research identifies a growing interest in innovating a uniquely 
Western approach to electricity system governance. Stakeholders across the Western 
Interconnection are discussing a “federated” approach to electricity system governance 
and the possibility of creating a “Regional System Operator” rather than an RTO. The 
EIM governance recommendation to create a Regional Issues Forum challenged 
stakeholders to consider this type of innovation and created opportunities for public 
power, civil society organizations, and adjacent balancing authorities to participate; but 
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requires that these entities engage in the deeply technical work of market design, 
operations, and planning.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter provides a brief summary of the purpose of my research, the central 
research question, how the data were collected, and the approach to data analysis. The 
remaining sections of this chapter discuss my major findings, the practical and theoretical 
contributions of my research, limitations of the study, and directions for future research. 
The West has a unique approach to electricity system design and governance. As I 
discuss in Chapter 2, in the late 1990s, when FERC required open access to the 
transmission grid, RTOs formed across most of the U.S.; yet, the West continued to rely 
on more decentralized institutions and decision-making processes to manage transmission 
planning and operations. Furthermore, outside of California, the West did not have access 
to the real-time, automated scheduling and dispatch of organized wholesale electricity 
markets. 
In the 20 years since the first organized markets were formed, policies promoting 
clean, low-carbon energy and technological innovation have spurred rapid growth in 
renewable resources and critical advances in communication, information, and control 
system technologies. These new resources and technologies are driving electricity 
systems in many regions to become even more integrated and interdependent. In the 
West, this evolution of policy and technology was instrumental in the decision of 
regulators, utilities and stakeholders to create an EIM to optimize real-time balancing 
services among voluntary market participants. 
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Given that the EIM emerged after many states enacted clean energy policies, and 
after the growth of wind and solar transformed the resource mix and operating constraints 
of the electricity system, I initially became interested in how these differences in context 
affected EIM implementation. Specifically, the purpose of my research was to explore the 
issue of authority in energy policy implementation and the role of non-market 
participants, like state policymakers and civil society organizations, in implementation 
involving voluntary multi-organizational networks, like RTOs. To accomplish this, I 
combined policy implementation, field theory, interorganizational communication, and 
boundary work concepts in Chapter 3 and developed an empirical investigation of how 
stakeholders reconciled multiple and often conflicting authority to enact policy change 
and achieve collective purposes. The intent was to provide a better understanding of how 
policy implementation occurs in practice and of the role of social interactions and 
interdependencies in shaping implementation processes. Therefore, this study asks how 
stakeholders, using social practices and strategies, created and legitimated sources of 
authority to establish a governance structure for this new market service. 
As outlined in Chapter 4, this research question was investigated through a 32-
month study of interactions among stakeholders in the West as they explored the 
implications of an organized market and developed an EIM governance structure. The 
research included 21 interviews with individuals across diverse industry and civil society 
sectors, 27 field observations of public meetings, and extensive document review. The 
data reflect perspectives of incumbent CAISO participants, key non-RTO actors, state 
regulators, and regional clean energy advocates. The data were analyzed using two 
complementary methods: the interviews, stakeholder comments, and fieldnotes were 
  
128 
coded through a cyclical process; and other documents were analyzed through 
progressive focusing to generate issues and themes. 
7.1. Summary of Findings 
This case study demonstrates how organizations were able to achieve a level of 
perceived legitimacy in the new EIM governance structure, despite long-standing 
mistrust among participants, a resistance to ceding authority to FERC, and conflicting 
perspectives on how to structure the relationship between the EIM and CAISO and 
relationships among stakeholders. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that policy 
implementation is worked out in practice through a process of reconciling multiple 
sources of authority and that in this process authority itself is an emergent and negotiated 
phenomenon. The multi-organizational policy implementation effort led by the EIM 
Transitional Committee resulted in governance structures intended to promote interaction 
and relational authority and with sufficient perceived legitimacy to attract new 
participants. 
The data support four primary findings: 1) dominant yet deficient narratives 
provided a rationale for ongoing resistance to regional governance in the West and 
prevented collaboration; 2) actors overcame and transformed deficient sources of 
authority by enacting social strategies that allowed alternative interpretations of the EIM 
construct and enabled organizations to begin collaboration; 3) actors using social 
negotiation interpreted and adjusted the EIM policy intervention and co-created emergent 
forms of authority that are flexible and dynamic; and 4) field interdependencies surfaced 
taken-for-granted assumptions and provided critical resources for innovative forms of 
collective action. These findings provide important insights for understanding how public 
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sector and civil society organizations that are engaged in complex governance systems 
seek to exercise discretion and sustain accountability to the public interest. 
Common Resistance to Shared Authority 
As I discussed in Chapter 5, in the U.S. and around the world, electricity systems 
are becoming more integrated and interdependent with regional governance and 
organized markets providing economic efficiencies and operational flexibility. Yet, some 
regions, including the Western U.S., have remained relatively decentralized. Forming an 
organized electricity market involves coordination or collaboration among organizations. 
This type of policy implementation often involves ambiguous authority relationships or 
competing sources of authority (Koschmann, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Ostrom, 
2011), and policy change requires efforts to overcome or transform existing authorities 
that would otherwise prevent collaboration (Koschmann & Burk, 2016). Thus, 
understanding what has prevented regional collaboration and the expansion of an 
organized electricity market in the West is central to understanding how policy change 
occurred. 
A key finding that emerged from my data is that a dominant narrative of 
jurisdictional independence and mistrust of multi-state RTOs and FERC provided a 
rationale for inaction and prevented collaboration. Stakeholders both within and outside 
of California believe that retaining jurisdictional independence, rather than engaging in 
the collective activities of a multi-state RTO, serves their political and economic 
interests. This can been seen in the resistance among states to engaging with each other; 
in the divisions across federal, state, and local levels of regulatory authority; and in 
concerns about the inherent risks of engaging in a more dynamic governance system. 
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These tensions and repeated interactions among stakeholders have reinforced a narrative 
around a preference for “homegrown solutions” and “local control,” and the need to 
“protect state interests.” 
This dynamic of mistrust and resistance to the shared authority required by a 
multi-state RTO emerges from the diverse energy system values and complex 
jurisdictional relationships in the West. The region’s energy system values are reflected 
in wide differences among states in formal clean energy policies, affordability of 
electricity, and their resources mix. Furthermore, CAISO is authorized by state statute 
and FERC, dominated by three large investor-owned utilities and a partially restructured 
industry. In contrast, the non-RTO region of the West is shaped by public power and a 
vertically integrated industry. These differences mean that any expansion of organized 
markets to access the anticipated economic, reliability, and environmental benefits of 
such a change involve complex negotiations. Stakeholders must negotiate different 
perspectives regarding potential political and economic benefits and risks of 
collaboration, as well as the complications introduced by California statute and FERC 
jurisdiction in relation to public power. This finding from my analysis demonstrates that 
rational positions can generate narratives that provide justification for inaction that can 
persist even as economic and political tradeoffs evolve. These then become deficient 
narratives that must be overcome or transformed to provide justification that will enable 
policy change. 
Transforming Existing Authority 
CAISO, state regulators, utilities, and other stakeholders needed to transform 
long-standing resistance to the shared authority of a multi-state RTO in order to open the 
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possibility for stakeholders to engage in a regional initiative. The concept of a Western 
EIM was developed through diverse venues over the course of nearly a decade and was 
designed to overcome some of this resistance, yet stakeholders continued to be deeply 
divided over how the EIM would be implemented in practice. The initial steps to 
implement the EIM involved stakeholders in the social negotiation of authority and a 
process of interpreting what is and what is not possible. Scholars have developed the 
concept of boundary objects to help understand the social practices involved in managing 
the tensions between different interpretations for how policy implementation should 
proceed and coordinating work without reaching consensus (Bowker & Star, 1999; 
Nelson-Marsh, 2017; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989). Central to these social 
practices is the ability to create a shared understanding of a loosely structured common 
concept and to maintain elements of alternative interpretations that make the concept 
useful for work that is not coordinated (Bowker & Star, 1999; Susan Leigh Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). 
Another key finding that emerged from my analysis in Chapter 5 involves the 
loosely structured meaning of an EIM and the alternative interpretations that allowed 
stakeholders to begin engaging in the initiative. My analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates 
that CAISO, state regulators, utilities, and other stakeholders did this using three 
discursive strategies. First, the bilateral EIM agreement between CAISO and PacifiCorp 
shifted the discourse by identifying major market participants, designating CAISO as the 
market operator, and proposing a relatively equal sharing of benefits. This strategic move 
framed the EIM as a dynamic, multi-state market that generates economic and 
environmental benefits and worked to shift the discourse regarding the potential 
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economic risks of regional engagement. Second, certain regulators and policymakers 
began to contrast the existing decentralized grid with regional information, 
communication, and control system technologies that could better serve the public 
interest. In repeated conversations about the efficiencies of grid modernization and efforts 
to lead the transition to renewable energy, actors used these symbolic contrasts to 
transform the dominant authoritative narrative about the potential political risks of 
regional engagement. Third, stakeholders engaged in boundary spanning to develop and 
sustain alternative interpretations around a loosely structured concept of the EIM. These 
alternative meanings of the EIM focus on four fundamental local needs and constraints of 
stakeholders: preservation of political autonomy; requirements for market efficiency; 
representation of market interests; and representation of political interests. 
The interpretive flexibility of the EIM allowed stakeholders to come together and 
explore these alternative meanings, which enabled collaboration and expansion. Between 
August 2014 and April 2016, five additional investor-owned utilities decided to join the 
EIM. These actions were important in overcoming and transforming existing authorities 
that had prevented collaboration for nearly two decades. This finding from my analysis 
demonstrates that multi-organizational policy implementation is a social process that 
involves transforming deficient narratives that have prevented or could undermine 
collaboration. 
Negotiating Authority and Altering Interventions 
Because the EIM is voluntary, the imposition of one governance model or another 
could threaten the success of the initiative. Therefore, to further coordination among 
stakeholders, it was necessary to collaboratively construct shared meanings that provide 
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rationales for particular governance structures, adjust the policy intervention to reconcile 
competing sources of authority, and allow stakeholders to tailor interpretations to address 
local needs and constraints (Bowker & Star, 1999; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Moulton 
& Sandfort, 2017; Susan Leigh Star & Griesemer, 1989). In this way authority is co-
created or negotiated among organizations as it is interpreted within a particular context 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Koschmann & Burk, 2016; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). 
The third finding from my analysis is that actors interpreted and adjusted the 
policy intervention to co-create emergent forms of authority that are flexible and 
dynamic. The analysis in Chapter 6 of the EIM initiative demonstrates two distinct 
approaches for how actors interpreted and adjusted the policy intervention. In negotiating 
the tension between political autonomy and market efficiency, actors did not 
substantively alter the policy intervention, but instead interpreted existing authority and 
co-created new authority to legitimate the structure of the proposed intervention. Critical 
to acceptance of this structure was stakeholder engagement in a process that co-created 
authority to enable collaboration, without reaching consensus. Specifically, the shared 
understanding of EIM governance as something temporary and open to further 
modifications, but linked to the success of market reform in the wider region, allows 
stakeholders with different beliefs about market evolution to tailor local interpretations 
and participate together in the EIM. These new sources of authority provided a rationale 
for stakeholders to express conditional support for delegated, rather than autonomous 
governance, as a pragmatic and temporary approach based primarily on relational 
authority. In contrast, actors negotiating the tension between political and market 
influence modified the proposed policy intervention to reconcile conflicting 
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organizational norms and promote greater interaction and relational authority. The 
Committee recognized that CAISO needed to interact in new ways in order for EIM 
governance to be perceived as legitimate and to attract new market participants. By 
instituting new structures to increase interactions among participating and non-
participating stakeholders, the Committee acknowledged the importance of 
communication, relationships, and trust as emergent sources of authority. Specifically, 
the Committee created new governance structures for state regulators and regional 
stakeholders to interact with each other, with the CAISO Board and with the EIM 
Governing Body. Somewhat counter intuitively, the Committee sought to achieve greater 
interaction and relational authority by creating more hierarchical structure than in the 
CAISO process, which has been highly participatory and relatively flat in structure. 
This research highlights that EIM governance was designed to provide 
interpretive flexibility and a rationale that would encourage participation among 
stakeholders with diverse perspectives and that success will depend on the Governing 
Body’s ability to co-create emergent forms of authority, rather than on hierarchies and 
rules. Since appointment of the EIM Governing Body, three public power utilities have 
announced their intent to join the EIM and participants in both the Body of State 
Regulators and the Regional Issues Forum have commented on the value of relational 
communication. This finding from my analysis demonstrates that multi-organizational 
policy implementation is a social process that requires interpretation of authority and 
adjustment of policy interventions to enable collective action. This finding also highlights 
that in complex systems, like organized electricity markets, it is difficult to define 
hierarchies and rules to coordinate actions. In these systems, collaboration is facilitated 
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by flexible and dynamic sources of authority that allow temporary and pragmatic 
solutions and enable interactions and relational authority. 
Field Interdependencies 
Policy implementation processes occur across multiple fields and the horizontal 
and vertical ties among these fields affect the purposes of the field, the actors who are 
involved, what is possible, and introduce new discursive resources and sources of 
authority (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). 
The fourth finding from my analysis is that routine field interdependencies 
provided critical resources for innovative forms of collective action or, in other words, 
policy change. The analysis in Chapter 6 identifies the critical importance of actions in 
adjacent fields for surfacing taken-for-granted assumptions. This allowed new sources of 
authority to be perceived as legitimate, and contributed to interpretations and adjustments 
to policy interventions that enabled collective action. Specifically, the PacifiCorp 
decision to explore the feasibility of full participation in the CAISO organized markets 
meant that the EIM could no longer be expected to evolve into a regional market with 
expanded functionality. This external event required the Committee and stakeholders to 
discuss the future of the EIM in more specific terms and a new rationale for delegated 
governance emerged. The success of EIM governance was framed as critical for building 
the trust necessary for a wider regional market. In another example, the failure of the 
Northwest Power Pool effort to create a second EIM meant that it became clearer that 
Bonneville Power Administration would be unlikely to join an EIM. These external 
events brought attention to the concerns of stakeholders who do not intend to participate 
in an organized market, but are critical for coordinating such services and ensuring the 
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efficient use of transmission infrastructure. Consequently, these events led to a 
fundamental shift in thinking about stakeholder engagement. Rather than designing 
governance around market participants, the Committee began thinking about how to 
coordinate work with non-participants and the seams with these “neighboring balancing 
authorities.” 
This finding from my analysis demonstrates that field interdependencies can 
affect the social processes of negotiating authority by surfacing taken-for-granted 
assumptions, which provided discursive resources and new potential sources of authority 
for innovative forms of collective action. 
7.2. Theoretical and Practical Implications 
The understanding of authority as a negotiated phenomenon is well established in 
field theory and organizational communication literature (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; 
Taylor & Van Every, 2014) and is being explored in policy implementation literature 
(Moulton & Sandfort, 2017). My contribution is to extend these ideas to the context of 
multi-organizational regulatory policy implementation and to provide empirical evidence 
of the process. Accordingly, my research makes several theoretical and practical 
contributions: 1) multi-organizational policy implementation is a social process of 
transforming, negotiating, and co-creating authority and relational authority can be an 
important rationale for enacted practices; 2) strategic actors engage in communicative 
and social processes in which authority is emergent, and abstraction enables collective 
action without requiring consensus; 3) routine field interdependencies can bring attention 
to taken-for-granted assumptions and create a moment of co-authoring; and 4) regional 
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electricity system governance structures evolve as they balance the inherent tensions of 
organized market participation. 
Policy Implementation Involves Transforming, Negotiating, and Co-Creating Authority 
My research provides empirical support for the idea that policy implementation 
involves social negotiation of multiple, often conflicting or ambiguous, sources of 
authority. Moulton and Sandfort (2017) introduce this idea in their strategic action field 
framework for policy implementation, but the implications of this theoretical approach 
are not well established in the policy process literature. The research in this dissertation 
supports the usefulness of this theoretical approach in understanding drivers of policy 
change and the aspects of a policy intervention that are ultimately enacted, particularly 
within the context of policy implementation that spans the responsibilities of more than 
one organization. It also applies the theory to new policy domains and provides empirical 
evidence from application to regulatory policy implementation and to the complex socio-
technical system that shapes energy policy implementation. 
This research also extends the Moulton and Sandfort (2017) theory of the social 
negotiation of authority by introducing two established ideas from organizational 
communication literature. First, this research provides empirical evidence that multiple 
conflicting authorities and the complexity of work can prevent imposition of authority 
through hierarchies and rules. Furthermore, it provides evidence that to enable collective 
action in such cases, actors can establish structures designed to increase interactions and 
relational authority. Here, my research provides empirical evidence of established ideas 
within the organizational communication literature that conceptualize the negotiation of 
authority as an ongoing process of producing emergent forms of influence and 
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accountability that can “transcend boundaries and hierarchies” and extends these ideas to 
the context of policy implementation (Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009; Koschmann & 
Burk, 2016; Taylor & Van Every, 2014). Second, this research provides empirical 
evidence that in complex policy implementation systems, actors using discursive 
strategies overcome and transform established yet deficient authority that would 
otherwise prevent collective action. Here, my research provides additional support to 
preliminary research in the organizational communication literature on de-authoring to 
overcome or transform existing authority (Koschmann & Burk, 2016). 
Strategic Actors Engage in Social Negotiation to Enable Policy Change 
An important implication of this research is that social negotiation of legitimacy is 
a fundamental driver of policy change. My research provides evidence of authority as an 
emergent phenomenon and of the use of abstraction to enable collective action. This 
extends and complicates the policy process theory concept of a policy entrepreneur or 
policy broker by drawing attention to the importance of communication in practice and of 
considering both instrumental and existential motivations for individual actions. 
Accordingly, this research provides empirical support for the strategic action field 
framework proposed by Moulton and Sandfort (2017) and contributes to policy process 
theory by extending the theoretical understanding of individual strategic action beyond a 
focus on instrumental motives or the traits of a particular individual. 
Using rational choice or bounded rationality models of the individual, several 
policy process frameworks and theories draw attention to the role of individuals in 
driving policy change and these actors are sometimes referred to as policy entrepreneurs 
or policy brokers (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011; Lindblom, 1968; Olsen 
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& March, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). However, this is an area of research 
that is considered under-theorized (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Pierce et al., 2014; 
Sætren, 2016; Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). My research demonstrates that 
policy implementation involving voluntary collective action is shaped by the strategic 
actions of individuals interpreting sources of authority and adjusting policy interventions 
to provide rationales and perceived legitimacy for the practices they enact. It identifies 
several specific strategies used in the social process of negotiation, including shifting the 
discourse, symbolic contrast, boundary spanning, and tacking. However, the primary 
theoretical contribution is to make a distinction between instrumental and existential 
motivations and to suggest that for strategic actors seeking to enable change by forming 
shared meanings and collective identities, abstraction is an important strategy that can 
enable collective action without requiring consensus among participants. 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) theorize a model of the individual that recognizes 
both instrumental and existential motives. Instrumental motives reflect individual and 
collective self-interest, whereas existential motives reflect the human need to fashion 
shared meanings and identities. Adopting this model of the individual and applying the 
Moulton and Sandfort (2017) framework, which draws attention to understanding how 
authority gains perceived legitimacy, this research clarifies how such negotiations can 
proceed in cases without consensus among actors. In social processes of negotiation that 
require voluntary coordination, the interpretive flexibility of the policy intervention 
allows stakeholders to develop alternative interpretations to serve their local needs and 
abstraction of the rationale for collective action contributes to the perceived legitimacy of 
the enacted policy intervention. Thus, the social skills of entrepreneurs are not particular 
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strategies that are applied by particular individuals at particular moments, but emerge 
through the interactions among actors and structures within the process of social 
negotiation of authority. 
The practical implication of this finding is that actors seeking to implement a 
particular policy intervention within a complex implementation system are necessarily 
going to be required to engage in a process of negotiation. As actors negotiate competing 
and ambiguous sources of authority, modifications or adaptions of the policy 
intervention, interpretation of authorities within context, and the emergence of new 
rationale can enable collective action and innovative policy change. Furthermore, social 
strategies that accept interpretive flexibility, alternative interpretations, and abstraction 
can facilitate the coordination of work without driving decision making to consensus. 
Rather than associating these changes and strategies with flaws in policy design or 
departures from democratic accountability, these characteristics are inherent to multi-
organizational policy implementation and the flexibility of structures and the emergence 
of new rationales. The use of dynamic and emergent sources of authority can be critical 
to innovative policy change in complex systems. 
Interdependencies Critically Affect Social Negotiation 
Another important implication of this research is that field interdependencies that 
bring attention to taken-for-granted assumptions and create moments of co-authoring are 
important drivers of policy change. This expands on the understanding of “external 
shocks” and subsystem interdependencies in the policy process literature by providing 
insight into the intervening steps between the external event and policy implementation 
decisions. Thus, this research provides empirical support for the Fligstein and McAdam 
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(2012) theory that suggests the ties among fields impose constraints and opportunities 
that are routinely affected by actions in other fields. It also extends this idea to the 
context of policy implementation to suggest that policy stability and change are the result 
of dynamic interactions across interdependent action fields. 
Several policy process theories focus on a single policy system or subsystem as 
the level of analysis, while also highlighting the role of external effects on change or 
stability (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 2011; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 
Schneider & Ingram, 2005). However, researchers have called for additional 
investigation into the interdependence among multiple policy systems or levels in a 
system and the intervening steps between an external event and major policy change 
(Hupe, 2014; Weible et al., 2009). Policy process literature has long recognized the role 
external events or “external shocks” in fostering policy change by shifting material 
resources, altering the power of coalitions, and changing beliefs. This research brings 
new insight to the role of field interdependencies by focusing on how these ties routinely 
introduce discursive resources and different sources of authority that affect social 
negotiations among actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Hardy et al., 2005; Moulton & 
Sandfort, 2017). Specifically, this dissertation demonstrates how interdependencies result 
in new opportunities or constraints that shape the policy implementation process and 
demonstrates how interdependencies can reveal taken-for-granted assumptions to enable 
innovative policy change. 
My research provides empirical evidence that routine actions in other fields 
impose constraints and opportunities and suggests two ways in which this can occur. 
First, the emergence of a new interdependent action field around creation of a west-wide 
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organized market imposed constraints on what was possible and shifted material and 
symbolic resources in ways that critically shaped the structure of the policy intervention. 
Second, the elimination of a competing action field that had engaged actors in ongoing 
negotiations to create an alternative EIM made new resources available and removed 
informal sources of authority that had been introduced into and could have continued to 
be leveraged in negotiations. 
My research also provides empirical evidence that field interdependencies 
required actors to explore taken-for-granted assumptions and enabled innovative policy 
change. Other research theorizes that critical exchanges between actors in which they 
socially negotiate conflicting or ambiguous authorities can be characterized as moments 
of discursive attention, which distinguish exchanges involving the negotiation of areas 
where actors disagree from exchanges involving the negotiation of areas where actors 
have taken-for-granted agreement (Nelson-Marsh, 2006). This research expands on this 
literature by suggesting that in relatively formal venues or when many social negotiations 
occur in non-public settings, field interdependencies may trigger moments of discursive 
attention and draw the researcher’s attention to exchanges that involve co-authoring and 
are critical to understanding policy implementation responses. 
My research demonstrates that field interdependencies not only imposed 
opportunities and constraints, but also created moments of co-authoring that led to 
innovative policy change. Specifically, my research provides empirical evidence that 
actions in other fields not only imposed constraints and opportunities, but also influenced 
the social negotiation among actors by revealing previously taken-for-granted 
assumptions and justifications. Adopting the focus of Fligstein and McAdam (2012) on 
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change requiring innovative action, my research identifies that following critical field 
interdependencies and negotiation of taken-for-granted justifications for certain practices, 
actors innovated new governance structure that had not previously been considered or 
implemented elsewhere. Thus, rather than competing to impose one alternative or 
another, actors engaging in a social process of negotiation co-created new sources of 
authority and novel structures. 
Regional Governance Structures Balance Tensions of Organized Market Participation 
Finally, another implication of this research is that RTO governance structures 
evolve as they balance the inherent tensions of organized market participation. RTO 
political control and accountability to the public interest are served through common 
governance structures adapted to the unique combinations of local needs and constraints 
of stakeholders within a particular region. This contributes insights into how RTO 
governance structures are evolving and informs the ongoing debate about RTO 
accountability, aligning federal power markets with state policy initiatives, and 
institutional change to support the current energy transition. 
RTOs differ in how they work with utilities, state regulators, and other 
stakeholders to adapt market rules in response to state policies and there are important 
observed variations in how RTO processes prioritize implementation approaches. These 
RTO governance structures and stakeholder processes are increasingly important, yet 
understudied, policy environments. This research fills an important gap in energy policy 
literature by identifying the formal and informal authorities that shaped the governance 
structures of a newly forming regional electricity governance organization. My research 
identifies common governance structures and variations across RTOs that serve to 
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balance the inherent tensions of regional organized markets within our system of energy 
federalism: 1) requirements for market efficiency, 2) preservation of political autonomy, 
3) representation of political interests, and 4) representation of market interests. 
This research provides empirical evidence that extends earlier work identifying 
the challenge RTOs face in balancing accountability to a wide range of stakeholders who 
are “not equally important,” critical dimensions in responding to pressures for 
institutional change within the electricity system, and the complexity of public interest 
accountability within the evolving federal and state regulatory relationships (Dworkin & 
Goldwasser, 2007, p. 579; Dworkin et al., 2013; Eisen, 2016; Goldthau, 2014; Rossi, 
2016). 
This work also provides practical insights for ongoing deliberations involving 
FERC, RTOs, state regulators, utilities and other stakeholders. The future of Western 
electricity system governance continues to evolve. The initiative to create a west-wide 
RTO based on the CAISO-PacifiCorp partnership is currently stalled; however, the EIM 
is expanding and stakeholders are gaining experience with the new EIM governance 
structures. Whatever emerges will be shaped by efforts to balance the inherent tensions of 
organized market participation and by the actors that have been and will continue to be 
engaged in this process. 
The West has demonstrated a unique approach to energy system governance and 
the EIM has been a critical part of the evolution of this complex system. For now, the 
EIM is an innovative alternative to a fully organized market. As such, the EIM is 
fundamentally reshaping interactions among CAISO, EIM participants, and neighboring 
balancing authorities, Western electricity system governance, other aspects of CAISO 
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market design, and the value of new technologies and existing assets. If the EIM evolves 
into a separate RTO offering a full range of market services or, alternatively, if CAISO 
expands to be a west-wide RTO, making the EIM obsolete, the EIM still will have served 
a critical role in facilitating this transition. The EIM is providing experience with 
innovative structures, new sources of authority, and building relationships that will shape 
the governance of any future Western RTO. 
7.3. Limitations and Future Research 
Despite these contributions to understanding policy implementation and energy 
policy, the research is limited by its focus on a single case study and a single policy 
implementation problem. Furthermore, the research is somewhat limited by the 
perspectives included. The interview participants were people actively involved in 
CAISO, the EIM initiative, or the Northwest Power Pool EIM initiative. Therefore, the 
perspectives of stakeholders in the Rocky Mountain west and southwest were only 
included through formal written comments. Additionally, many informal and working 
group interactions were not public. While this is typical of public sector 
interorganizational collaborations and stakeholder engagement processes, the impact of 
these conversations on the overall implementation process can only be discerned 
indirectly through subsequent public interactions, comments, and personal reflections in 
interviews. 
There is much more to be learned about how RTOs engage with stakeholders and 
how these processes shape energy policy implementation. Having established initial 
concepts about how RTOs act at the border between federal and state authorities and are 
responsive to the needs of voluntary market participants, further research should explore 
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the idea of negotiated authority across additional RTOs and explore different policy 
problems. It would be particularly important to examine how RTOs are responding to 
other state policy initiatives—for example, mandates or incentives to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions or to encourage distributed energy resources. Additionally, further research 
is needed to examine how RTOs relate to one another along jurisdictional boundaries or 
“seams.” Finally, valuable insights could be gained from research assessing the policy 
outcomes of the EIM Governing Body, the role of the Body of State Regulators, and the 
Regional Issues Forum, as well as continued exploration of how the initiative to create a 
Western Regional System Operator unfolds. 
Additionally, there is much more to be learned about policy implementation that 
spans the responsibilities of more than one organization. This dissertation highlights the 
value of applying the strategic action field framework and boundary work concepts to the 
context of policy implementation, but many questions remain. Additional research could 
be undertaken using this framework to make sense of observed variations in 
implementation approaches across electricity governance organizations, including across 
RTOs and across newly emerging organizations to facilitate distributed energy resources. 
More research could be undertaken applying these ideas to additional regulatory policy 
setting and comparing these to the service delivery settings that were used to develop the 
Moulton and Sandfort (2017) framework. Finally, research could be undertaken to further 
evaluate how actors adjust their approach to social negotiation as they move across 
interdependent action fields. 
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7.4. Conclusion 
The findings and implications of this research are relevant for policy and 
management and are of interest to practitioners and researchers engaged in facilitating 
implementation of energy policy. The conclusions are three-fold. First, engagement in 
RTO processes is critical for ensuring effective policy implementation to achieve policy 
goals for institutional innovations, the adoption of emerging technologies, and the pace of 
electricity system change. Second, understanding RTO structures and social processes 
critically underpins state and federal clean energy policy implementation and allows 
evaluation and assessment of policy effectiveness. Third, cultural authority and social 
processes are fundamental to RTO policy implementation and should be considered in 
designing energy policies. Electricity market governance organizations, like RTOs, are 
central to energy policy implementation and are fundamentally shaping the future 
electricity system.
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APPENDIX A 
Western Interconnection Balancing Authorities 
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AESO - Alberta Electric System Operator 
AVA - Avista Corporation 
AZPS - Arizona Public Service Company 
BANC - Balancing Authority of Northern California 
BCHA - British Columbia Hydro Authority 
BPAT - Bonneville Power Administration - Transmission 
CFE - Comision Federal de Electricidad 
CHPD - PUD No. 1 of Chelan County 
CISO - California Independent System Operator 
DEAA - Arlington Valley, LLC 
DOPD - PUD No. 1 of Douglas County 
EPE - El Paso Electric Company 
GCPD - PUD No. 2 of Grant County 
GRID - Gridforce 
GRIF - Griffith Energy, LLC 
GRMA - Sun Devil Power Holdings, LLC 
GWA - NaturEner Power Watch, LLC 
HGMA - New Harquahala Generating Company, LLC 
IID - Imperial Irrigation District 
IPCO - Idaho Power Company 
LDWP - Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
NEVP - Nevada Power Company 
NWMT - NorthWestern Energy 
PACE - PacifiCorp East 
PACW - PacifiCorp West 
PGE - Portland General Electric Company 
PNM - Public Service Company of New Mexico 
PSCO - Public Service Company of Colorado 
PSEI - Puget Sound Energy 
SCL - Seattle City Light 
SRP - Salt River Project 
TEPC - Tucson Electric Power Company 
TIDC - Turlock Irrigation District 
TPWR - City of Tacoma, Department of Public Utilities 
WACM - Western Area Power Administration, Colorado-Missouri Region 
WALC - Western Area Power Administration, Lower Colorado Region 
WAUW - Western Area Power Administration, Upper Great Plains West 
WWA - NaturEner Wind Watch, LLC 
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Introductory Questions 
Establish you’ve done your homework, but that you’re a novice and you’re open to being 
taught. It’s crucial to establish that the goal is to learn the ins and outs without 
judgment.  
 
Provide the consent form, allow them to read and sign. After consent given, START THE 
RECORDER and begin. 
 
Opening Script: The primary goal of our research project is to understand how the 
decision making process works at RTOs. We’ve been trying to understand the formal 
process; we need to understand better the experiences of those who participate in the 
actual process. Our questions are really a conversational guide to help us understand 
your experience at/with ___ [RTO].  
 
Demographics/History 
 
1. How have you been involved with _____ [RTO]? 
a. Probe:  How long have you been involved with ________ [RTO]?  
 
Understanding the Process for Decision Making 
 
2. How would you characterize the stakeholder process at _____ [RTO]? 
a. Probe:  What is a typical meeting like? 
b. Probe:  Are there any other elements in the process that I wouldn’t 
understand from information on the website? 
c. Probe:  
i.It sounds like you’ve had a positive experience; can you tell me more 
about what works well in the process? Is there anything that you 
would change? 
ii.It sounds like you’ve had a negative experience; what were some of 
the challenges or what would you change in the process? 
 
3. How would I know when a decision has been made? 
a. Probe:  Who is involved in deciding what items are put on the agenda or 
how quickly issues move through the process? 
b. Probe: Could you provide an example? 
 
4. Do stakeholders or staff work on issues outside of the formal meetings? 
[UNDERSTAND EXPERIENCE / SENSE OF RTOs] 
 
a. Probe: How does that work? 
b. Probe:  Is it important to have certain stakeholders or staff involved in an 
issue? 
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Understanding the Stakeholder Groups 
 
5. Who are the stakeholder groups involved [in the issues you are working on? 
a. Probe: Who are the stakeholders frequently involved in stakeholder 
processes? 
 
6. How would you characterize the stakeholders? 
a. How would you describe the influence of certain stakeholder groups? 
b. How would I recognize different stakeholder groups in a meeting? 
 
7. What is it like for newcomers to participate in the stakeholder process? 
a. Probe: What have _____ [names of new stakeholder groups] had to do to 
be part of the process? 
b. Probe:  How would you know if a newcomer is doing something wrong or 
how would you help a newcomer figure out the process? 
 
Understanding Influences 
 
8. Are issues regarding transmission, markets and reliability related?  
a. Are these coordinated in the decision making process? 
b. What are some common disagreements you see in the process? 
 
9. How do people enter into leadership positions? 
a. I’m trying to understand leadership. Do stakeholder groups identify 
formal or informal leaders? 
b. Can you describe the board/advisory committee nomination process? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
10. That’s all for my questions. What else should I know or be asking in order to 
understand the ______ [RTO]’s processes, stakeholder groups and participation? 
 
11. Is there anything you would like to ask me?  
 
12. Would you mind recommending anyone else who you think I should speak with 
that would be interested in particpating?  
 
Thank you for your time. We really appreciate it! 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Summary of Field Observations 
  
1
7
0 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
CAISO 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Meetings and 
Stakeholder 
Workshops               
Transmission 
Planning Meeting 1 10 
54 on WebEx 
at opening 
27-Feb-
14 Folsom, CA WebEx 180 
Transmission 
Planning 
Standards 
Meeting 1 16 NA 4-Apr-14 Folsom, CA WebEx 240 
Energy Storage 
Interconnection 
Opening Initiative 1 9 NA 7-Apr-14 Folsom, CA WebEx 60 
  
1
7
1 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
Energy Storage 
Roadmap 
Workshop 1 23 
200 - 300 in-
person and 
201 WebEx 4-Sep-14 Folsom, CA WebEx 360 
Second Storage 
Roadmap 
Workshop 1 18 
66 on WebEx 
after opening 13-Oct-14 
CPUC, San 
Francisco, CA WebEx 270 
Board of 
Governors and 
Market 
Surveillance 
Committee 
Meetings               
Regular CAISO 
Board of 
Governors 
Meeting 1 13 NA 6-Feb-14 Folsom, CA 
Recorded 
Audio 180 
  
1
7
2 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
Market 
Surveillance 
Committee 
Meeting 1 23 NA 
19-May-
14 Folsom, CA WebEx 330 
Regular CAISO 
Board of 
Governors 
Meeting 1 11 
About 35 in-
person at 
opening 
18-Sep-
14 Folsom, CA In-Person 240 
EIM Governance 
and Transitional 
Committee 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Meetings               
Governance 
Recommendation 1 6 
12 in-person 
and 41 WebEx 12-Jan-15 Phoenix, AZ 
Recorded 
Audio 69 
  
1
7
3 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
Issue Paper 
Presentation 
Governance 
Recommendation 
Straw Proposal 
Presentation X X 
14 in-person 
and 56 WebEx 
31-Mar-
15 Folsom, CA X X 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meetings               
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 7 TBD 1-Jul-14 Folsom, CA WebEx 78 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting X X X 
26-Aug-
14 Las Vegas, NV WebEx X 
  
1
7
4 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 
Executive 
Session NA NA 
10-Sep-
14 Teleconference NA NA 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 14 TBD 23-Oct-14 
Sacramento, 
CA WebEx 122 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 14 TBD 
20-Nov-
14 
San Francisco, 
CA WebEx 114 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 5 TBD 
19-Dec-
14 Teleconference WebEx 53 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 5 TBD 12-Jan-15 Phoenix, AZ WebEx 63 
  
1
7
5 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 
Executive 
Session NA NA 
17-Feb-
15 Teleconference NA NA 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 7 
About 20 
including staff 5-Mar-15 Portland, OR In-Person 150 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 
Executive 
Session NA NA 
13-Apr-
15 Teleconference NA NA 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 16 TBD 
30-Apr-
15 Folsom, CA WebEx 148 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 12 TBD 25-Jun-15 Reno, NV WebEx 133 
  
1
7
6 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 
Executive 
Session NA NA 20-Jul-15 Teleconference NA NA 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting 1 9 TBD 
25-Aug-
15 Folsom, CA WebEx 103 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting X NA NA 21-Oct-15 
Sacramento, 
CA WebEx NA 
EIM Transitional 
Committee 
Meeting X NA NA 
19-Nov-
15 Teleconference WebEx NA 
Regional 
Governance 
Meetings and               
  
1
7
7 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
Regional 
Webinars 
Market 
Governance 
Webinar PUC-EIM 
Group 1 4 
131-153 on 
Phone 1-Oct-14 
Recorded 
Audio WebEx NA 
Senate Bill 350 
Studies Public 
Meeting 1 15 97 at opening 8-Feb-16 Folsom, CA WebEx 300 
PacifiCorp 
Presentation at 
NWPCC Meeting 1 5 NA 8-Feb-16 Portland, OR WebEx 60 
  
1
7
8 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
CAISO and 
PacifiCorp Joint 
Conference on 
Governance 
Development 1 9 NA 
10-Feb-
16 
Web 
Conference WebEx 88 
Regional Grid 
Operator and 
Governance 1 TRANSCRIPT NA 6-May-16 
Sacramento, 
CA WebEx 269 
Regional Grid 
Operator and 
Governance 1 TRANSCRIPT NA 16-Jun-16 
Sacramento, 
CA WebEx 209 
Regional Grid 
Operator and 
Governance 1 TRANSCRIPT NA 20-Jun-16 Denver, CO WebEx 173 
  
1
7
9 
Observation 
Type 
Number of 
Observations 
Pages of 
Fieldnotes Participation Date Location 
In-
Person 
or 
WebEx Minutes 
Regional Grid 
Operator and 
Governance 1 TRANSCRIPT NA 26-Jul-16 
Sacramento, 
CA WebEx 315 
Regional Issues 
Forum 1 10 NA 4-Aug-16 Boise, ID In-Person 120 
TOTAL FIELD 
NOTES SINGLE-
SPACED PAGES   261           
TOTAL 
TRANSCRIPT 
DOUBLE-SPACED 
PAGES   718           
TOTAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
AND MINUTES 27           4427 
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Summary of Energy Imbalance Market Documents   
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Document 
Type 
Number of 
Documents Pages Source  
Governance 
Foundational 
Information 
14 511 
Proposals and White Papers = 7 
Transitional Committee Draft and 
Final Charter = 3 
Governance Sector Roster = 1 
MOU = 1 
Benefits Studies = 2 
Transitional 
Committee 
Development 
30 581 
Proposals, White Papers, and 
Presentations = 18 
Draft Transitional Committee 
Charters = 2 
Board of Governors Decision 
Documents = 5 
FERC Opinion = 1 
Agendas and Sector Templates = 4  
Transitional 
Committee 
Meetings and 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
77 641 
Proposals, White Papers, and 
Presentations = 33 
Market Surveillance Committee 
Opinions = 4 
Working Group Updates, Benefits, 
and Motions = 6 
Draft Charters, Bylaws, Selection 
Policies = 4 
Agendas and Minutes = 30 
Stakeholder 
Comments 
28 459 
Number of Comments = 136 
Number of Stakeholders = 55 
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Codebook 
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THEME CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY 
Resistance to 
Collective Action 
Energy Values Clean Energy Goals 
  
Affordability/ 
Reliability 
  
Environmental Goals - 
Hydro 
 Jurisdictional Divides California Dominating 
  FERC Dominating 
  
Shift in Regulatory 
Federalism 
Transforming 
 Authority / Boundary 
Object 
Shift in Discourse Teamwork 
  Benefits 
 Symbolic Contrast Grid Modernization 
  Clean Energy Transition 
 Boundary Spanning Discrete Product 
  Integrated Product 
  Transformation Policy 
  Constitution Policy 
Political Autonomy vs. 
Market Efficiency 
Authorities Value Proposition 
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THEME CATEGORY SUB-CATEGORY 
  California Statute 
  Limited EIM Functionality 
 Social Skills Tacking 
  Ambiguity 
 Interdependence 
No Expansion of 
Functionality 
Political Influence vs. 
Market Influence 
Authorities 
Norms for Market 
Participant Interactions 
  
Norms for Public Sector 
Interactions 
 Social Skills 
Boundary Spanning: 
Questioning 
 Interdependence 
Relevance of  
Non-Participants 
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APPENDIX F 
Initial Stakeholder Positions 
  
1
8
6
 
 
Utility Name Position Position 2 Ownership RTO 
Southwestern Power Group 
Advisory - 
Support   Power Marketer SOUTHWEST 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co 
Advisory - 
Support 
Transition   Investor Owned CAISO 
Southern California Edison Co 
Advisory - 
Support 
Transition Autonomous - Oppose Investor Owned CAISO 
Xcel Energy Inc. 
Advisory - 
Support 
Transition Autonomous - Oppose Investor Owned SOUTHWEST 
Avista Corp 
Autonomous - 
Support Advisory - Opposed Investor Owned NWPP 
Northwest Public Power 
Association 
Autonomous - 
Support   Public Power NWPP 
Portland General Electric Co 
Autonomous - 
Support   Investor Owned NWPP 
  
1
8
7
 
Utility Name Position Position 2 Ownership RTO 
Powerex 
Autonomous - 
Support   Power Marketer CANADA 
Public Power Council 
Autonomous - 
Support   Public Power NWPP 
Chelan County 
Autonomous - 
Support   Public Power NWPP 
Seattle City Light 
Autonomous - 
Support Advisory - Opposed Public Power NWPP 
Western Grid Group 
Autonomous - 
Support 
Autonomous - 
Support 
Public Interest - 
Environmental BOTH 
Interwest Energy Alliance 
Delegated - 
Support   
Renewable 
Generators SOUTHWEST 
PacifiCorp 
Delegated - 
Support Autonomous - Oppose Investor Owned SOUTHWEST 
Six Cities 
Delegated - 
Support Autonomous - Oppose Public Power CAISO 
Sonoran Institute 
Delegated - 
Support   
Public Interest - 
Environmental BOTH 
  
1
8
8
 
Utility Name Position Position 2 Ownership RTO 
Vote Solar 
Delegated - 
Support   
Public Interest - 
Environmental BOTH 
Western Resource Advocates 
Delegated - 
Support   
Public Interest - 
Environmental BOTH 
Arizona Public Service Co 
Delegated - 
Support 
Transition Advisory - Opposed Investor Owned SOUTHWEST 
California Municipal Utilities 
Association 
Delegated - 
Support 
Transition Advisory - Opposed Public Power BOTH 
Eugene Water & Electric Board 
Delegated - 
Support 
Transition 
Autonomous - 
Support Public Power NWPP 
Public Utility Commission of 
Nevada 
Delegated - 
Support 
Transition   Regulator SOUTHWEST 
  
1
8
9
 
Utility Name Position Position 2 Ownership RTO 
Puget Sound Energy 
Delegated - 
Support 
Transition   Investor Owned NWPP 
Renewable Northwest 
Delegated - 
Support 
Transition 
Autonomous - 
Support 
Public Interest - 
Environmental NWPP 
American Wind Energy 
Association 
No Stated Model 
Preference   
Renewable 
Generators BOTH 
California Office of Ratepayer 
Advocates 
No Stated Model 
Preference   
Public Interest - 
Ratepayers CAISO 
California Public Utilities 
Commission 
No Stated Model 
Preference   Regulator CAISO 
Wyoming Public Service 
Commission 
No Stated Model 
Preference   Regulator SOUTHWEST 
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APPENDIX G 
Comparison of U.S. Regional Transmission Organizations
  
1
9
1
 
 
 CAISO ERCOT ISO-NE MISO NYISO PJM SPP 
Jurisdiction  Single state  
(~80% of CA 
and small 
part of NV)  
Single state 
not synch-
ronously 
intercom-
nected 
Six states All or parts 
of 15 states 
and one 
province 
Single state All or parts 
of 13 states 
and DC 
14 states 
Energy 
Market 
Operation 
1998 
Wholesale 
2002 Retail 
2003 
Wholesale 
1999 
Wholesale 
2005 
Wholesale 
1999 
Wholesale 
1997 
Wholesale 
2007 
Imbalance 
2014 
Wholesale 
Incorporation 501 c (3) 
public 
benefit 
status 
501 c (4) 
community 
welfare 
status 
501 c (3) 
public 
benefit 
status 
501 c (4) 
community 
welfare 
status 
501 c (3) 
public 
benefit 
status 
LLC 501 c (3) 
public 
benefit 
status 
Market 
Participants 
100+ 160+ 400+ 175+ 400+ >960 93 
Population 
Served 
~30 million  ~ 23 million ~14 million  ~48 million  ~19.5 
million 
~ 61 million  ~18 million 
  
1
9
2
 
 CAISO ERCOT ISO-NE MISO NYISO PJM SPP 
Generation 
Capacity 
60,000 MW 75,964 MW 31,000 MW 180,711 MW 39,000 MW 171,648 MW 78,953 MW 
Peak Demand 50,000 MW 69,600 MW 28,000 MW  127,100 MW 31,100 MW 165,500 MW 45,300 MW 
Transmission 
Lines 
26,000 miles 46,500 miles 8,500 miles 65,800 miles 11,000 miles >81,000 
miles 
60,000 miles 
Transmission 
Owners 
18 8a 21 48 8 14 voting  
38 affiliated 
43 
State 
Regulator 
Relationship 
State 
Governor 
Appointment 
of Board 
State PUC 
Oversight 
NE States 
Committee 
on Electricity 
and NE 
Conference 
of Public 
Utilities 
Commis-
sioners 
Organization 
of  
MISO States 
State PUC 
Oversight 
Organization 
of  
PJM States 
Regional 
State 
Committee 
  
1
9
3
 
 CAISO ERCOT ISO-NE MISO NYISO PJM SPP 
Authorization   1996 = 
California 
Stat.  
1997 = FERC 
1995 = Texas 
Stat.; Not 
subject to 
FPA §203, 
205, 206 
1997 = FERC 2001 = FERC  1998 = FERC 1997 = FERC 2004 = FERC 
History Not a power 
pool legacy 
Texas 
Intercon-
nection 
System 
(1941); 
ERCOT 
(1970) 
New England 
Power Pool 
(1971); ISO 
(1997); RTO 
(2005) 
Not a power 
pool legacy 
New York 
Power Pool 
(1965) 
PJM Power 
Pool (1927); 
ISO (1997) 
RTO (2002) 
Southwest 
Power Pool 
(1941) 
Industry 
Structure: 
Output from 
Independent  
Power b, c 
41%  = CA 57% = TX > 66% = 5 
states4 
< 33% = 12 
states 
 
>33%< 66% 
= TX 
 
>66% = IL, 
MT 
62% = NY < 33% = 7 
states 
 
>33% < 66% 
= WV 
 
>66% = DE, IL, 
MD, NJ, PA 
< 33% = 12 
states 
 
>33% < 66% 
= TX 
 
>66% = MT 
  
1
9
4
 
 CAISO ERCOT ISO-NE MISO NYISO PJM SPP 
Industry 
Structure: 
Sales from 
Retail Power  
Marketers b, c  
 8% = CA 61% = TX Zero = VT4 
 
 
< 33% = MA, 
NH 
 
 
>33% < 66% 
= CT, ME 
Zero = 11 
states 
 
< 33% = IL, 
MI, MT 
 
 
>33% < 66% 
= TX 
25% = NY Zero = 6 
states 
 
< 33% = DE, 
IL, MD, 
MI,NJ, OH 
 
>33% < 66% 
= PA 
Zero = 11 
states 
 
< 33% = MI, 
MT 
 
 
>33% < 66% 
= TX 
Curtailment 
of Variable 
Generation 
Dispatchable 
and non-
dispatchable 
variable 
generation 
Dispatch 
based on 
market offer 
Curtail 
generation 
without day-
ahead 
commitment 
Dispatchable 
and non-
dispatchable 
variable 
generation 
Dispatch 
based on 
market offer 
Dispatch 
based on 
market offer 
Dispatchable 
and non-
dispatchable 
variable 
generation 
SOURCES: (Borenstein & Bushnell, 2015; California Independent System Operator, 2015; Electric Reliability Council of Texas, 
n.d.; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, n.d.-a; Fernandez, 2011; Independent System Operator of New England, n.d.; 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator, n.d.; New York Independent System Operator, n.d.; PJM Interconnection, n.d.; 
Potomac Economics, 2016; Southwest Power Pool, n.d., 2014; Utility Variable Generation Integration Group, 2015)  
 
 
